



**AN ASYMMETRICAL LOOK AT AIR FORCE HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT:
MORE EMPHASIS ON QUALIFICATIONS AND LESS ON RANK**

THESIS

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AFIT/GLM/ENV/06-02

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Abstract

This research explored an asymmetrical concept of personnel management, specifically whether status, rank, is an artificial barrier to employing qualified enlisted personnel in some company grade officer duties. It takes the approach under the Human Capital Theory and questions whether rank plays a role in effective performance and whether eliminating rank as a criterion to employment, in some duties, can support Air Force transformation efforts, without negatively affecting culture (i.e. chain-of-command, customs and courtesies). It describes a concept where more emphasis is put on meeting the knowledge, education, experience, and training qualifications and the required rank be interchangeable between enlisted and officer airmen. Key support factors include: increase in enlisted education level; reduction in end strength; undermanned career fields; and salary difference between enlisted and officer airmen.

Some of the findings were statistically implausible due to limitations in the data and offered no significant data but other findings were significant and lend themselves toward the idea that status has little affect on one's ability to perform effectively. This research also provided extensive qualitative information that indicates managing personnel knowledge is the important aspect of human capital management.

This concept is not intended to be a model of equality toward all airmen but is attempting to increase the capability of the Air Force within the existing manpower and budget constraints by putting the right person, in the right place, at the right time.

To all enlisted: past, present, future

Acknowledgments

I think if we truthfully reflect on who we are and how we got here we will discover a debt to others that spans our life time. Further, there is never a single event that decides who we are or what we will become; it takes a combination of life experiences with support from many people, known and unknown. I wish to acknowledge all of these persons here. It is also necessary to specifically acknowledge those people who have directly supported me throughout the course of my thesis effort: Major Carolyn Macola, Dr. Alan Johnson, and Dr. Albert Robbert. I am indebted to these exceptional doctors for it was their guidance and support that led to my success. Their patience, knowledge, and experience were invaluable in keeping my efforts in focus and on schedule. Above all, I must thank my wife and son for their undying patience, understanding, and support – I love you.

Daniel M. Romano, CMSgt

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AN ASYMMETRICAL LOOK AT AIR FORCE HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT:
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I. Introduction

Military Transformation

Transformation is meant to identify, leverage and even create new underlying principles for the way things are done. Transformation is meant to identify and leverage new sources of power. The overall objective of these changes is simply – sustained American competitive advantage in warfare.

Vice Admiral (ret) Arthur K. Cebrowski

Director, Office of Transformation

www.ofot.osd.mil/what_is_transformation.cfm

The above mentioned quote, a ceaseless United States Air Force mission and an uncertain future coupled with a smaller force structure suggests a transformation in personnel management is required in order to sustain the competitive advantage in warfare. In their article “Breaking Ranks: U.S. Commanders Need Flexible Ways to Manage Personnel,” Asch and Hosek specify President George W. Bush proposed a realignment of military forces, bringing 60,000 – 70,000 home from overseas bases and deploy as necessary to help manage military personnel in meet emerging mission needs. Further, the ongoing military transformation, sought by U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, requires a major rethink of personnel management even extending to a shift in military culture. The military personnel system must begin to produce greater variations in career paths to allow greater flexibility in assignments and place a higher value on innovation, intelligent risk taking, and entrepreneurship. One of Asch and Hosek’s

suggested tools to help personnel managers develop airmen for transformation is to provide more choices in job assignments (Asch and Hosek, 2004a:16). Liebowitz states:

The GAO [Government Accounting Office] and OPM [Office of Personnel Management] further stress the need for cultural transformation as a new model for government organizations. These agencies indicate that government organizations will need to become less hierarchical, process-oriented, stovepiped, and inwardly focused. They will need to become more partnerial, results-oriented, integrated, and externally focused. (Liebowitz, 2004:8)

Portions of the U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, pages 31-35, identify the new technology that is transforming aircraft and weapon systems is by no means the beginning or end of transformation. Equally important are the organizational concepts that capitalize on technological advances and allow the Air Force to transform. The Air Force has embraced a new personnel vision and strategic plan to transform its human capital management. The strategy integrates people with technology by determining what personnel capabilities are required to meet the technological advancements and developing the right competencies in airmen to meet mission requirements. The manpower, personnel, and training communities are redefining how the Air Force puts the right people in the right place at the right time with the most effective use of resources. The strategy focuses on the effectiveness of the mission outcome and the required personnel capabilities to meet it. While improving the Air Force's return on investment in its people, this strategy is moving us from a regulatory-established construct to a performance-based construct where the measures of merit are successful mission outcomes. Two of the components of this strategy include: (1) synchronizing training, education, and experience to create innovative, flexible, and capable airmen who can successfully employ air and space power; and (2) implementing a robust strategic

planning construct while understanding the Air Force investment in people (Department of the Air Force, The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, 2004:31-35). The Force Development Branch Guide on Force Development specifies:

We [Air Force] has a smaller force today, one which is experiencing a very high [operation] tempo, while absorbing high technological growth; we must therefore, better utilize the time and effort of our [Air Force] people. It is logical then, that as an institution, we optimize development in the future so our investment in people and their investment in the Air Force best meet the needs of our service and the nation. (AFPC, Force Development Branch Guide on Force Development, 2005:2)

Transformation is a continuous process that will result in the most efficient use of resources. Alternatively, some qualified Air Force personnel could be employed in duties regardless of their rank while not violating the chain-of-command or customs and courtesies.

Importance: Personnel Transformation

Using technology [transactional methods] is one way the personnel management community is undergoing a transformation of how it delivers personnel services and manages its human capital resources. In the Air Force Personnel Center's (AFPC), Force Development Focus, Number Two article, page one, the Personnel Service Delivery transformation is replacing many of the labor intensive processes with web-based, self-service technology (i.e., LeaveWeb, MyPay, Virtual Military Personnel Flight, etc). The plan is to use technology to compensate for a smaller force allowing personnel to perform more value-added work for airmen and commanders (AFPC, Force Development Focus, Number Two, 04:1-3). Also, a force development strategy is being implemented. Force development is multidimensional blending experience, skills, knowledge, and motivation to refine the skills and competencies each airmen hold. Through deliberate career

planning and development, airmen are assigned to meet mission requirements in ways that capitalize on the Air Force's investment in training and education (Department of the Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1, 2004:22). Furthermore, to support the goals of transformation, the values and beliefs that define military culture will have to emphasize innovation and entrepreneurship within the bounds of the military's chain-of-command environment, and recognize the importance of flexibility in managing personnel (Asch and Hosek, 2004b:7). Offering more choices in duty and job assignments to service members could help personnel managers to achieve transformation to meet future mission needs (Asch and Hosek, 2004a:16).

Factors: Enlisted Education, Reduced End Strength, Undermanned Career Fields, and Enlisted/Officer Pay Differences

Enlisted Education

Enlisted personnel in the Air Force are better educated and more technically informed than ever. Advanced skill courses and leadership education are standard and promotions are more centralized and skill-based (Kirby and Naftel 01:2-3). Although a college education is not a duty requirement for enlisted positions (DOD Directive 1304.26, 1993:6), the number of enlisted personnel with master degrees or higher has steadily risen over the past 16 years. Statistics from the AFPC, Enlisted Demographics for FY90 through FY04, showed an increase from 1,338 in FY90 to 1,933 in FY04, (a 30.78% increase). The same source shows the number of enlisted personnel with bachelor degrees in FY90 at 13,862 and 13,065 in FY04. The trend fluctuated, but remained approximately steady with a 5.7 percent drop over all (AFPC, Reports and Data Retrieval Branch, Enlisted Demographics for FY89-FY04, 2005). Additionally, enlisted

personnel have been afforded the opportunity to attend the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) under the Enlisted-to-AFIT Program. The program is in its fourth year and each year approximately eight to ten enlisted personnel are accepted to receive an AFIT master degree. To date, 19 Air Force enlisted personnel have graduated from AFIT, with 19 in the program at this time (nine graduating in March 2005 and ten in March 2006). According to, *The Chief's Sight Picture*, General Jumper maintains that in the future more enlisted men and women will attend AFIT. We are also developing ways to leverage the skills of those who already possess advanced education and examining how other educational programs could support Enlisted Force Development (Jumper 03:1). In contrast to the increase in the number of enlisted personnel with higher education degrees is the reduction of Air Force personnel end strength.

Reduced End Strength

When combining the total number of personnel from the AFPC Enlisted and Officer Demographics for FY90 through FY04, the statistics show a total of 530,863 airmen in FY90 reduced to 374,746 in FY03 (a 29.4 percent drop) (AFPC, Reports and Data Retrieval Branch, Enlisted Demographics for FY89-FY04, Reports and Data Retrieval Branch, Officer Demographics for FY89-FY04, 2005). More recently, the AFPC Interactive Demographic Analysis System (IDEA) shows a force size of 347,474 at the end of November 2005 when combining enlisted and officer demographics, an additional 7.3 percent drop from FY03 (AFPC, IDEA Report, Officer Demographic(s) and AFPC, IDEA Report, Enlisted Demographic(s), 2005). What toll has this reduction taken on the Air Force as an organization? One area has been the increase of critical fields; jobs that require certain skill sets yet the pool of candidates to draw from has shrunken.

Undermanned Career Fields

There are many undermanned career fields in the Air Force that require qualified personnel. For example, the electrical engineering (62ExE) and acquisition manager (63A, program manager) career fields are under strength. The acquisition career field has sufficient lieutenants, but is consistently undermanned at higher ranks; captain, major, and lieutenant colonels are about 78% manned. The manning shortfall could be largely offset if more acquisition officers continued in acquisition assignments (Galway and others, 05:35). The electrical engineering (EE) field is cited the most often as chronically and critically under strength because it is a large field. Although authorizations have been reduced, only 75 percent of the positions are filled and only 66 percent of those positions go beyond the lieutenant grade (Galway and others, 05:25). Many of these duty positions are neither strategic in nature (i.e. those that are not part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command), nor interface with senior echelons, foreign military/governments and outside organizations consistently.

Enlisted/Officer Pay Differences

It is known that the overall cost of employing enlisted personnel is less than that to employ officers. Based on data from the Total Human Resource Managers' Information System, an Air Force reporting and analysis tool that receives end-of month data from major personnel data systems, the average enlisted and officer retirement grade between FY95 and FY05 was Master Sergeant (MSgt) and Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) respectively and the average time-in-service (TIS) is 21.3 and 23.1 years respectively. Using the 2006 basic pay, basic allowance for housing (BAH), with dependents, and

basic allowance for subsistence (BAS), retrieved from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (Department of Defense, Monthly Basic Pay Table, '06 BAH Rates, and BAS Rates, 2006), and a basic 50 percent of basic pay retirement pay at 20 years, Table 1 shows the general difference in payments between a Lt Col and MSgt with in these categories.

Table 1. Lt Col, MSgt Pay Comparison Table.

	Base Pay (TIS, 20 years)	BAH	BAS	Total Pay (Base, BAH, BAS)	50% Basic Pay as Retirement Pay
Lt Col	\$7,003.80	\$1,531.00	\$183.99	\$8,718.79	\$3,396.60
MSgt	\$3,565.80	\$1,010.00	\$267.18	\$4,842.98	\$1,454.10
Difference	\$3,438.00	\$521.00	\$83.19	\$3,875.81	\$1,942.50

It is understood this information about the cost difference is a brief overview but it shows the magnitude of the differences in, base, BAH and BAS pays between a Lt Col and MSgt (\$3,875.81), and retirement pay (\$1,942.50) who serve 20 years of active duty service. This cost difference represents the cost savings of employing enlisted personnel in place of officers in the event both remain in the Air Force for at least 20 years. This example does not imply the Air Force should employ a MSgt in place of a Lt Col. However, in general, it is cheaper for the Air Force to employ enlisted personnel, which could lead to increasing the Air Force's capability assuming Air Force personnel levels are dependent on budgetary concerns.

Even with less end strength, the Air Force is still progressively transforming to meet the challenges of the future. Personnel management transformation is taking full advantage of technology to get the most value-added performance of human capital as

noted previously. However, there appears to be a window of opportunity to explore the possibility of interchanging selected positions with officer or enlisted personnel. Officer and enlisted personnel receive first class educations from similar institutions; are trained or can be trained for similar positions; and have similar experiences that can meet the future needs of the Air Force. However, these highly qualified personnel are then separated by rank, employed separately, with some enlisted personnel not fully utilizing their education, training, and/or experiences that the Air Force has provided.

Purpose

This research investigates whether employing qualified enlisted personnel, in the ranks of technical sergeant (TSgt), master sergeant (MSgt), and senior master sergeant (SMSgt), in duties designated for company grade officers (CGOs), who are employed in non-rated, non-strategic technical and management duty positions, is an acceptable realignment of human capital and supports current Air Force transformation efforts. This research will briefly cover the affects this concept has on Air Force organizational culture. The factors discussed above: increase in enlisted education; reduction in end strength; undermanned career fields; and enlisted/officer pay differences are the rationale for this research but will not be analyzed any further.

Figure 1 below simply illustrates that some duty positions are commensurate with the respective education, training, and experience of both enlisted and officer personnel. Both ranks can share employment in this area (non rank dependent), which could increase manning flexibility for the personnel management system, potentially reducing several under strength retention problems and supporting personnel management transformation.




Figure 1. Potential Enlisted, Officer Force Overlap.

The premise of this research is that the Air Force could benefit more if qualified enlisted personnel were employed in some specialties currently reserved for company grade officers. In essence, based on the AFPC Enlisted Demographic education statistics above, the Air Force has 13,065 enlisted personnel with bachelors degrees and 1,933 enlisted personnel with masters degrees that are employed in positions where a high school diploma is desirable but not mandatory (DOD Directive 1304.26, 1993:6). This gap between not requiring a college education for the position, combined with enlisted personnel who because of their rank, are not considered for other duties commensurate with their respective education level, raises the question of why is the Air Force not better utilizing this segment of its human capital? This is not to say that all the Air Force's return on investment is lost by employing enlisted personnel in non degree required duties; any educated Air Force member can improve their organization, regardless of the level of organization in which they serve. However, there are approximately 15,000 college educated enlisted personnel, which is an untapped resource that if leveraged could increase the Air Force's capability at the same time lowering personnel employment costs. Enlisted personnel who under the current method (i.e., maintain full time Air Force job and attend night school using tuition assistance, etc) receive a

bachelors degree in the appropriate field and have or can receive any appropriate training could be considered for some of the same assignments as CGOs, who have the same education and training. The Air Force, through its educational services programs, pays for a significant amount of enlisted personnel's education cost and only sometimes requires an additional time-in-service commitment. Flamholtz and Lacey indicate that:

If a company offers to pay for MBA training for its employees, that company should be able to offer a lower wage than other similar companies which do not have such a plan. Alternatively, this training could be viewed as a fringe benefit offered to employees who are expected to stay with the firm. Providing such training as a fringe benefit expresses the firm's interest in the employee's development (Flamholtz and Lacey, 1981:40).

Furthermore, TSgt, MSgt, and SMSgts may bring more on-the-job experience to these CGO positions because of their time in service, experience in management, and technical knowledge in fields they were previously assigned. Authorizing the employment of these enlisted personnel in duties commensurate with their education, training, and experience levels may improve the manning levels in under strength specialties; thereby, reducing the number of critical fields and saving the Air Force money by not having to provide bonus pay as it currently does.

This thesis research will follow a qualitative approach using the human capital theory (HCT) as a basis to ultimately suggest that this interchanging rank concept is a method of strategic management of human capital that will support transformation. The focus will be to determine (1) if rank is an artificial barrier and whether rank can be eliminated as a criterion to employment, in some situations, without violating the chain-of-command or customs and courtesies; (2) whether this potential interchangeable rank concept approach to personnel management supports personnel management

transformation; and (3) if this significantly affects Air Force culture with a focus on chain-of-command and customs and courtesies. Surveys will be used to collect research data.

Research Questions

This research seeks to answer the following questions:

- What effect would rank have on one's ability to perform effectively in accordance with existing Air Force criteria?
- What effect would this interchangeable rank concept have on personnel transformation efforts?
- What effect would this interchangeable rank concept have on Air Force culture?

Overview of Remaining Chapters

This chapter briefly introduced Air Force personnel transformation efforts. It discussed that personnel transformation as well as technology are required to meet the challenges ahead. It acknowledged Personnel Service Delivery and force development as the Air Force's approaches to personnel transformation. It then identified factors such as the increase in education level of enlisted personnel, the reduction of Air Force personnel, the under strength of some company grade office career fields and the cost difference in employing enlisted versus officer airmen. Finally, it introduced the interchangeable rank concept in some CGO positions, allowing qualified enlisted personnel to fill some CGO positions as an acceptable concept to personnel management, while supporting transformation and not negatively affecting Air Force culture, chain of command or customs and courtesies.

As an overview of the remaining research, chapter II will review surrounding literature to gain insight into HCT, transformation, and organizational culture and how they relate to the Air Force. Chapter III will examine the methodology used in this research and chapter IV will explain the results. Finally, chapter V will summarize and conclude the research as well as provide opportunities for future research.

II. Literature Review

Preface

Numerous publications have been written about Human Capital Theory (HCT) and its relationship to the overall strategic management of a business/agency. The following literature review starts with a brief history of HCT. It continues by tracing HCT from D. M. McGregor's "Theory X, Theory Y," then describes HCT as a strategic resource through the 21st century. The review then gives a federal government view point of HCT, then the Department of Defense and finally the Air Force. It continues with a brief history of the enlisted force and ends with a discussion about organizational culture.

Due to the narrowness of this subject, available public literature does not specifically address whether eliminating the criterion of rank and allowing the interchanging of enlisted personnel and company grade officers in some technical and management duty positions, based on established qualification required to perform effectively, has an effect on the Air Force as an organization. Creswell suggests one of the chief reasons for conducting a qualitative study is that the study is exploratory; not much has been written about the topic or population being studied, and the researcher seeks to listen to informants and to build a picture based on their ideas (Creswell, 1994:21). The issues to consider are: (1) does interchanging rank in some duties have an effect on effective performance?; (2) does interchanging rank support Air Force personnel transformation efforts?; and (3) does interchanging rank affect the Air Force's organizational culture?

Human Capital Theory (HCT)

HCT is not a new field. Machlup explains the first estimate of a nation's stock of human capital was probably made around 1676 by Sir William Petty; however, Petty did not use his estimate in support of any substantive hypothesis or in connection with any theoretical model for the derivation of causal connection. Human capital (HC) had been part of the economic and statistical literature for almost 300 years before it became popular by Schultz and Becker in the 1950s. Theodore Schultz applied the notion of human capital to the economics of education, particularly to an explanation of the increase in productivity of human resources; he also examined the relationship between human capital and economic growth. Becker engaged in more technical research in mathematical and statistical economics, computing rates of return to the investments people have made in their own skills and efficiency in self improvement through schooling and training. Schultz (1970) as reported by Flamholtz and Lacey denotes since then, the growth of the study of HCT was due to the unexplained rise in economic value of man that led to the concept of human capital. Schultz (1961) also explains the development of HCT is the result of an attempt to explain the differences in income and productivity between human beings as well as between nations (Flamholtz and Lacey, 1981:19-20).

Human Capital Definition Overview

HCT has been defined from several personnel and organizational view-points. Davenport explains that Schultz (1961) was the first to use the term human capital in his article, *Investment in Human Capital*. Since then, other economists have assigned several other terms to human capital but most agree that human capital comprises skills,

experience, and knowledge. Some, like Becker, added personality, appearance, reputation, and credentials to the definition and management consultant Richard Crawford suggests human capital consists of skilled and educated people (Davenport 1999:18-19). Flamholtz and Lacey indicate it is the premise of HCT that expenditures on human beings constitute investments, which will produce future returns. Their HCT is based on the concept that people possess skills, experience, and knowledge, which can be viewed as a form of capital. Expenditures on education, training, and health are viewed as investments from which returns are expected to flow in the form of increased productivity and wages. Often human capital results tie back to personal growth and earnings from investing in one self; however, Flamholtz and Lacey cite Mayer, Fama, and Schwert as saying this HCT can be extended from individuals to organizations. In analysis, inexplicable differences in return on equity and in growth rates among firms can be found. Differences in human capital available to firms may explain these observed variations in return. Flamholtz and Lacey continue that HCT is intended to explain why individuals invest in themselves and how such investments affect their earnings as well as show how organizations behave in decisions involving acquisition, development (training) and conservation of those who possess human capital. This does not assume the organization owns the individuals possessing the human capital but that the organization can act as though the individuals are part of its capital (Flamholtz and Lacey, 1981:3-29). More recently, Liebowitz defines human capital as the collective experience, knowledge, and expertise of those contributing to an organization's mission. His primary interest is in the organization's employees and the knowledge they hold. Liebowitz also uses Josefek and Kauffman's definition: the stock of knowledge, skills,

and abilities embedded in an individual that result from natural endowment and subsequent investment in education, training, and experience (Liebowitz, 2004:2). One of the well-documented facts of modern labor economics is that education and training, or what economists call human capital investments, have high payoff in terms of income and productivity. Increases in human capital have traditionally translated into rising productivity and growth in earnings (Denison 1985:15).

Schultz (1971) as reported by Eugene B. McGregor Jr. in his book *Strategic Management of Human Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities*, explains human capital investments can take many forms: improved selection methodologies, smart recruitment systems, supportive compensation systems, education, on-the-job training, manpower migration, health maintenance, and research and development (R&D) activity. HC is defined not by the number of available workers, but by what the workers are capable of doing (McGregor E. B., 1991:26). McGregor continues that worker capability, however, is itself a multifaceted and extremely slippery notion. Becker (1964), Schultz (1971) and Thurow (1970) state:

Theoretical formulations suggest that HC can be divided into general and specific categories. General HC consists of the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) that are common to many jobs and employers. *Specific* HC are the KSAs uniquely preferred and valued by a single employer. In general, the task is to manage the portfolio of KSAs against the changing requirements of jobs designed to fulfill the missions of agencies and corporations. Thus, managers will need to be evaluated not only on the extent to which they meet nominal productivity goals but also on "their stewardship regarding the enhancement of the HC assigned to them" (Fossum et. Al., 1986, p. 372). (McGregor E. B., 1991:26).

From Douglas M. McGregor's Theory X and Theory Y to the 21st Century

This section will synopsize the overarching organizational theory that HCT falls under and afterwards, a brief look to the future of how HCT can be used as a strategic management tool for the Air Force in its current transformation efforts.

For a long time, managers have been interested in the behavior of people in organizations. However, it has only been since about 1957 when basic assumptions about the relationship between organizations and people truly began to change. It was this change that led to organizational behavior perspective or human resource theory (HRT) (Shafritz and Ott, 2001:147). Shafritz and Ott point out HRT draws on a body of research and theory built around four basic assumptions: 1) organizations exist to serve human needs (rather than the reverse); 2) organizations and people need each other; 3) when the fit between the individual and the organization is poor, one or both will suffer; and 4) as reported by Shafritz and Ott, Bolman and Deal (1997, pp. 102, 103) a good fit between individual and organization benefits both human beings find meaningful and satisfying work and organizations get the human talent and energy that they need (Shafritz and Ott, 2001:146).

HCM's basics roots lie within one of HRT's areas of motivation. One motivation theory is Douglas M. McGregor's "Theory X and Theory Y." In his article "The Human Side of Enterprise," D. M. McGregor articulates how managerial assumptions about employees become self-fulfilling prophecies; managerial assumptions cause employee behavior. He labeled two sets of contrasting assumptions "Theory X" and "Theory Y," both of which are ways of seeing and thinking about people that, in turn, affect their behavior. Theory X represents a restatement of the tenets of the scientific management

movement. Theory X holds that human beings inherently dislike work and will avoid it if possible; most people must be coerced, controlled, directed, or threatened with punishment to get them to work toward achievement of organizational objectives. Humans prefer to be directed and to avoid responsibility and will seek security above all else. In contrast, Theory Y suggests that people are not passive and do not inherently dislike work and that work can be a source of satisfaction. People will exercise self-direction and self-control, if they are committed to organization objectives. People will seek to accept responsibility; avoidance of responsibility is not natural; it is a consequence of experiences. The essential task of management is to arrange organizational conditions and methods so people can achieve their own goals by directing their efforts toward organizational objectives. This is the process of creating opportunities, releasing potential, removing obstacles, encouraging growth, and providing guidance. It is what Peter Drucker has called “management by objectives” in contrast to “management by control.” It does not involve the abdication of management, the absence of leadership, the lowering of standards, or the other characteristics usually associated with the approach under Theory X. With D. M. McGregor’s work as a basis, organizational behavior assumes that under the right circumstances, people and organizations will grow and prosper together and that [that even then] the intellectual potential of most humans is only partially utilized at work (Shafritz and Ott, 2001:148-149, 179-184). Kochan, Orlikowski, and Cutcher-Gershenfeld point out while D. M. McGregor’s Theory Y sparked important innovations in human resource practices, it did not challenge fundamental assumptions underpinning the twentieth century organizational model. If, as is widely recognized, human capital and knowledge are the

most important sources of value for the twenty-first-century organization, then fundamental assumptions about the relationship between work and organizations will also need to be challenged (Kochan and Schmalensee, 2003:85, 113). Human capital and knowledge [management] are considered together because they can be linked. Liebowitz defines knowledge management as the process of creating value from an organization's intangible assets; it deals with how to best leverage knowledge that is derived from the organization's human capital. Knowledge management and human capital strategy should be aligned with the organizational mission and strategy in order to maximize the contributions of the organization's human capital (Liebowitz, 2004:11). Both concepts will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

Strategic Management

E. B. McGregor, Jr. explains the:

Awareness of the strategic role of human resources in modern organizations has penetrated management literature and practice (Meyer, 1978; "Personnel Widens," 1979; Douglas, Klein, and Hunt 1985; Fombrun, Tichy, and Devanna, 1984; Odiorne, 1984). A few prescient analysts (Machlup, 1962; Chorafus, 1968; Drucker, 1968; Shultz, 1971) grasped early the significance of human resources in information-based societies and economies. For the most part, however, social scientists and practitioners have been slow to understand the profound changes required when trained intelligence is the critical ingredient required in what is now commonly referred to as the postindustrial age. (McGregor E. B., 1991:9-10)

E. B. McGregor explains that a discontinuity exists in this postindustrial age.

McGregor writes that Brickner (1981), *Scientific American* (1982), and Reich (1983) indicate that when final products are physical things or routine services, the workforce is significant only at an operational or tactical level. When the final products are smart products and complex services, humans and their knowledge become the critical input

and are inseparable from the final output. Thus, what is strategic about strategic human resource management is the management of the workforce's knowledge so that this resource is converted into final knowledge products and ever-changing production techniques. It means that productivity is increasingly linked to the trained human intellect. In postindustrial systems, occupation refers less to a position in a production process and more to classes of work based on knowledge and skill requirements (McGregor E. B., 1991:11-12). Human capital can be linked to knowledge management, which is the process of creating value from an organization's intangible assets. Knowledge management deals with how best to leverage the knowledge throughout the organization. This knowledge base is derived from the organization's human capital. The knowledge management and human capital strategy should be aligned with the organizational mission and strategy in order to maximize the contributions of the organization's human capital. Knowledge management should be a key pillar in an organization's human capital strategy. (Liebowitz 2004: 11, 14). The transformation in work systems underway today involves a shift from industrial to knowledge-based work systems that blur the lines between managerial and non-managerial work. These systems assume that in a knowledge-based economy, high levels of performance can only be achieved by organizing work in ways that allow workers to use and deepen their knowledge and skills, with an emphasis on horizontal interrelationships among diverse groups and the coordinated use of teams, cross-functional task forces, and cross-organizational alliances and networks (Kochan and Schmalensee, 2003:89-90). The strategic importance of human capital changes forever the way both public and private

sector managers must think about workforce management (McGregor E. B., 1991:12).

This in turn will affect the way organizations meet future challenges.

E. B. McGregor then explains that the workforce management problem is to give operational meaning to the idea that it [the problem] involves making the right people available in the right place at the right time, defining “the right people” based on either the products they produce or their functional role in the production process, or the knowledge, skill, and abilities they possess. The latter is particularly important where knowledge-intensive technology is strategic to the final outcome. Typically, personnel management offices and managers, who concentrate on the individual persons of a bureau or agency, focus only on one small piece of the puzzle. More strategically positioned personnel offices work with the issues associated with the human resources required to achieve [organizational] goals. They start the workforce management discussion on the requirements side and make a deliberate connection with the workforce availability (McGregor E. B., 1991: 60, 68).

Is human capital management concerned with the human or the knowledge the human holds? Liebowitz suggests if people form the body of an organization, then their knowledge is the blood that keeps the organization alive. As a result, management of that knowledge (“knowledge management”) must be a central part of an organization’s human capital strategy (Liebowitz, 2004:63). Experts on intellectual capital as reported by Marr say human capital is often defined as part of intellectual capital or the intangible resources of firms, which many believe is the most important intangible resource of firms. Guy Ahonen (2000) emphasizes that human capital is the only generative intangible and the central element of intellectual capital. Barney (1991) says as a

resource [intellectual capital] contributes to a sustainable competitive advantage if it is valuable, rare, difficult to imitate, or hard to substitute. Teece (1998) adds that this means that a competitive advantage of firms in today's economy does not result from market position by difficult-to-replicate knowledge-based assets and the manner they are developed. Teece (et al. 1997) goes on to say this understanding led to the development of another concept in strategic management; the dynamic capability, which is the ability to achieve new forms of competitive advantage by appropriately adapting, integrating, and reconfiguring organizational skills, resources, and competencies to match the requirements of a changing environment (Marr, 2005:30, 96). This synopsis provides a brief overview of HCT as it relates to HRT and some various distinctions between knowledge management, human capital and intellectual capital. Next, the review highlights some literature that focuses on HCT within the federal government.

A Federal Focus of Human Capital

Liebowitz cites Susannah Figura's article, *Human Capital: The Missing Link*, in Government Executive Magazine:

most federal managers and human resources specialists are still more focused on short-term needs than long-term ones. It would be better for human resources departments to be rated on a more strategic scale rather than a tactical one. Such rating criteria might be: conducts strategic analysis of present and future human resources needs and workforce planning; able to obtain needed employees; able to maintain a workforce with a mix of skills that matches its needs; and ability to motivate and reward employees to support strategic and performance goals. (Liebowitz 2004: 6)

In December 2002, the General Accounting Office (GAO) published a report for the Secretary of Defense, *Military Personnel: Oversight Process Needed to Help Maintain Momentum of DOD's Strategic Human Capital Planning*. It indicates in

January 2001, the GAO designated strategic human capital management as a government-wide, high-risk area and stated that one of the pervasive human capital challenges facing federal government was a lack of strategic human capital planning and organizational alignment and the President, in August 2001, placed human capital at the top of his management agenda and (GAO 2002b:4). The GAO released *A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management* that identified four critical cornerstones and eight critical success factors for managing human capital strategically. Figure 2 shows these cornerstones and success factors.




Figure 2. GAO Model (GAO 2002a:8).

All of the critical success factors reflect two principles that are central to the human capital idea: (1) People are assets whose value can be enhanced through investment. As with any investment, the goal is to maximize value while managing risk and (2) an organization's human capital approaches should be designed, implemented, and assessed by the standard of how well they help the organization achieve results and pursue its mission. For each of the eight critical success factors noted in Figure 2, Figure 3 describes three levels of managing people that are typical of an organization. Level one is unlikely to have effectively put the two principles into practice; level two is where organizations are taking steps to apply them; and level three, being the ultimate level, is where an organization has made these principles an integral part of its approach to doing business, and can see demonstrable results for having done so. Progressing to level three, which every agency strive to accomplish, will take considerable time, effort, and resources on behalf of organizational leadership to successfully manage the required change and will take long-term commitment to value human capital as a strategic asset. (GAO 2002a:8-9)




Figure 3. GAO Approaches to Human Capital Management (GAO 2002a:9).

Highlighting the integration and alignment factor that falls under the strategic human capital planning cornerstone, the GAO report indicates:

Effective organizations integrate human capital approaches as strategies for accomplishing their mission as well as programmatic goals and results. Furthermore, high performing organizations stay alert to emerging mission demands and human capital challenges and remain open to reevaluating their

human capital practices in light of their demonstrated successes or failures in achieving the organization's strategic objectives. (GAO 2002:20-21)

21st Century

The direction of human capital management in the 21st century was discussed in a GAO testimony, "Human Capital: Managing Human Capital in the 21st Century:"

as the value of people increases, so does the performance capacity of the organization, and therefore its value to clients and other stakeholders. As with any investment, the goal is to maximize value while managing risk. Second, an organization's human capital approaches must be aligned to support the mission, vision for the future, core values, goals, and strategies by which the organization has defined its direction and its expectations for itself and its people. An organization's human capital policies and practices should be designed, implemented, and assessed by the standard of how well they help the organization pursue these intents and achieve related results. It is clear that, in many government entities, the transition to performance management – and along with it, to strategic human capital management – will require a cultural transformation. Hierarchical management approaches will need to yield to partnertial approaches. Process oriented ways of doing business will need to yield to results oriented ones. And siloed organizations will need to become integrated organizations if they expect to make the most of the knowledge, skills, and abilities of their people. (GAO 2000:7)

Next, this literature review focuses on the Air Force and its HC strategy.

Air Force Human Capital

Until this point, the literature in this review discussed human capital from a civilian, commercial business, point-of-view. However, the GAO report, *Human Capital: Major Human Capital Challenges at the Department of Defense and State*, states the human capital issues for the Department of Defense are not fundamentally different from those facing other federal agencies today. The human capital problems of the Department of Defense can be seen as part of a broader pattern of human capital weaknesses that have eroded mission capabilities across the federal government. Human

capital remains as the critical link to reforming and modernizing the federal government's management practices (GAO 2001: 1-2).

Air Force Flight Plan

Summarizing the Air Force's Human Capital Management Transformation according to The U.S. Air Force Transformational Flight Plan explains that as part of the new Total Force Development construct, a new personnel vision and strategic plan to transform human capital management has been adopted. The strategy integrates people with technology by defining required human capabilities and developing the right competencies in airmen to meet mission requirements. Facilitated through organizational alignment, business process transformation and reengineered delivery systems, the manpower, personnel and training communities are optimizing how the Air Force puts the right people in the right place at the right time for the most effective use of resources. The intent is to transform the Air Force personnel system to be agile and responsive to changing requirements while efficiently serving all airmen. It was clear the personnel community needed to shift thinking from how to meet a given threat to thinking in terms of developing capabilities for war fighters, which resulted in a new Personnel Vision and a Personnel Strategic Plan. This led to a new set of goals focused on a transformed view of the traditional personnel lifecycle. The new Personnel Strategic Plan supports the President's Management Agenda, incorporates feedback from a recent GAO report, and is directly linked to the new Air Force core competencies. Accordingly, the effects-based strategy focuses on mission outcomes and required capabilities while optimizing the Air Force's return on investment in its people and moves us from a regulatory-based construct to a performance-based construct where the measures of merit are successful.

mission outcomes (Department of the Air Force, The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, 2004:34-35).

Force Development

The Force Development Construct grew out of a Chief of Staff of the Air Force initiative launched in July 1999 to examine and recommend actions necessary to prepare the Air Force Total Force for the 21st Century. The intent was a transition in Total Force development from a rigid, one size fits all, with functionally independent career path pyramids, to a flexible, competency-based, deliberate development model that rests on institutional needs and requirements. Force Development will be executed in three parts — Officer, Enlisted, and Civilian across the active and reserve components (Department of the Air Force, Air Force Handbook 2003:22). The Force Development Branch Guide on Force Development elaborates that civilian, reserve, guard, and enlisted force development will execute initiatives using officer force development as a benchmark. Force Development is executed through the Development Team Meeting Process and has three distinct phases: administrative, execution, and analysis (AFPC, Force Development Branch Guide on Force Development, 2005:7).

The purpose of the total force policy is to provide key leadership policies for managing human resource and career field development at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels through Total Force Development. The goal is to better prepare our total force to successfully lead and accomplish rapidly evolving global missions, while fulfilling airmen's personal and professional expectations to the greatest extent possible consistent with mission accomplishment (Department of the Air Force, Air Force Policy Directive 36-26, 2004:1). Further defined, force development is a series of experiences

and challenges, combined with education and training opportunities, that are directed at producing airmen who possess the requisite skills, knowledge, experience, and motivation to lead and execute the full spectrum of Air Force missions. Force development programs specify how the Air Force leverages its investment in its people. The Air Force has determined there are clearly identifiable skill requirements for airmen who have experiences in more than one connected career area. Force development defines the occupational skill combinations and then facilitates the education, training, and assignment processes to produce a sufficient capability within the personnel inventory. Force development is executed through policies, force management strategies, and prioritization of resources. Finally, these programmatic decisions are executed through deliberate management of Air Force programs and operations in the field to achieve the desired objectives (AFDD 1-1, 2004:14-15).

Force development processes are focused to produce and maximize the capabilities of airmen. When force development shifts its primary focus to tactical processes or individual aims, airmen can be erroneously viewed as commodities, and the whole force suffers. Effective integration of force development is centered on capability-based requirements. Education and training are critical components of the force development construct and represent a large investment of resources and are the primary tools in developing airmen (AFDD 1-1, 2004:19-24).

Finally, the Air Force Handbook describes force development as:

is doctrinally based and focuses on three levels: (1) tactical - gaining knowledge and experience in primary skill, combined with education and training experiences; (2) operational - continued widening of experience and increased responsibility within a related family of skills; and (3) strategic - developing a full breadth of experience and leadership perspective at the joint, inter-governmental,

and international levels. Force Development provides individuals with tailored, connected education and training to appropriately prepare them for an additional Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC). These AFSC pairings are based on Air Force requirements, providing the Air Force its necessary leadership talent and the individual with a higher level of mission competence. Force Development will provide a competency based development process by connecting the depth of expertise in the individual's primary career field (AFSC) with the necessary education, training and experiences to produce more capable and diversified leaders. (Department of the Air Force, Air Force Handbook 2003:22)

Air Force Specialties

How does the Air Force define human capital? Air Force human capital can be defined using the Officer and Enlisted Classification Air Force Instructions (AFI) 36-2105 and 36-2108, respectively. In general, both AFI 36-2105, Officer Classification, and AFI 36-2108, Enlisted Classification, describes the mandatory standards of each specialty job qualification for effective performance in terms of "knowledge," "education," "experience," "training," and "other" such as physical standards, security clearances, certifications, etc. The definition of each term, as described in both AFI 36-2105 and AFI 36-2108, are generally the same, but each AFI uses different wording. Neither instruction defines duties inherent to all officers or enlisted airmen comprehensively (Department of the Air Force, AFI 36-2105, 2004:6 and AFI 36-2108, 2004:7). All Air Force specialties are described in one of these AFIs, which are divided by enlisted and officer rank categories. This shows rank is the first qualifier that classifies officer duties (AFI 36-2105) from enlisted duties (AFI 36-2108) and is the first role in the employment selection process for Air Force airmen and is part of its organizational culture. The Air Force has non-rated, mid-level technical and management duties that are filled by company grade officers where their status associated with rank is not critical (i.e. their function is not strategic and interface with senior

echelons, foreign military/governments and outside organizations is limited) and these duties could be performed by anyone who meets the qualifications, regardless of rank.

Generally, certain officer ranks are tied to each level of force development. As an example, Figure 4, shows the career pyramid for a, 63A, Acquisition Manager. It can be seen that company grade officers are generally employed at the tactical level; majors and Lieutenant Colonels at the operational level; and mainly colonels the strategic level. It is at the tactical level rank that there is often little importance of the rank of the person in the duty position due to the lack of supervisory requirements. It is at this lower level that the interchangeable rank concept can be useful. Next will be a brief look at the Air Force's enlisted history.

63A Acquisition Manager

Career Pyramid




Figure 4. Acquisition Manager Career Pyramid
(Head Quarters AFPC Career Planning Diagrams & Utilization Charts, 2006)

Enlisted as a Career Force

Since the establishment of the National Security Act in 1947, United States Air Force (USAF) enlisted personnel have played a vital role in making the USAF an exceptional independent service. The start of a career enlisted force, to support the independent USAF, began in 1954 with the signing of a memorandum by Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson that eliminated joint Army and Air Force recruiting (Grandstaff, 1997:94). During this period of time of post Korean War exodus, enlisted personnel retention was low and the Womble Committee Report studied retention to explain why services were losing personnel and what specific actions could be taken to reverse the poor retention trend (Grandstaff, 1997:173). The USAF findings showed the most competent personnel enlisted for the training, to escape the draft, or to find college training and used the USAF as a stepping stone and did not see the USAF as a career (Grandstaff, 1997:180). To improve retention, retaining competent enlisted workers was stressed, which was a significant shift in Air Force thought. The Air Force was relying on highly skilled workers but took actions to retain career minded personnel, recognizing that older, possibly married members, in their second reenlistment were valuable to the stability of the Air Force. Some of the incentives used to retain enlisted personnel were: specialized skills training to meet the demand of increasing technology; encouraged off-duty education; and started tuition assistance programs. Noncommissioned officer (NCO) academies were established and enlisted career paths were developed to standardized training and promotion requirements. One of the most important changes was base commanders assigning certain officers' jobs to NCOs such as supply officers, records management (jobs usually assigned to field grade officers (major and above), and

training specialists (Grandstaff, 1997:184). By fiscal year 1957, first term reenlistment rates increased an average of 128 percent and career retention increased from 70.2 percent to 91.4 percent and the USAF continued to focus on retaining only individuals capable of comprehending technical training and those willing to make the USAF a career (Grandstaff, 1997:187). These changes were the start of an experienced, career enlisted force. Over the next 20 years, additional changes took place that recognized enlisted personnel's leadership and management capabilities. In 1958, the warrant officer ranks were eliminated and the ranks of senior master sergeant and chief master sergeant were created [further increasing the responsibilities levied on enlisted personnel]. The expertise and skills of NCOs continued as officers vacated more jurisdictional space to them, and they began to serve in the Titan program as missile launch officers and in the top rungs of middle management (Grandstaff, 1997:195). This was the start of a career enlisted force but Kirby and Naftel explain that although "careers" for officers have been the subject of debate in the United States for over 200 years, the idea of careers for enlisted members of the military services is a relatively recent development. Since the beginning of the All Volunteer Force in 1973, career considerations have come to the forefront. How enlisted members are accessed, trained, promoted, and transitioned has also changed significantly over the years (Kirby and Naftel 2001:2-3). Most of these changes, that make the enlisted force a career force, are still in effect and since 1973 enlisted personnel have continued to become more knowledgeable, educated, trained, and experienced. There are more instances of enlisted personnel performing at levels commensurate with a higher rank such as commandants, senior personnel managers, and

most recently, the Enlisted-to-AFIT program shows promise in the enlisted force and their propensity for increased responsibilities.

So far, this literature review has traced HCT, using HRT as an umbrella, from the civilian to the government to the Air Force perspective. The interchangeable rank concept requires an organizational culture that is capable of embracing it as a change for the better and an increase in capability for the Air Force in the long run.

Organizational Culture

In Shafritz and Ott book “Classics of Organization Theory,” culture is part of organizational life that influences the behavior, attitudes, and overall effectiveness of employees. It is what the employees perceive and how this perception creates a pattern of beliefs, values, and expectations. Edgar Schein (1993) defines culture as a pattern of shared basic assumptions – invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with the problems of external adaptation and internal integration – that has worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. Bohm (1990) says one of the main problems in resolving intercultural issues is that we take culture so much for granted and put so much value on our own assumptions that we find it awkward and inappropriate even to discuss our assumptions or to ask others about their assumptions. We tend not to examine assumptions once we have made them but to take them for granted, and we tend not to discuss them, which makes them seemingly unconscious. If we are forced to discuss them, we tend to examine them but to defend them because we have emotionally invested in them (Shafritz and Ott, 2001:373-374).

An organization that emphasizes rules, policies, procedures, chain of command and centralized decision making has a bureaucratic culture. The military, government agencies, and firms started and managed by autocratic managers are examples of bureaucratic culture (Gibson and others 2003:36). The Air Force is a bureaucratic culture, with the chain of command having a distinction between officer and enlisted personnel. This distinction is often required in order to maintain a clear chain-of-command and control of the forces. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-8 defines command and control as the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission (AFDD 2-8:57). Because of the requirement of a chain-of-command in a military organization, professional relationships are essential to the effective operation of all organizations, both military and civilian, but the nature of the military mission requires absolute confidence in command and an unhesitating adherence to orders that may result in inconvenience, hardships or, at times, injury or death. This distinction makes the maintenance of professional relationships in the military more critical than in civilian organizations (AFI 36-2909:2).

The interchangeable rank concept is not intended to violate our culture in terms of chain-of-command or customs and courtesies and it is further believed that its existence will not accelerate the propensity for personnel, officer and enlisted airmen, to violate the chain-of-command and/or customs and courtesies.

Conclusion

This literature review started with a brief history along with several definitions of HCT. It continued by tracing HCT from D. M. McGregor's "Theory X, Theory Y," then

describes HCT as a strategic resource. The review then gives a federal government view point of HCT, then the Department of Defense and finally the Air Force. It continues with a brief history of the enlisted force, showing increases in capabilities, responsibilities, education, and a propensity toward being career airmen. The review ended with a discussion about organizational culture. Cultural change within an organization challenges the “norm.” HCT growth is an outcome of the technological as well as the conceptualized growth over the past 60 years. The research questions for this thesis, interchangeable rank concept, challenges the Air Force’s organizational culture today; however, its explanation and intent is valid in this era of asymmetrical warfare, reduced airmen end-strength, shrinking budgets, and increases in enlisted human capital.

III. Methodology

Introduction

Data for this research was collected using a web based survey that was sent to a random selection of active duty Air Force airmen between the rank of technical sergeant and colonel throughout the Air Force. Lists of names and associated e-mail addresses were provided from several different locations: CEPME/DOA provided lists of 13,558 NCO academy graduates and 3,503 SNCO academy graduates; and AFCMO provided a list of 4,352 colonels. These three lists were adjusted, removing all non active duty airmen, then each list was alphabetized and a random select of e-mails were selected. The entire lists were not used due to time constraints; 709 personnel were selected from the NCOA list; 840 from the SNCOA list; and 470 from the Colonel list. Also, 947 active duty Air Force students at the AFIT were surveyed that consisted mainly of students between the rank of Second Lieutenant through Major and 22 enlisted students. Finally, AF/DPPF provided a list of 107 enlisted career field managers, which was used in whole.

The rationale behind this method of selecting respondents (other than the career field managers) was the airmen that go to Air Force schools/academies are from all parts of the Air Force, not a focused group such as a select career field or major command. The randomly selected respondents selected from these lists met the rank requirement of this research and was a representative sample of the Air Force. For the purposes of this research, the survey was publicly available from 19 December 2005 through 10 January 2006 at <http://www.afit.edu/en/Surveys/dromano/Survey/>. The survey was sent to a total of 3,073 e-mail addresses and reached 2,758; 315 e-mails returned an administrative

error, therefore, it was considered that the survey did not reach these respondents. Additionally, some respondents commented, via e-mail, that the survey was malfunctioning on the computer he/she was using to complete the survey. These respondents were informed this was a known problem that happened on some computers and that it was an individual computer configuration issue and were advised to try a different computer. Being an anonymous survey and not sure the number of airmen who had a problem and did not mention it, the number of respondents that made one unsuccessful attempt at the survey is unknown.

Questionnaire Design

The questionnaire consisted of 97 items and three comment sections. A cover page was included that described the purpose of the survey and stressed to the respondents that their participation was voluntary and their responses were anonymous. Respondents were asked to select from a six point Likert scale or make a selection based on their personal demographics (i.e. education level, age, etc). Non-Likert scale items were numerically coded so they can be statistically analyzed. For example, an item that required a respondent to answer “yes” or “no,” would have a “yes” response coded as a “one” and a “no” response coded as a “two.” Please see Appendix A for further details about the cover letter and survey. The items used to construct the questionnaire were based on definitions from Air Force guidance. A small portion of the items in the organizational culture section were taken from an existing scale. These items were modified to be specifically relevant to this research.

An informal pilot test of the survey was conducted using eight airmen, four AFIT students and four airmen from other locations (Marietta GA, McGuire AFB NJ, Fairchild

AFB WA, and Okinawa Japan) as well as committee members. The respondents in the pilot study were asked to answer the questionnaire and provide feedback about the language used, directions, layout, ease-of-use, length and clarity. After all necessary changes another pilot test was conducted using approximately 18 AFIT students. These students were briefed on this research topic, then asked to complete the survey to determine the appropriateness of the items for the research. Again, all necessary corrections were made before the final version of the questionnaire was posted on the web-page. None of the pilot test respondents had previous knowledge of the survey.

Coding

The survey was divided into nine sections. Each section of the survey has been coded to keep the data and structure of the methodology in order. For example, section one below relates to section one of the survey and is coded “S1,” section two below relates to section two of the survey and is coded “S2,” etc. Further, code “Q6.21” refers to section six, item (question) 21 and code “Q8.4” refers to section eight, item four.

Statistical Analysis

Statistical data analysis was conducted using *Statistical Package for the Social Sciences* (SPSS), software version 13.0. Appropriate descriptive and inferential statistics were used to analyze the data collected from the questionnaires, with regression analysis, analysis of variance (ANOVA), or independent paired t-tests being the primary means of answering the hypotheses. Factor analysis was used as post hoc analysis to further explore the data.

Multiple regression analysis will be used to determine the correlation between the independent variable(s), moderating variables (when used) and the dependent variable.

When there are two continuous interval or ratio variables, one of which can be identified as an independent variable and the other as a dependent variable, regression analysis is the appropriate technique to measure the relationship between them and assess its significance (Alreck and Settle, 2004:329). When the independent variables are analyzed with the moderating variable separately, the intent is to determine the amount of impact the moderating variable has on the regression model. When the independent variables are analyzed together against the dependent variable, the independent variables will be ordered hierarchically based on the pair comparison results from Section Six (S6).

An ANOVA is the appropriate technique to determine if the mean values of the dependent variable for each category of the independent variable are significantly different. A paired t-test is used when there are only two categories/means, a special case of an ANOVA (Alreck and Settle 2004:318).

Before statistically analyzing the data, SPSS cross-tabbing was used to determine errors, missing data, etc as well as any trends that may be evident. SPSS crosstabs produce “two-way to n-way” cross-tabulations for variables that have a limited number or string values. In addition to cell count, cell percentages, expected values, residuals, and optional measures of association can be obtained (SPSS Users Guide, 1986:337). Each case was examined to determine whether the responses to the items were sound overall and was based on the amount of missing data and number and type of mistakes found when cross-tabbing the data. For example, a respondent indicating his or her age as 21 year old and rank as a major, or if none of the demographic data were completed, would be indications of unreliable data. The remainder of this chapter describes each section of

the questionnaire in more detail along with information about the methodology and statistical analysis used to analyze the data and answer the hypotheses.

Using statistical functions in SPSS, the reliability and validity of the survey was checked to statistically measure how repeatable the survey was and the level of random error and systematic bias in the data. Random error is the unpredictable error that occurs in all research and may be caused by many different factors but is affected primarily by sampling techniques. No instrument is perfect, so some error will occur during the measurement process. The lower the measurement error, the closer the data are to the truth (Alreck and Settle, 2004:58-60). To lower the chance of random error, a large, random, and representative sample size was selected across all rank categories from TSgt – Col. The only limitation to the number of respondents selected from the lists of names/e-mails provided was the amount of research time available. The internal consistency of the scales and sub scales was determined using a Cronbach Alpha. Besides determining a survey item's or scale's reliability, its validity, or how well it measures what it sets out to measure, must also be assessed (Alreck and Settle, 2004:58-60). The two pilot tests, an assessment by the research committee members attempted to improve its validity. Also, the survey used branching techniques that only allow airmen to answer selected questions based on their previous responses. For example, airmen who never served in a supervisory capacity (i.e. answered “No” to the question in section III) were not allowed to provide their perception in Section Five (S5), which is only concerned with supervisor respondent's views.

Section One – Education Demographics (S1)

The first section (S1) consisted of an 11 item scale that determined the amount of college education each respondent received while he/she was in the Air Force, the general category of each degree held at the time he/she completed the questionnaire, and whether he/she was a full or part-time student. It asks three basic questions - the amount of education at the time he/she entered the military, the amount of education he/she has now, and the general category his/her degree is in, if applicable. Respondents were asked to select the education level and type of degree that applied. The respondents did not have to answer all 11 items because the survey used a branching technique that only showed each respondent the items that were applicable to them, based on their answers to the first and second questions. Using this information, along with basic demographic data, it can be determined how much education a category of airmen (i.e. officer, enlisted) received while in the Air Force. Furthermore, using this data combine with the cost the Air Force pays for college education can provide an estimated amount of money the Air Force spends on college education for its airmen.

Section Two - Effective Performance, Employee Perception (S2)

The second section (S2) consists of a 38 item scale that addressed hypotheses one through five:

- H1: Respondents' perception of status will not moderate the individual relationships between the independent variables knowledge, education, experience or training and the dependent variable effective performance.
- H2: Enlisted (TSgt-SMSgt), officer (CGO), and leader (CMSgt and Field Grade Officers (FGO)) respondents will not differ on their perception of the effect status has on the individual relationships between knowledge, education, experience or training and effective performance.

- H3: Respondents' perception of knowledge, education, training, or experience, individually, will significantly increase the ability to determine effective performance.
- H4: Enlisted (TSgt-SMSgt), officer (CGO), and leader (CMSgt and FGO) respondents will not differ on their perception of the affect knowledge, education, training, or experience, individually, will have on the ability to determine effective performance.
- H5: Respondents' perception of knowledge, education, experience, and training will significantly increase the ability to determine effective performance, while status, indoctrination, and PME will not significantly increase the ability to determine effective performance.

The scale was divided into eight sub scales. Seven of the sub scales represent certain preparations or traits that a respondent may have and each constitute an independent variable (i.e. knowledge, education, training, experience, status, indoctrination, and professional military education (PME)). The eighth sub scale represents the dependent variable, effective performance. Each variable will be explained in detail later in this section of the methodology.

The intent of the second section of the survey was to determine what preparations or traits the respondents have that they perceived important for them to perform effectively (the dependent variable) in their current Air Force Specialty (AFS). The respondents were specifically asked to consider only the representative duties, responsibilities, or requirements to perform in the AFS and not to consider their supervisory, management, or leadership roles that may be inherent to their position. As an example, an aircraft maintenance specialist, research engineer, or an acquisition manager, who may also supervise airmen, would only consider what it takes to effectively perform the representative duties and responsibilities of the job and would not consider their possible associated supervisory role. Respondents who were strictly

supervisors, managers, leaders, or students were asked to base their responses on their experience from the most recent position, where they performed the representative duties and responsibilities of their AFS. Respondents were asked to select the number that appropriately indicates the extent to which they agreed with each statement about preparations or traits that may have helped them to effectively perform the representative duties and responsibilities of their AFS. A six point Likert scale was used as shown in Figure 5.

① N/A	① Strongly Disagree	② Disagree	③ Neither Agree Nor Disagree	④ Agree	⑤ Strongly Agree
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Figure 5. Likert Scale.

The items that will make up the seven independent variables and one dependent variable (sub scales) were developed based on the following definitions. Please see Appendix A for the wording of each item. No known scales were available to develop these items:

- Knowledge is the factual understanding and practical military skills required to perform at the qualification level (AFI 36-2105, 2004:6). Three items, Q2.2, Q2.10, and Q2.21, were used to determine the respondent's perception whether knowledge was important to them in order for them to perform effectively.
- Education is specific academic subjects or disciplines, or courses of study required or desired to succeed in the specialty (AFI 36-2105, 2004:6). Five items, Q2.3, Q2.12, Q2.23, Q2.30, and Q2.35, were used to determine the respondent's

perception whether education was important to them in order for them to perform effectively.

- Experience is having performed in specialty duties needed for upgrade to the qualified level (AFI 36-2105, 2004:6). Four items, Q2.5, Q2.14, Q2.25, and Q2.32, were used to determine the respondent's perception whether experience was important to them in order for them to perform effectively.
- Training is military courses training for or contributing directly to effective performance (AFI 36-2105, 2004:6). Six items, Q2.4, Q2.13, Q2.19, Q2.24, Q2.31, and Q2.37 were used to determine the respondent's perception whether training was important to them in order for them to perform effectively.
- Status for the purposes of this research includes time-in-grade, time-in-service, military status (i.e. as a company or field grade officer, noncommissioned officer or senior noncommissioned officer status), or rank/grade. Seven items, Q2.6, Q2.11, Q2.16, Q2.20, Q2.26, Q2.33, and Q2.38, were used to determine the respondent's perception whether their status was important to them in order for them to perform effectively.
- Indoctrination, for the purposes of this research, includes the training all military members receive during entry such as basic military training, officer training school, or in processing at inbound bases. Three items, Q2.7, Q2.17, and Q2.27 were used to determine the respondent's perception whether their indoctrination training was important to them in order for them to perform effectively.
- Professional Military Education, for the purposes of this research, includes military courses such as airmen leadership school, noncommissioned officer

academy, senior noncommissioned officer academy, or squadron officer school.

Four items, Q2.9, Q2.18, Q2.28, and Q2.34, were used to determine the respondent's perception whether their professional military education was important to them in order for them to perform effectively.

- The term "Effective Performance" was defined as meeting the minimum requirements as established in the guidance the respondent followed (i.e. technical order, military standard, federal acquisition regulation, air force instruction, etc) to perform their job. Six items, Q2.1, Q2.8, Q2.15, Q2.22, Q2.29, and Q2.36 were used to determine the respondent's perception of what constitutes effective performance.

A typical item in these sub scales included, "To perform effectively, I require factual understanding of the technical part of my AFS" or "To perform effectively, I require a certain rank/grade." Table 2 shows all the variables and their associated items on the survey.

Table 2. Section Two Variables and Items.

Variables	Items
Knowledge	Q2.2, Q2.10, Q2.21
Education	Q2.3, Q2.12, Q2.23, Q2.30, Q2.35
Experience	Q2.5, Q2.14, Q2.25, Q2.32
Training	Q2.4, Q2.13, Q2.19, Q2.24, Q2.31, Q2.37
Status	Q2.6, Q2.11, Q2.16, Q2.20, Q2.26, Q2.33, Q2.38
Indoctrination	Q2.7, Q2.17, Q2.27
Professional Military Education	Q2.9, Q2.18, Q2.28, Q2.34
Effective Performance	Q2.1, Q2.8, Q2.15, Q2.22, Q2.29, Q2.36

Based on the definition of Air Force human capital (in chapter two), the specialty qualifications that the Air Force has established in the officer and enlisted classification instructions can be represented in three different human capital models.

Hypothesis one analyzed four models where the four independent variables (1) knowledge, (2) education, (3) experience, and (4) training were individually regressed against the dependent variable, effective performance, with status as a moderating variable; hypothesis three analyzes the same relationship as in hypothesis one without status as a moderating variable; and hypothesis five will regress all seven of the independent variables (knowledge, education, experience, training, status, indoctrination, and PME) together against the independent variable, effective performance. The job qualification criterion “other” as discussed in chapter two and AFI 36-2105 and 36-2108, was excluded to simplify the model.

Hypotheses One and Two Evaluation Design

Since rank, which is part of the independent variable status, separates all Air Force duties into two categories (i.e. officer duties and enlisted duties), one research question is whether the variable status moderates the relationship between the four independent variables and if so, whether it has a positive or negative affect. Barron and Kenney indicate that moderator variables are important because they often are assumed to reduce or enhance the influence that specific independent variables have on specific responses in question (dependent variable). In general terms, a moderator is a qualitative (e.g., sex, race, class) or quantitative (e.g., level of reward) variable that affects the direction and/or strength of the relation between an independent and dependent variable. Specifically, within correlational analysis framework, a moderator is a third variable that

affects the zero-order correlation between two other variables (Baron and Kenny, 1986:1174). Put simply, a basic moderator variable is one that influences the strength of a relationship between two other variables. Viewed as a basic moderating variable, status (rank) may be shown to have a positive affect on the relationship between the variables, or not.

For hypothesis one, multiple regression techniques were used to determine the relationship between the independent variables knowledge, education, training, and experience, and the dependent variable, effective performance, with status as a moderating variable. Figure 6 shows a typical model. Each independent variable was examined separately with status (i.e. rank) as the moderating variable and effective performance as the dependent variable. The assertion in hypothesis one is that the respondents will perceive the rank of the employee to have little effect on the value each independent variable has on being able to perform effectively. Status (i.e. rank) is hypothesized to have no effect on the relationship between variables and perhaps could be an artificial barrier to employing enlisted airmen in some technical and management duties currently reserved for officers, which prevents full exploitation of the acquired and developed human capital already within the Air Force.




Figure 6. Typical, One Independent, One Moderating, and One Dependent Variable Regression Model.

In hypothesis two, the data was separated in three rank categories: an enlisted category consisting of TSgt - SMSgt; a CGO category; and a leader category consisting of CMSgt and officers in the rank of FGO and above. A combination of regression and ANOVA will be performed on the data to determine the extent of the difference that the respondents in these rank categories perceive status to have on the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, effective performance. The assertion in hypothesis two is that there will be no significant variation in the respondent's perception in each of these rank categories.

Hypotheses Three and Four Evaluation Design.

Figure 7 shows a proposed schematic relationship, showing each of the independent variables in a vertical alignment with the dependent variable, indicating that a certain level of knowledge, education, training, and experience can individually have a positive or negative affect on effective performance.




Figure 7. Vertical Variable Model.

Hypothesis three will have the independent variables knowledge, education, training, and experience individually regressed with the dependent variable, effective performance, to determine the effect each of these independent variables has on the dependent variable without status as a moderating variable. Figure 8 shows a typical model.




Figure 8. Typical, One Independent, One Dependent Variable Regression Model.

The assertion in hypothesis three is that the relationship between the independent and dependent variable will be significant and that the relationship will not significantly increase or decrease as a result of status being removed from moderating the relationship. These outputs will be compared to the outputs from hypothesis one and is hypothesized that no significant difference will be found.

Similarly as in hypothesis two, hypothesis four will have a combination of regression and ANOVA conducted and the results will be compared. The assertion in hypothesis four is also that there will be no significant variation in the respondent's perception in each of these rank categories.

Hypothesis Five Evaluation Design.

All the independent variables status, indoctrination, PME, knowledge, education, training, and experience will be analyzed together against the dependent variable, effective performance, as modeled in Figure 9 below. Figure 9 shows a schematic relationship that models all seven independent variables in a horizontal alignment with

the dependent variable. This model indicates that a certain level of each of the independent variables, together, may have an overall effect on effective performance.




Figure 9. Horizontal Variable Model.

The independent variables will be in a prioritized order based on the outcome of section six (S6) of the questionnaire that asks the respondents to prioritize the independent variables using a paired comparison scale (Figure 10 shows the independent variables in a random order). The assertion in hypothesis five is that when regressed together, knowledge, education, training, and experience will statistically account for a significant amount of the variance in the model and status, indoctrination, and PME will account for an insignificant amount. Similarly, as in hypothesis one, the respondents will perceive the rank, indoctrination, and PME of the employee to have little affect on the value each independent variable has on being able to perform effectively and will perceive knowledge, education, training, and experience to have the most affect on effective performance. This would further support the assertion that status (i.e. rank) could be an artificial barrier to employing airmen.

Section Three – Supervisory Determination (S3)

Section three (S3) consisted of one item and separated respondents who supervised airmen from those who never have by asking the question "Do you now or have you ever in your Air Force career supervised any number of airmen"? Respondents

who answered “no,” were directed to section six (S6) and skipped section five (S5) while respondents who answered “yes” were directed to section four (S4), then proceeded to section five (S5). The term “supervise” was defined as being in charge of and responsible for subordinate airmen who you may or may not write performance reports on.

Section Four – Supervisory Demographics (S4)

This section consisted five items and determined the number of years the respondent has been a supervisor; the number of airmen he/she supervised at the time of the survey; the most people he/she has ever supervised; the rank categories such as NCO or CGO; and the level of command he/she currently works. This data provided demographic information about the supervisors who answered the items in section five (S5). The data will be used in descriptive statistics and will allow potential separation of other data based on the number of people supervised, number of years as a supervisor, or the level of command at which the respondent supervised. Separation based on one of these factors may show similarities or differences in the data. The data will also be cross-tabbed against other demographic data to find errors as necessary.

Section Five - Effective Performance, Supervisor Perception (S5)

Section five consists of a 39 item scale and addresses hypotheses six through ten:

- H6: Supervisors’ perception of status will not moderate the individual relationships between the independent variables knowledge, education, experience or training and the dependent variable effective performance.
- H7: Enlisted (TSgt-SMSgt), officer (CGO), and leader (CMSgt and FGO) supervisors will not differ on their perception of the effect status has on the individual relationships between knowledge, education, experience or training and effective performance.

- H8: Supervisors' perception of knowledge, education, training, or experience, individually, will increase the ability to determine effective performance.
- H9: Enlisted (TSgt-SMSgt), officer (CGO), and leader (CMSgt and FGO) supervisors will not differ on their perception of the effect knowledge, education, training, or experience, individually, will have on the ability to determine effective performance.
- H10: Supervisors' perception of knowledge, education, experience, *and* training will significantly increase the ability to determine effective performance, while status, indoctrination, and PME will not significantly increase the ability to determine effective performance.

The intent of section five (S5) is similar to that of section two (S2) but is for respondents who supervise airmen only. Only respondents who answered “yes” in section three (S3) (i.e. they now supervise or have in the past supervised airmen) were led to this section (S5), after completing section four (S4, Supervisor Demographics). The assertions in this section are the same as in section two (S2) and the items in the survey are similar to the items in section two (S2) but now are asking the respondent to consider the question from a supervisor’s perspective only. Table 3 shows how the items in section five were divided into each variable.

Table 3. Section Five Variables and Items.

Variables	Items
Knowledge	Q5.2, Q5.10, Q5.21,
Education	Q5.3, Q5.12, Q5.23, Q5.30, Q5.35,
Experience	Q5.5, Q5.14, Q5.25, Q5.32,
Training	Q5.4, Q5.13, Q5.19, Q5.24, Q5.31, Q5.37,
Status	Q5.6, Q5.11, Q5.16, Q5.20, Q5.26, Q5.33, Q5.38, Q5.39
Indoctrination	Q5.7, Q5.17, Q5.27,
Professional Military Education	Q5.9, Q5.18, Q5.28, Q5.34,
Effective Performance	Q5.1, Q5.8, Q5.15, Q5.22, Q5.29, Q5.36,

Respondents were asked to consider the representative duties, responsibilities, or requirements he/she perceives that their subordinates require to perform in the AFS. As

an example, an acquisition manager respondent would consider what he/she perceives to be required for their subordinate acquisition personnel to plan, organize, direct, and coordinate acquisition worker activities. Each item in this section was worded to reflect that only supervisors were answering the items about their subordinates; everything else remained the same as the items in section two (S2). This data gave insight to what airmen who are or were in supervisory positions perceive as important for their subordinates to perform effectively. The same statistical analysis as in section two (S2) will be used to analyze the data collected in this section (S5).

Section Six – Independent Variable Paired Comparison Scale (S6)

Section six (S6) uses a paired comparison scale. Alreck and Settle indicate this will measure simple, dichotomous choices between alternatives when the focus is exclusively on the evaluation of one entity relative to one other. They suggest to reduce the intransitivity that is often found when paired comparison scale data are analyzed that rating the alternatives two at a time will avoid most of the limitations and problems inherent in paired comparison (Alreck and Settle 2004:127-128). In this section, respondents are required to rank order a pair of the independent variables from section two (S2), one relative to the other, under the assumption that he/she had to choose between the two. All seven independent variables were paired into 21 combinations, which are all possible combinations without duplication. The respondents were asked the same question “For each pair of variables, select the one you believe is most important for a subordinate to have to perform effectively – if you had to choose between the two.” A pair of independent variables, along with their associated definitions, were provided to choose from.

This data will determine, in priority order, what the respondents perceive as most to least important in order to perform effectively and will further define the importance of status in a worker's ability to perform effectively. Further, this paired comparison will assist in the sequence the variables are places during multiple regression analysis in sections two (S2) and four (S4).

Section Seven – Organizational Culture (S7)

This section consists of an 11 item scale and a free comment space. These items address hypothesis 11.

- H11: Enlisted and officer airmen do not differ on their perception of the concept that eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in nonstrategic duties will not negatively affect Air Force culture.

This section wishes to determine if enlisted and officer airmen differ on their perception of the interchangeable rank concept in nonstrategic duty positions (without violating the chain of command or customs & courtesies) and assigning enlisted personnel to these duties (who are otherwise qualified in accordance with the AFIs) would adversely affect the culture of the Air Force. Nonstrategic duties are those that are not part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command.

The assertion is that enlisted and officer airmen will not differ on their perception and will show that eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment will not negatively affect Air Force culture. Enlisted and officer airmen already interact in close proximity in many organizations without violating Air Force culture. Air Force enlisted airmen are an educated career force and have or can be trained and educated the same as officers and should be able to perform in the same duties to increase the capability of the Air Force.

This hypothesis should support the interchangeable rank concept and can be implemented while maintaining a chain of command and customs and courtesies.

Respondents were asked to select the number that appropriately indicates the extent to which they agree with each statement about Air Force culture. A six point Likert scale was used as shown in Figure 5. A typical item in this scale included "A chain of command is important to effective organizational performance. Eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in duties that are not part of strategy, plan of action, or chain of command will not negatively affect this." or "Commitment and holding a high sense of responsibility to the organization is what is important to our Air Force culture. Having enlisted and officer airmen performing the same technical duties would violate existing Air Force culture. Eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in duties that are not part of strategy, plan of action, or chain of command will not negatively affect this."

Four of the items in this scale (Q7.1, Q7.2, Q7.5, Q7.6, and Q7.8) are loosely based derivatives of an organizational culture scale developed by Abraham Carmeli and Ashler Tishler in their article, *The Relationships Intangible Organizational Elements and Organizational Performance*, in the Strategic Management Journal 25: 1257-1278, 2004. The other six were developed based on personal knowledge of Air Force customs and courtesies and chain-of-command. Each item states an important part of organizational culture then ask the respondent whether eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in duties that are not part of strategy, plan of action, or chain of command will negatively affect this part of organizational culture. This requires respondents to weigh whether eliminating rank in these duties will affect culture. Should the respondents perceive the

qualification to be more important, their response on the Likert scale should be further to the right and if they perceive rank to be of more importance, their response should be further to the left. From these items, an understanding of the importance of rank on organizational culture can be determined.

Because this is a previously unexplored topic based on publicly available literature, the free comment space gives respondents an opportunity to comment on anything they wish concerning the affect of eliminating rank in non-strategic, mid-level duties will have on Air Force culture. The comments are listed verbatim in Appendix C and any possible trends/consistencies will be briefly summarized in chapter four.

Similar descriptive and inferential statistics as described in section two will be used to analyze the data from this section where applicable. A pair t-test or analysis of variance will be conducted, separating the data between officer and enlisted airmen.

Section Eight – Air Force Personnel Transformation (S8)

This section consists of a 13 item scale and a free comment space. These items address hypothesis 12.

- H12: Eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in nonstrategic duties is an acceptable method to assist in meeting the intent of transformation.

Using descriptive statistics, this section wishes to provide fundamental data to determine the respondent's perception on whether relaxing the rank requirement and employing some enlisted airmen (who are otherwise qualified) in the same duties designated for some non-rated company grade officers is an acceptable realignment of human capital and supports Air Force transformation efforts. Nonstrategic duties are those that are not part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command.

The assertion is that eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in nonstrategic duties will positively affect future transformation because it eliminates an artificial barrier to employing Air Force airmen. Successful mission accomplishment and effective performance can be accomplished regardless of the rank of the airman in these duty positions. Proper supervision, management, and leadership of the airmen in these duty positions still apply.

Respondents were asked to select the number that appropriately indicates the extent to which they agree with each statement about Air Force transformation. A six point Likert scale was used as shown in Figure 5. A typical item in this scale included "Knowledge is more important than the rank an airman holds when employing airmen in mid level duty positions that are not an integral part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command" or "The concept of assigning qualified enlisted and company grade officer airmen in similar duties put the right person in the right place at the right time."

The scale is broken into two sub scales. One sub scale consists of six items (Q8.1, Q8.2, Q8.4, Q8.5, Q8.7, and Q8.11), and represents the respondent's perception of the importance of rank in nonstrategic duty positions when compared to qualifications such as knowledge, education, training, and experience. Two of these items (Q8.7 and Q8.11) ask specifically for their perception of the importance of status or rank when employing airmen in mid-level duty positions that are not an integral part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command. These items were developed by combining the Air Force specialty requirements as listed in AFI 36-2105 with the importance of rank. The items require the respondent to decide what is more important between a job qualification (such as education) and rank when employing airmen in mid-level duties. Should the

respondents perceive the qualification to be more important, their response on the Likert scale should be further to the right and if they perceive rank to be of more importance, their response should be further to the left. From these items, an understanding of the importance of rank versus a job qualification can be determined. No existing scales or items were used to develop these items. The second sub scale consists of seven items (Q8.3, Q8.6, Q8.8, Q8.9, Q8.10, Q8.12, and Q8.13) and represents the respondent's perception of whether eliminating rank as a qualifier and integrating qualified enlisted and officer airmen in similar duties supports transformation. These items were developed from our understanding of how transformation is defined in the 2004 U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan. For example, putting the right people in the right place at the right time with the most effective use of resources is a concept of transformation. One of the items requires the respondents to determine whether the concept of integrating qualified enlisted and officer airmen in similar duties assists this transformation concept. Similar items were developed in the same manner. No existing scales or items were used to develop these items.

Because this is a previously unexplored topic based on publicly available literature, the free comment space gives respondents an opportunity to comment on anything they wish concerning the interchangeable rank concept and transformation. The comments are listed verbatim in Appendix C and any possible trends/consistencies will be briefly summarized in chapter four.

Similar descriptive and inferential statistics as described in section two will be used to analyze the data from this section where applicable. Together, both concepts represented by the subscales must hold true for the hypothesis to have merit.

Section Nine – Demographics (S9)

The questionnaire ends with seven demographic questions and a final comment space. The questions ask for the respondent's to provide their age, gender, grade (rank), AFS, Time-in-grade, Total Active Federal Military Service Date, and whether any officer was prior enlisted. One other question requested the respondent's to mark whether their day-to-day duties are technical or managerial in nature using the scale in Figure 10.




Figure 10. Technical, Management Scale.

The data will be cross-tabbed against other demographic data to check for errors and may be used as a way to separate the cases, based on any one of these items, to show similarities or differences. One or more of the items requesting age, gender, and grade will be used as a control variable in the regression analysis. The final comment space gave respondents an opportunity to comment on anything they wish. The comments are listed verbatim in Appendix C and any possible trends/consistencies will be briefly summarized in chapter four.

IV. Results

Preliminary Data Analysis

The survey reached 2,758 active duty Air Force personnel and the database was populated with 727 completed surveys at the time data collection for the purposes of this research was terminated. This resulted in a response rate of 26.4 percent. Access to the survey was not terminated and respondents continued to complete the survey through 18 January 2006, at which time the survey was removed from the website. There were a total of 749 completed cases in the database at the time it was removed from the website. This database can be used in follow-on research if necessary.

None of the completed cases (i.e. a completed survey) from the respondents were deleted due to significant errors in the data. The web based survey process eliminated most accidental errors. Cases one and two were deleted because they were part of the test phase of the survey process and cross-tabbing revealed three errors in respondent's age. Case 57 listed their age as "1968" and it was changed to 36 years old; and case 82 listed their age as "3" and it was changed to "no answer." Case 472, listed their age as "17" and rank as Colonel. The other demographic data in this case indicated the age was a mistake and the rank was correct. Their age was changed to "no answer" and the data was kept. All other data in all cases appeared legitimate and was used in statistical analysis.

The remainder of the chapter will describe the statistical analysis and answers to the hypotheses in chapter three. First, all applicable demographic data from sections one (S1), three (S3), four (S4), and nine (S9) will be described. Second, the paired comparison from section six (S6) will be analyzed because it will be used in sections two (S2) and section five (S5). Third, the hypotheses in section two (S2) will be analyzed,

then the hypotheses in section five (S5). Then the hypothesis from section seven (S7) and the hypothesis from section eight (S8) will be analyzed. Finally, a brief section about the extensive comments that the respondents provided will conclude this chapter.

Survey Demographics Results

Respondent Personal Demographics

The survey was taken by active duty enlisted and officer airmen between the rank of TSgt and Brigadier General. Six of the Colonels that the survey was e-mailed to were promoted to Brigadier General since the list of names from AFCMO was developed. The data from these six Brigadier Generals were included in the statistical analysis. There were 99 female and 624 male respondents (four respondents did not answer this question) between the ages of 22 and 61 years of age.

The survey was sent to 1,678 enlisted and 1,395 officer airmen totaling 3,073 personnel. This 283 difference (9.2 percent of the total) in the additional number of enlisted respondents than officers is because a higher response rate from AFIT students (approximately 925 officers) was anticipated, which would have more closely evened the number of enlisted and officer respondents. Figure 11 shows respondent's rank in a bar chart. The completed cases in the database consisted of 435 enlisted respondents and 287 officer respondents totaling 722 respondents (five respondents did not answer the question about their rank). This equates to a response rate for enlisted respondents of 25.9 percent and 20.6 percent for officers.




Figure 11. Respondent's Rank.

Enlisted Education

All 435 enlisted respondents annotated their education level at the time they first enlisted in the Air Force and their highest education level they hold now. Figure 12 shows this data. Interesting is that 323, 74.3 percent, of all enlisted respondents increased their education level since enlisting in the Air Force. Figure 13 charts the difference in education from enlisted respondent's first enlistment until the time they took the survey. For example, 99 enlisted respondents increased their education level two degrees. This means, for example, a respondent who enlisted with a high school diploma increased his/her education two degrees to a bachelors degree or a respondent who enlisted with an associates degree increased his/her education level to a masters degree.




Figure 12. Enlisted Respondent's Education.




Figure 13. Difference in Education From First Enlistment to Now.

Section Six – Independent Variable Paired Comparison Results

Respondents ranked a pair of the independent variables (Knowledge, Education, Experience, Training, Status, Indoctrination, and PME), one relative to the other, under

the assumption that he/she had to choose between the two. All seven independent variables were paired into 21 combinations, which are all possible combinations without duplication.

Each of the variables were tabulated to determine which was selected the most to which was selected the least. Figure 14 shows a basic mathematical order to what independent variable was selected the most to least, indicating which independent variable the respondents perceived to be most important to least important for a subordinate to perform effectively.




Figure 14. Independent Variable Count.

Also, a percentage of the number of times an independent variable was selected over its paired independent variable was determined. For example, if all respondents selected training every time it was an option (i.e. each respondent had six opportunities to select training, multiplied by all 727 respondents), training would have been selected 4,362 times. However, training was selected 2,969 times, which results in a 68.1 percent

select rate over the other independent variables. Figure 15 shows the percent each independent variable was selected over its paired independent variable.




Figure 15. Variable Selection Percentage.

These ordinal scales of perceived importance of the independent variables will be used in the sequence the variables are places during multiple regression analysis in sections two (S2) and five (S5).

Limitations

One limitation with the data is the low internal consistency values on some variables, which may result in imprecise data. The internal consistency of some of the subscales are low, indicating that the items may not be truly measuring what they are supposed to measure based on a correlation of the items within the scale. Cronbach's alpha is the most common form of internal consistency reliability coefficient. By convention, a lenient cut-off of .60 is common in exploratory research; alpha should be at least .70 or higher to retain an item in an "adequate" scale; and many researchers require a cut-off of .80 for a "good scale" (<http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/reliab.htm>).

A second limitation in the data is that some of the independent variables are more than moderately correlated. Cohen and Cohen indicate correlations are relationships between two or more variables or sets of variables. They have three fundamental dimensions: significance, direction, and magnitude. There is usually some level of correlation between variables and is expressed, either positive or negative, as a small correlation if between .1 and .3; moderate correlation if between .3 and .5; or strong correlation if .5 and above (Cohen and Cohen, 1883, 67-69). This correlation indicates that there is a moderate or strong linear relationship, appropriately, between the two variables and that the correlated variables are moderately or strongly dependent on each other. One variable is not the cause of the other but can be related because, in this situation, they are directly proportional to each other or are so close to the being the same thing. This correlation between independent variables will result in some of the explained variance overlapping during the regression process and in the ambiguity in the interpretation of the regression because the variables are not well estimated, indicating a small change in the data values may lead to large changes in the estimates of the coefficients. This correlation between variables may result in imprecise data and is being identified as a potential limitation.

A third limitation is that the variable, did not accurately measure what they purport to measure. Each of the independent items that were the basis of the scales and subsequent variables already contained the relationship with effective performance within them. Each of the items in section two (S2) and section five (S5) of the survey asked whether a specific preparation or trait the respondent, or their subordinate, had would influence one's ability to perform effectively. Because of this line of questioning, the

scales/variables did not exclusively represent the conceptual idea of the independent variables and may have resulted in several regression problems. Although the dependent variable did not have this problem, it did not measure effective performance in a way that can be correlated with factors such as knowledge, education, training, experience, or status but measures the respondent's perception of what constitutes effective performance.

Section Two – Effective Performance, Employee Perception Results

Subscale Variables

A subscale variable was calculated for each of the subscales using the items as listed in Table 2, Section Two Variables and Items, in section two (S2) with the exception of the education variable. Item Q2_30 was removed from the scale in order to improve its internal consistency. In the effective performance sub scale, item Q2_22 was reverse coded in the survey and was recoded before it was used in the effective performance variable. The item was written such that it was obviously to any respondent who read the item that it was written backward and the respondents would rate the item low on the Likert scale (i.e. “strongly disagree” or “disagree”). This was done to spot test whether the respondents read the items and their responses were reversed before being used in the statistical analysis (i.e. “strongly disagree” was changed to “strongly agree,” “disagree” was changed to “agree,” etc). All variables were normally distributed based on the high number of cases used in each variable as well as all Shapiro-Wilk scores being greater than .90. Table 4 shows applicable descriptive statistics for all variables required in this section.

Table 4. Section Two Variables, Descriptive Statistics

	n	Alpha	Mean	Std Deviation
Knowledge	708	.41	4.21	.55
Education	655	.60	3.19	.78
Experience	691	.48	3.37	.65
Training	586	.63	3.68	.58
Status	204	.74	2.66	.68
Indoctrination	165	.62	2.78	.79
PME	48	.77	3.06	.78
Effective Performance	671	.50	3.89	.51

There was a moderate correlation between 14 pair and a strong correlation between two pairs of the independent variables. Table 5 shows the correlation between all the variables that were used in this section.

Table 5. Correlation Matrix.

	KnowVar	EdVar	ExpVar	TrVar	StatusVar	IndocVar	PMEVar	EffPerVar
KnowVar	Pearson Correlation							
	Sig. (2-tailed)							
	N	1	.264** .000	.332** .000	.422** .000	.243** .001	.357** .000	.348* .015
EdVar	Pearson Correlation							
	Sig. (2-tailed)							
	N	.264** .000	1	.221** .000	.428** .000	.371** .000	.296** .000	.464** .002
ExpVar	Pearson Correlation							
	Sig. (2-tailed)							
	N	.332** .000	.221** .000	1	.498** .000	.427** .000	.354** .000	.152 .309
TrVar	Pearson Correlation							
	Sig. (2-tailed)							
	N	.422** .000	.428** .000	.498** .000	1	.342** .000	.390** .000	.307* .038
StatusVar	Pearson Correlation							
	Sig. (2-tailed)							
	N	.243** .001	.371** .000	.427** .000	.342** .000	1	.472** .000	.597** .000
IndocVar	Pearson Correlation							
	Sig. (2-tailed)							
	N	.357** .000	.296** .000	.354** .000	.390** .000	.472** .000	1	.665* .000
PMEVar	Pearson Correlation							
	Sig. (2-tailed)							
	N	.348* .015	.464** .002	.152 .309	.307* .038	.597** .000	.665** .000	1
EffPerVar	Pearson Correlation							
	Sig. (2-tailed)							
	N	.403** .000	.101* .011	.222** .000	.227** .000	.116 .107	.238** .003	1

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Mean and Correlation Analysis

The limitations as explained above have no bearing on any univariate analysis such as evaluating the variable means and correlations. The means for each variable are listed in Table 4 above. The means reinforce the paired comparison findings that status is the least important independent variable when compared to the other independent variables. The mean for the independent variable status is 2.67, which correlates to “disagree” on the Likert scale. This suggests that when the respondents were given statements asking whether status was important in order to perform effectively, the respondents disagreed on average. All of the other independent variables, with the exception of indoctrination, had means greater than 3.0, which correlates to “Neither Agree Nor Disagree” or “Agree” on the Likert scale. This suggests that when the respondents were given statements asking whether each of these independent variables was important to perform effectively, the respondents were indifferent or in the case of the independent variable knowledge agreed on average.

As a post hoc calculation, the status variable was redefined, consisting of items Q2.11, Q2.20, Q2.26, Q2.33 and Q2.38; items Q2.6 (i.e. the importance of time-in-grade) and Q2.16 (i.e. the importance of time-in-service) were removed from the scale because they may have been measuring a need for experience rather than a need for status. The cases were further separated into enlisted and officer categories and a new mean were calculated for status in each rank category. The mean in the officer category was 2.69 and the mean in the enlisted category was 2.48, both correlating to “disagree” on the Likert scale.

Withstanding the limitations, the correlation between status and effective performance ($r = .116$) suggests there is not more than a small correlation between these variables and that the movement in status has a minimum affect on the movement of effective performance.

Control Variable

The respondents' rank will be used as a control variable for all regression analysis. A control variable is a constant, whose impact is removed in order to analyze the relationship between other variables without interference, or within subgroups of the control variable.

- **H1: Respondents' perception of status will not moderate the individual relationships between the independent variables knowledge, education, experience or training and the dependent variable effective performance.**

This hypothesis could not be answered because the method used did not produce enough significant data. Four separate models, one for each independent variable, were individually regressed and compared. All four models used rank as a control variable, a single independent variable, status as a moderating variable, and effective performance as the dependent variable. The reason for developing four separate models for this hypothesis was because problems with scale reliability and correlation between independent variables were anticipated in the methodology stages of this research. The education model was rejected and with the exception of the knowledge variable, none of the variables were significant predictors of the dependent variable; therefore, an accurate determination whether status moderates the relationship between any of the independent variables and effective performance could not be made. Scale reliability, correlation

between independent variables, and the wording of each item played a role in the poor significance in the data. Interaction terms were not explored.

To make the moderating variable for each model, the independent variable status was individually multiplied by each of the independent variables; knowledge, education, experience, and training (i.e. knowledge*status, education*status, experience*status, and training*status). The product of these resulted in four interim variables. Finally, to center each of the interim variables, their means (μ) were subtracted from them (i.e. (knowledge*status- μ), (education*status- μ), (experience*status- μ), and (training*status- μ) to produce the four moderating variables. Each of these variables was used as the moderating variables in the regression procedure. In extensive detail, Cohen and Cohen give an example of indirect effects [moderating variables] and indicate that when they are not significant they have no interaction with the other variables in the model (Cohen and Cohen, 1883, 356-361).

In the model ($n = 189$) regressing knowledge, the moderating variable status (i.e. knowledge*status- μ), and effective performance, the model was accepted ($F = 11.3, p = .00$) indicating the variation explained by this model (adjusted R-squared = .14) was not due to chance. The variable knowledge was a significant predictor ($\beta = .32, p = .00$) and the moderating variable was not ($\beta = .08, p = .31$), indicating status does not moderate the relationship between knowledge and effective performance. Knowledge and the moderating variable were strongly correlated (.55), condition index (26.0). A condition index above 15 indicates a potential problem with correlation. Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0, \sigma = 1$).

In the model ($n = 183$) regressing education, the moderating variable status (i.e. education*status- μ), and effective performance, the model was rejected ($F = 1.7, p = .17$) indicating a poor model to explain the variation. The variable education was not a significant predictor ($\beta = .16, p = .16$) nor was the moderating variable ($\beta = -.04, p = .74$). When a model is significant, but it has variables that are not, it is an indication of collinearity problems. Education and the moderating variable were strongly correlated (.77), condition index (17.1). Due to the rejected model and insignificant education variable, it cannot be determined whether status moderates the relationship between education and effective performance. Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0, \sigma = 1$).

In the model ($n = 190$) regressing experience, the moderating variable status (i.e. experience*status- μ), and effective performance, the model was accepted ($F = 2.9, p = .04$); however, the variable experience was not a significant predictor ($\beta = .04, p = .72$) nor was the moderating variable ($\beta = .14, p = .21$). Experience and the moderating variable were strongly correlated (.78), condition index (21.3). Due to the experience variable being insignificant, it cannot be determined whether status moderates the relationship between experience and effective performance. Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0, \sigma = 1$).

In the model ($n = 178$) regressing training, the moderating variable status (i.e. training*status- μ), and effective performance, the model was accepted ($F = 2.9, p = .04$); however, the variable training was not a significant predictor ($\beta = .15, p = .16$) nor was the moderating variable ($\beta = .06, p = .59$). Training and the moderating variable were strongly correlated (.69), condition index (22.5). Due to the independent variable training

being insignificant, it cannot be determined whether status moderates the relationship between training and effective performance. Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0$, $\sigma = 1$).

- **H2: Enlisted (TSgt-SMSgt), officer (CGO), and leader (CMSgt and Field Grade Officers (FGO)) respondents will not differ on their perception of the effect status has on the relationship between knowledge, education, experience and training and effective performance.**

This hypothesis could not be answered because the method used did not produce enough significant data. Three separate models, one in each rank category, were individually regressed and compared. All three models used the five independent variables experience, knowledge, training, education, and status. The leader model was rejected and status was not a significant predictor in the other models; therefore, an accurate comparison between groups could not be made. Scale reliability, correlation between independent variables, and the wording of each item played a role in the poor significance in the data. Interaction terms were not explored.

The enlisted model ($n = 116$) model was accepted ($F = 4.3$, $p = .001$) and was able to explain a moderate amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .15). However, only knowledge was a significant predictor ($\beta = .30$, $p = .004$) and explained six percent of the variance in the model. Status was insignificant, indicating it does not have an affect on the model. There were strong correlations between experience and training (.59) and education and training (.53). There was a serious problem with collinearity with the model (condition index = 35.0). Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0$, $\sigma = .1$).

The CGO model ($n = 19$) model was accepted ($F = 4.2, p = .017$) and was able to explain a significant amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .52). Three of the variables were significant predictors: knowledge ($\beta = .42, p = .04$) and explained two percent of the variance; training ($\beta = .41, p = .001$) and explained 32 percent of the variance; and education ($\beta = -.64, p = .03$) and explained 19 percent of the variance. Status was insignificant, indicating it does not affect the relationship between the other independent variables and effective performance. There were strong correlations between experience and training (.63), experience and status (.56) and training and education (.72). There was a serious problem with collinearity with the model (condition index = 84.4). Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0, \sigma = .82$).

The leader model ($n = 18$) was rejected ($F = 2.25, p = .12$) and none of the predictors were significant. There were strong correlations between knowledge and effective performance (.63); experience and education (.53); and knowledge and training (.58). There was a serious problem with collinearity with the model (condition index = 73.3). Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0, \sigma = .80$).

- **H3: Respondents' perception of knowledge, education, training, or experience, individually, will significantly increase the ability to determine effective performance.**

This hypothesis was broken into four sub hypotheses where each independent variable was individually regressed with the dependent variable, effective performance. This hypothesis was not rejected based on all the separate models' and independent variables' significance values all being accepted. When combining the amount of explained variance in all four models, 56 percent of the variance is accounted for by knowledge, education, experience, and training in determining effective performance. It

is understood the variance accountability would not be the same in a significant model that regresses all the independent variables together with the dependent variable. The 56 percent variance accountability could have been better if scale reliability, correlation between independent variables, and the wording of each item were better.

In the model ($n = 654$) regressing knowledge and effective performance, the model was accepted ($F = 67.4, p = .00$) indicating the variation explained by this model was not due to chance. Knowledge was able to explain a reasonable amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .17) in the model, which suggests other variables, not in the model, explain more of the variance. This is logical since more than knowledge is required to perform effectively. The independent variable knowledge was a significant predictor ($\beta = .41, p = .00$). The large beta coefficient indicates knowledge has a sizeable impact on the variance in the model and a good predictor of effective performance in this model. Collinearity between the variables proved to be slight in this model. Although the tolerance value (.99) was acceptable, the condition index (20.12) proved that a potential collinearity problem exists. Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0, \sigma = 1$).

In the model ($n = 617$) regressing education and effective performance, the model was accepted ($F = 7.0, p = .001$) indicating the variation explained by this model was not due to chance but education only explain a small amount of variance (adjusted R-squared = .02) in the model, which suggests it is a small factor in determining effective performance. The independent variable education was a significant predictor ($\beta = .14, p = .001$) but the small magnitude of the beta coefficient indicates the level of education would not considerably change the variance in the model and is a small predictor of

effective performance. Collinearity is not significant in this model with acceptable tolerance value (.89), and condition index (10.0). Residual values were normally distributed. Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0$, $\sigma = 1$).

In the model ($n = 644$) regressing experience and effective performance, the model was accepted ($F = 17.03$, $p = .000$) indicating the variation explained by this model was not due to chance but experience only explain a small amount of variance (adjusted R-squared = .05) in the model, which suggests it is a small factor in determining effective performance. The independent variable experience was a significant predictor ($\beta = .22$, $p = .000$) but the small magnitude of the beta coefficient indicates the level of experience would not considerably change the variance in the model and is a small predictor of effective performance. Collinearity is not significant in this model with acceptable tolerance (.97) and condition index (14.2). Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0$, $\sigma = 1$).

In the model ($n = 551$) regressing training and effective performance, the model was accepted ($F = 15.4$, $p = .000$) indicating the variation explained by this model was not due to chance but training only explain a small amount of variance (adjusted R-squared = .05) in the model, which suggests it is a small factor in determining effective performance. The independent variable training was a significant predictor ($\beta = .22$, $p = .000$) but the small magnitude of the beta indicates the level of experience would not considerably change the variance in the model and is a small predictor of effective performance. Collinearity is not significant in this model with acceptable tolerance (.98) and condition index (16.7). Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0$, $\sigma = 1$).

Post Hoc

In an attempt to determine the amount of variance status may explain on effective performance, it was individually regressed however, the model ($n = 191$) was rejected ($F = 2.3, p = .106$) and the status variable was not a significant predictor ($\beta = .11, p = .14$). Collinearity is not significant in this model with acceptable tolerance (.99) and condition index (10.6). Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0, \sigma = 1$).

- **H4: Enlisted (TSgt-SMSgt), officer (CGO), and leader (CMSgt and FGO) respondents will not differ on their perception of the effect knowledge, education, training, and experience, individually, will have on the ability to determine effective performance.**

Similar to hypothesis two, this hypothesis could not be answered because the data did not produce enough significant results.

- **H5: Respondents' perception of knowledge, education, experience, and training will significantly increase the ability to determine effective performance, while status, indoctrination, and PME will not significantly increase the ability to determine effective performance.**

This hypothesis could not be answered because the method used did not produce enough significant data. This model ($n = 35$) included all the independent variables in the order established in section six (S6), Independent Variable Paired Comparison Results, in an entry method with one independent variable per block. The model was not significant ($F = 1.07, p = .41$) and cannot be accepted as a method to answer this hypothesis and explain effective performance. Table 6, shows some of the values of each model. As shown, none of the beta coefficients of the independent variables were significant due to problems with collinearity.

Based on its low tolerance value (.32), being close to zero and the condition index (48.53) being well over the 30, the value at which multicollinearity becomes a serious

problem, is too difficult to determine the separate effects of each independent variable on the dependent variable. This problem can be attributed to the lack of internal consistency of most of the scales as described above as well as the close relationships between the independent variables. The fine differences in the description of experience, knowledge, training, and education made it difficult to distinguish between the items that described them on the survey. Also, for example, airmen who receive education, training, experience, etc become more knowledgeable, hence making these difficult to separate.

Table 6. Multiple Model Value Table.

Variables Entered	Adjusted R-Squared (when added to model)	Beta (β)	Sig	Tolerance	Condition Index
Rank	-.030	.067	.751	.66	9.46
Experience	-.057	-.519	.123	.27	12.17
Knowledge	.056	.404	.069	.64	14.55
Training	.027	.010	.978	.23	17.93
Education	.000	-.174	.580	.30	22.56
PME	.014	-.075	.799	.34	34.12
Indoctrination	-.008	.231	.491	.26	39.07
Status	.016	.390	.207	.32	48.53

Section Five – Effective Performance, Supervisor Perception Results

Subscale Variables and Limitations

A subscale variable was calculated for each of the subscales using the items as listed in Table 3, Section Five Variables and Items, in section five (S5) with the exception of the training variable. Item Q5_31 was removed from the training scale in order to improve its internal consistency. All variables were normally distributed based on the high number of cases (n) used in each variable as well as all Shapiro-Wilk scores being greater than .92. The same limitations as in section two are applicable in the

calculations in this data. Table 7 shows applicable descriptive statistics for all variables required in this section.

There is a moderate correlation between 11 pair of the independent variables but most significant are the strong positive correlations between eight pairs. This correlation between variables may result in imprecise data and is being identified as a potential limitation. Table 8 shows the correlation between all the variables that will be used in this section.

Table 7. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	n	Alpha	Mean	Std. Deviation
Knowledge	666	.52	4.24	.48
Education	640	.67	3.24	.67
Experience	653	.59	3.42	.63
Training	609	.71	3.97	.56
Status	284	.87	2.56	.76
Indoctrination	294	.67	2.92	.82
PME	258	.88	3.11	.95
Effective Performance	660	.66	4.02	.51

This correlation indicates that there is a strong linear relationship between the two independent variables and that the correlated variables are strongly dependent on each other. One variable is not the cause of the other but can be related because they are directly proportional to each other or are so close to the being the same thing. This correlation will result in some of the variance overlapping during the regression process and in ambiguity in the interpretation of the regression because the variables are not well estimated. This indicates that a small change in the data values may lead to large changes in the estimates of the coefficients.

Table 8. Correlation Matrix.

		Knowledge	Education	Experience	Training	Status	Effect Perform	Indoc	PME
Knowledge	Pearson Correlation	1	.293**	.282**	.607**	.170**	.531**	.347**	.389**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.004	.000	.000	.000
	N	666	632	646	601	280	648	289	254
Education	Pearson Correlation	.293**	1	.408**	.439**	.534**	.215**	.507**	.513**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	632	640	621	583	276	623	283	246
Experience	Pearson Correlation	.282**	.408**	1	.451**	.550**	.228**	.367**	.380**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	646	621	653	596	275	636	286	250
Training	Pearson Correlation	.607**	.439**	.451**	1	.244**	.424**	.305**	.347**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	601	583	596	609	270	596	276	242
Status	Pearson Correlation	.170**	.534**	.550**	.244**	1	.147*	.624**	.640**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.004	.000	.000	.000	.014	.000	.000
	N	280	276	275	270	284	277	243	221
EffectPerform	Pearson Correlation	.531**	.215**	.228**	.424**	.147*	1	.309**	.353**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.014		.000	.000
	N	648	623	636	596	277	660	287	254
Indoc	Pearson Correlation	.347**	.507**	.367**	.305**	.624**	.309**	1	.871**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000
	N	289	283	286	276	243	287	294	235
PME	Pearson Correlation	.389**	.513**	.380**	.347**	.640**	.353**	.871**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	254	246	250	242	221	254	235	258

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Mean and Correlation Analysis

The limitations as explained above have no bearing on any univariate analysis such as evaluating the variable means and correlations. The means for each variable are listed in Table 7 above. The means reinforce the paired comparison findings that status is the least important independent variable when compared to the other independent variables. The mean for the independent variable status is 2.56, which correlates to “disagree” on the Likert scale. This suggests that when the respondents were given statements asking whether status was important in order to perform effectively, the respondents disagreed on average. All of the other independent variables, with the exception of indoctrination, had means greater than 3.0, which correlates to “Neither Agree Nor Disagree” or “Agree” on the Likert scale. This suggests that when the

respondents were given statements asking whether each of these independent variables was important to perform effectively, the average response was indifferent or in the case of the independent variable knowledge he/she agreed.

The correlation between the status and effective performance ($r = .147$) suggests there is not more than a small correlation between these variables and that the movement in status has a minimum affect on the movement of effective performance.

Control Variable

The respondents' rank will be used as a control variable for all regression analysis. A control variable is a constant, whose impact is removed in order to analyze the relationship between other variables without interference, or within subgroups of the control variable.

- **H6: Supervisors' perception of status will not moderate the individual relationships between the independent variables knowledge, education, experience or training and the dependent variable effective performance.**

This hypothesis was broken into four sub hypotheses where each independent variable was individually regressed with the dependent variable, effective performance, and status used as a moderating variable. The moderating variable was calculated as described under hypothesis one.

This hypothesis was not rejected and suggests that status does not play a role in the relationship between the independent variables knowledge, education, experience, and training and the dependent variable, effective performance. Four separate models, one for each independent variable, were individually regressed and compared. All four models used a single independent variable, status as a moderating variable, and effective performance as the dependent variable. All models and independent variables were

significant and the moderating variable, status, was insignificant in every model, indicating it has no affect on the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. The aggregate variance explained by all models was 68.8 percent. It is understood the same amount of variance accountability would not be the same in a good model that regresses all the independent variables together with the independent variable. The explained variance could have been better if scale reliability, correlation between independent variables, and the wording of each item were better.

In the model ($n = 270$) regressing knowledge, the moderating variable status, and effective performance, the model was accepted ($F = 38.5, p = .00$). The entire model was able to explain a considerable amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .295). The variable knowledge was a significant predictor ($\beta = .51, p = .00$) and the moderating variable was not ($\beta = .08, p = .23$). The variables in this model had a moderate level of collinearity (tolerance = .66, condition index = 22.6). Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0, \sigma = 1$).

In the model ($n = 266$) regressing education, the moderating variable status, and effective performance, the model was accepted ($F = 7.59, p = .00$). The entire model was able to explain small amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .069). The variable education was a significant predictor ($\beta = .23, p = .02$) and the moderating variable was not ($\beta = .03, p = .77$). The variables in this model had a moderate level of collinearity (tolerance = .33, condition index = 20.4). The residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0, \sigma = 1$).

In the model ($n = 265$) regressing experience, the moderating variable status, and effective performance, the model was accepted ($F = 11.7, p = .00$). The entire model was

able to explain a good amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .108). The variable knowledge was a significant predictor ($\beta = .39, p = .00$) and the moderating variable was not ($\beta = -.13, p = .21$). The variables in this model had a moderate level of collinearity (tolerance = .34, condition index = 22.3). The residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0, \sigma = 1$).

In the model ($n = 262$) regressing training, the moderating variable status, and effective performance, the model was accepted ($F = 24.9, p = .00$). The entire model was able to explain considerable amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .216). The variable training was a significant predictor ($\beta = .43, p = .00$) and the moderating variable was not ($\beta = .03, p = .66$). The variables in this model had a moderate level of collinearity (tolerance = .58, condition index = 20.9). Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0, \sigma = 1$).

- **H7: Enlisted (TSgt-SMSgt), officer (CGO), and leader (CMSgt and FGO) supervisors will not differ on their perception of the effect status has on the relationship between knowledge, education, experience and training and effective performance.**

This hypothesis could not be answered because the method used did not produce enough significant data. Three separate models, one in each rank category, were individually regressed and compared. All three models used the five independent variables experience, knowledge, training, education, and status. Although all three models were accepted, status was not a significant predictor in two of them; therefore, an accurate comparison between groups could not be made. Poor scale reliability, correlation between independent variables, and the wording of each item played a role in the poor significance in the data. Interaction terms were not explored.

The enlisted model ($n = 104$) model was accepted ($F = 6.6, p = .00$) and was able to explain a reasonable amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .25). There were three significant predictors in the model; knowledge ($\beta = .43, p = .001$), education ($\beta = .26, p = .023$), and status ($\beta = -.29, p = .014$). Status contributed four percent of the variance. There were strong correlations between experience and training (.54), experience and education (.52), experience and status (.55), and knowledge and training (.71). There was a serious problem with collinearity with the model (condition index = 36.8). Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0, \sigma = .97$).

The CGO model ($n = 34$) model was accepted ($F = 3.9, p = .006$) and was able to explain a reasonable amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .35); however, only experience was a significant predictors ($\beta = .49, p = .018$). Since status was insignificant, its affect on the model could not be determined. There were strong correlations between experience and effective performance (.57), experience and status (.54), and knowledge and training (.79). There was a serious problem with collinearity with the model (condition index = 117.2). Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0, \sigma = .91$).

The leader model ($n = 97$) model was accepted ($F = 11.3, p = .00$) and was able to explain a reasonable amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .39); however, only knowledge was a significant predictor ($\beta = .44, p = .00$). Since status was insignificant, its affect on the model could not be determined. Seven pairs of variables were strongly correlated and there was a serious problem with collinearity with the model (condition index = 67.9). Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0, \sigma = .97$).

- **H8: Supervisors' perception of knowledge, education, training, or experience, individually, will increase the ability to determine effective performance.**

This hypothesis was broken into four sub-hypotheses where each independent variable was individually regressed with the dependent variable, effective performance. The hypothesis was not rejected based on all the separate models and independent variables' significance values all being accepted. When combining the amount of explained variance in all four models, 56 percent of the variance is accounted for in determining effective performance. It is understood the same variance accountability would not be the same in a model that regresses all the independent variables together with the dependent variable. The 56 percent variance accountability could have been better if scale reliability, correlation between independent variables, and the wording of each item were better.

In the model ($n = 644$) regressing knowledge and effective performance, the model was accepted ($F = 125.2, p = .00$) indicating the variation explained by this model was not due to chance. Knowledge was able to explain a significant amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .28) in the model. The independent variable knowledge was a significant predictor ($\beta = .53, p = .00$). The variables in this model were moderately correlated (.53), condition index (21.4). Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0, \sigma = 1$).

In the model ($n = 619$) regressing education and effective performance, the model was accepted ($F = 15.6, p = .00$) indicating the variation explained by this model was not due to chance. Education was able to explain a small amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .05) in the model. The independent variable education was a significant

predictor ($\beta = .22$, $p = .00$). The variables in this model had a small correlation (.22), condition index (12.0). Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0$, $\sigma = 1$).

In the model ($n = 633$) regressing experience and effective performance, the model was accepted ($F = 18.1$, $p = .00$) indicating the variation explained by this model was not due to chance. Experience was able to explain a small amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .05) in the model. The independent variable experience was a significant predictor ($\beta = .23$, $p = .00$). The variables in this model had a small correlation (.23), condition index (13.6). Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0$, $\sigma = 1$).

In the model ($n = 592$) regressing training and effective performance, the model was accepted ($F = 65.4$, $p = .00$) indicating the variation explained by this model was not due to chance. Training was able to explain a good amount of the variance (adjusted R-squared = .18) in the model. The independent variable training was a significant predictor ($\beta = .42$, $p = .00$). The variables in this model had a moderate correlation (.42), condition index (17.8). Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0$, $\sigma = 1$).

- **H9: Enlisted (TSgt-SMSgt), officer (CGO), and leader (CMSgt and FGO) supervisors will not differ on their perception of the effect knowledge, education, training, or experience, individually, will have on the ability to determine effective performance**

Similar to hypothesis seven, this hypothesis could not be answered because the data did not produce enough significant results.

- **H10: Supervisors' perception of knowledge, education, experience, and training will significantly increase the ability to determine effective performance, while status, indoctrination, and PME will not significantly increase the ability to determine effective performance.**

This hypothesis could not be answered because the method used did not produce enough significant data. This model ($n = 182$) included all the independent variables in the order established in section six, Independent Variable Paired Comparison Results, in an entry method with one independent variable per block. The model was significant ($F = 15.34$, $p = .00$) and explain a significant amount of variance (adjusted R-squared = .39), which is attributable to knowledge and training, the only significant variables. Table 9, shows some of each variable's values in the model. As shown, the beta coefficients of five of the independent variables were not significant (experience, education, PME, indoctrination, and status). Having an acceptable model with several insignificant independent variables is an indication that collinearity problems exist.

Table 9. Multiple Model Value Table.

Variables Entered	Adjusted R-Squared (when added to model)	Beta (β)	Sig	Tolerance Value	Condition Index
Rank (control)	.05	.055	.425	.71	9.5
Experience	.12	.005	.952	.48	11.7
Knowledge	.35	.351	.000	.45	14.7
Training	.38	.210	.024	.40	20.3
Education	.38	.094	.235	.54	27.8
PME	.39	.092	.471	.21	28.5
Indoctrination	.39	.095	.443	.22	31.4
Status	.39	-.108	.271	.35	42.3

Further, based on the tolerance value (.35) being close to zero and the condition index (42.3) being well over the 30, the value at which multicollinearity becomes a serious problem, it became difficult to determine the separate effects of each independent

variable on the dependent variable. Table 9 shows a steady decrease in tolerance values and steady increase in condition indexes as additional variables were added to the model. This problem can be attributed to the lack of internal consistency of most of the scales as described above as well as the close relationships between the independent variables. Overall, 12 of the correlations between each of the variable were moderate and nine were strong, contributing to the problems in this model. The fine differences in the description of experience, knowledge, training, and education made it difficult to distinguish between the items that described them on the survey. Also, for example, airmen who receive education, training, experience, etc become more knowledgeable, hence making these difficult to separate.

Post Hoc Analysis

The same data as used in hypothesis ten was reanalyzed using principal axis factor analysis with an orthogonal (Varimax) rotational method. The purpose of this factor analysis with rotation was to allow SPSS to combine statistically similar items into the same categories (factors). This reduces the convergent validity between the independent variables and eliminates as much correlation between the factors as possible, making the data easier to interpret. SPSS was arranged to automatically extract only factors with Eigen values over one, and suppress any item that had an absolute coefficient value less than three.

Prerequisite factor analysis testing suggests factor analysis is appropriate for this data with an acceptable Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (Chi-Square = 4316.7, sig = .00) and a meritorious Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure (.87). The factor analysis suggests eight factors (all Eigenvalues > 1) can explain 57.3 percent of the variance between the factors.

The factor analysis resulted in a matrix of eight factors with 23 items having no cross-loading between factors and 16 items having cross loading between two or more factors. Fifteen of the 16 cross loaded items were eliminated in order to reduce the correlation and optimize the reliability of the new scales that were produced in this analysis. One item that had cross loading, Q5_29, remained to assist in the reliability of the effective performance scale. All items remaining (23 with no cross loading and one, Q5_29, with cross loading) in the eight factors were analyzed to determine what scale they came from as described previously in section five (S5). Table 10 show the rotated factor matrix with the values of the cross factored items removed, showing which factor each of the 24 remaining items were in after the rotation phase.

Table 10. Rotated Factor Matrix.

	Factor							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Q5_2			.671					.534
Q5_1								
Q5_3								
Q5_4								
Q5_5								
Q5_6								
Q5_8								
Q5_7	.761							
Q5_9	.848							
Q5_10								
Q5_11								
Q5_12			.794					
Q5_13								
Q5_15								
Q5_14								
Q5_16								
Q5_17								
Q5_18	.845							
Q5_19								
Q5_20								
Q5_22								
Q5_21								
Q5_23								
Q5_24								
Q5_26								
Q5_25								
Q5_27	.533							
Q5_29								
Q5_28								
Q5_30								
Q5_31								
Q5_32								
Q5_33								
Q5_34								
Q5_36								
Q5_35								
Q5_37								
Q5_39								
Q5_38			.790					

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

In factor one, two of the items (Q5_7 and Q5_27) were from the indoctrination scale and two (Q5_9 and Q5_18) were from the PME scale; in factor two, both items (Q5_11 and Q5_38) were from the status scale; in factor three, one of the items (Q5_2) was from the knowledge scale, one (Q5_30) was from the education scale, one (Q5_14) was from the experience scale and the remaining three (Q5_4, Q5_13, and Q5_19) were from the training scale; in factor four, three of the items (Q5_8, Q5_29, and Q5_36) were from the effective performance scale and one (Q5_39) was from the status scale; in factor five two of the items (Q5_6 and Q5_16) were from the status scale and one (Q5_36) was from the effective performance scale; in factor six, two items (Q5_12 and Q5_35) were from the education scale and one (Q5_31) was from the training scale; factor seven had no items remaining in it once all the cross factored items were removed; and factor eight, had three items (Q5_1, Q5_15, and Q5_29) from the effective performance scale. Item Q5_29 is the one item that cross-factored between factor four and factor eight. Next, similar items between factors were combined, if reasonable, to further simplify the analysis without introducing excessive correlation or unreliable scales.

Factor one remained separate from the other factors, creating an indoctrination/PME scale. The two status items in factor two were combine with the status item in factor four and the status item in factor five, creating a status scale. All six items in factors three were combined, creating a scale that merged knowledge, education, experience, and training. Finally, the effective performance items in factors four, five, and eight were combine, creating an effective performance scale. The result of this was four new scales/variables indoctrination/PME (IP), status,

knowledge/education/experience/training (KEET), and effective performance that were used in a multiple regression. Figure 16 shows the new model.




Figure 16. Factor Analysis Model.

With the exception of the effective performance scale, all scale variables were calculated with the items as described, except the effective performance variable. Item Q5_25 was removed from the effective performance variable to improve its reliability. Table 11 shows some descriptive statistics of the new scale variables.

Table 11. Descriptive Statistics.

Scale Variables	n	Alpha	Mean	Std. Deviation
KEET	579	.74	3.7	.52
IP	577	.82	3.3	.82
Status	313	.70	2.4	.76
Effective Performance	661	.62	4.0	.53

All variables were normally distributed due to the large number of cases and high Shapiro-Wilk values (lowest = .95). None of the correlations between variables were higher than moderate (highest = .40).

This new model ($n = 253$) included the four new variables that were input in an entry method with one independent variable per block; rank first, then KEET, then IP, then status, with effective performance being the dependent variable. The model was

significant ($F = 14.64$, $p = .00$) and explain a reasonable amount of variance (adjusted R-squared = .18). In this model, all beta coefficients were significant. Table 12, shows some of each variable's values. Having a significant model and significant independent variables is an indication that collinearity in the model has reduced due to the reconfiguration of the items/scales. In this model, KEET explained 11.4 percent of the variance, status explained 3.6 percent of the variance, I/P explained 2.7 percent.

Table 12. Multiple Model Value Table.

Variables Entered	Adjusted R-Squared (when added to model)	Beta (β)	Sig	Tolerance Value	Condition Index
Rank (control)	.001	.016	.793	.831	8.51
KEET	.115	.325	.000	.805	9.04
IP	.142	.253	.000	.727	11.04
Status	.178	-.227	.001	.749	21.53

The tolerance value (.75) and condition index (21.5) show a noticeable improvement, drop, in the amount of multicollinearity in this model when compared to the model used in hypothesis ten. Residual values were normally distributed ($\mu = 0$, $\sigma = 1$).

Section Seven – Organizational Culture Results

- **H11: Enlisted and officer airmen do not differ on their perception of the concept that eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in nonstrategic duties will not negatively affect Air Force culture.**

Statistics

An independent sample t-test was conducted to test this hypothesis by comparing the means of enlisted and officer respondents when considering whether they differ on their perception of the concept that eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in

nonstrategic duties will not negatively affect Air Force culture. All 287 officer cases were used and of the 435 enlisted cases, 287 were randomly selected for this comparison. The scale consisted of 11 items with one item, Q7_3, being problematic to the internal consistency of the scale so it was eliminated from the scale. The 10 item scale with all 574 cases was reliable (.81) and when separated, the 287 enlisted cases were reliable (.82) and the 287 officer cases were also reliable (.81). The culture variable had an overall mean of 3.3 (enlisted 3.4, officers 3.3) and standard deviation of .67 (enlisted .66, officers .67). The normality of the data was suitable ($n = 528$) and a Shapiro-Wilk test for normality ranging from .75 to .89 with an overall of .85. The Levene's test for homogeneity of variance indicated the variances of the enlisted and officer respondents were homogenous ($F = .29$, $p = .59$).

Results

The findings reject this hypothesis ($t = 2.4$, $p = .017$), indicating enlisted and officer respondents do differ on their perception of the concept that eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in nonstrategic duties will not negatively affect Air Force culture. The higher average in the enlisted respondents indicate they are more in favor of the concept than the officer respondents. However, the difference in the two samples is by a mean of .14, with a standard deviation of .06. Both means fall between the “neither agree nor disagree” and “agree” categories on the Likert scale. Further, 95 percent of the time the difference between the groups can range from .03 to .25.

As a note, the double negative in the hypothesis (...not negatively...) was intentional. The intent of this hypothesis was to determine only whether the respondents perceived the concept that eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in nonstrategic

duties would have a *negative* affect on Air Force culture, not to determine whether the affect would be positive.

Item Q7_11.

Item Q7_11 specifically asked “As an organization the Air Force should consider the concept of employing enlisted and company grade officer personnel in similar duties where grade is not an integral part of strategy, plan of action, or chain-of-command.” It was intended to get a future direction of the concept presented in this research. The mean response to this item (n=707) alone was 3.4 with a standard deviation of 1.1. Based on the Likert scale a three response equated to “Neither Agree nor Disagree” and a four response equated to “Agree.”

Post Hoc Analysis

To further examine the data, it was divided into four categories to see if the differences were specifically between enlisted and officer respondents or based on another trait. An ANOVA was conducted on four categories: (1) TSgt, MSgt, and SMSgt; (2) CMSgt; (3) CGOs; and (4) FGOs, including the six general officer respondents. There were 37 CMSgt respondents; therefore, 37 random cases were selected from each of the other categories for this comparison. Item Q7_3 was not included in the scale to improve its internal consistency. The overall scale was reliable (.80) as well as within each category (NCO .82, CMSgt .75, CGO .81, and FGO .82). The culture variable had an overall mean of 3.3 (NCO 3.4, CMSgt 3.2, CGO 3.5, FGO 3.3) and standard deviation of .67 (NCO .71, CMSgt .63, CGO .62, FGO .69). The normality of the data was suitable (n=140) and a Shapiro-Wilk test for normality ranging from .73 to .88 with an overall of .99. The Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance

reveals the variances between the categories was homogenous ($F = .84$, $p = .48$). Based on these findings, if a hypothesis similar to H11 was asked to these four groups, it would not have been rejected ($F = 1.6$, $p = .19$), indicating that when divided, NCO, CMSgt, CGO, and FGO respondents do not differ on their perception of the concept that eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in nonstrategic duties will not negatively affect Air Force culture.

Section Eight – Air Force Personnel Transformation Results

- **H12: Eliminating rank as a qualifier to employment in nonstrategic duties is an acceptable method to assist in meeting the intent of transformation.**

The items for this hypothesis were broken into two subscales. Subscale one represented the respondent's perception of the importance of rank in nonstrategic duty positions when compared to qualifications such as knowledge, education, training, and experience. Subscale two represented the respondent's perception of whether eliminating rank as a qualifier and integrating qualified enlisted and officer airmen in similar duties supports transformation.

Variables were developed for each subscale. Subscale one had a good reliability (.80), once item Q8_7 was removed from the scale, and subscale two had a poor reliability (.57) even with item Q8_10 removed from the scale. The data in both variables were normally distributed based on the number of cases used in each variable ($n = 693$, $n = 682$) and on their high Shapiro-Wilk values (.94, .98) accordingly. The means and standard deviations of both variables (variable one: $\mu = 3.7$, $\sigma = .67$; variable two: $\mu = 3.6$, $\sigma = .53$) indicate the respondents' perception were between a three "Neither Agree nor Disagree," and four "Agree," on the Likert scale. This incline toward "agree"

indicates that the respondents tend to agree, more so than disagree, with the concepts that make up this hypothesis.

Comments Received on Surveys

There were a total of 270 cases, 37 percent, that included comments. Most of the comments were extensive and did not universally accept or reject the proposed concept in this exploratory research. Some common themes are to maintain the chain-of-command and customs and courtesies. Others include the difference in compensation for the same job would be unfair to enlisted personnel and that the propensity for unprofessional relationship would increase. Some claim enlisted and officer personnel and currently performing the same duties in some areas and that this concept would work in some situations.

No data analysis was conducted on the comments; however, due to the unexpected large volume received, they were included in Appendix C. All comments are as written by the respondents except where indicated. Portions of some comments were removed by the author to protect respondent's personal information and privacy.

V. Discussion

This research explored an asymmetrical concept of personnel management.

Regardless of the limitations presented in chapter four and most undisputable is that status placed last in the compared comparison where respondents were forced to select one variable over another that they perceived to be important for a subordinate to perform effectively. Also, the analysis of the means and correlation between status and effective performance indicate status has little effect on one's ability to perform effectively.

This asymmetrical concept is not without its complications and some of the data was implausible due to insignificance from poor scale reliability, correlation between the independent variables, and problems with the wording of the items in the survey. Withstanding these limitations and base on the statistically significant data in the regression analysis in H3, H6, H8, H10 (post hoc findings), H11, and H12, the results lend themselves slightly toward the idea that status, rank, has little affect on one's ability to perform effectively. The results of the regression in hypotheses three (all respondents) and eight (supervisor respondents) indicate knowledge, education, experience, and training account for 56 percent of the variance, indicating the ability to perform effectively can be determined partially from these variables. Hypothesis six shows the aggregate variance explained by knowledge, education, experience, and training is 69 percent and status had no affect on the relationship between these independent variables and the dependent variable effective performance, again an indication status has no bearing on effective performance. In the post hoc analysis in hypothesis 10, knowledge, education, experience, and training (calculated as a single variable) accounted for 11.4 percent of the overall variance, status accounted for 3.6 percent, and indoctrination/PME

accounted for 2.7 percent. The findings in hypothesis 11 suggest that when the respondents were divided by enlisted and officer, the groups did differ on whether this concept would not negatively affect Air Force culture; however, the means of both groups both were in between the “neither agree nor disagree” and “agree” selections on the Likert scale. When the respondents were divided in four categories (NCO, CMSgt, CGO, and FGO) the respondents did not differ and the means of all groups were in between the “neither agree nor disagree” and “agree” selections on the Likert scale. Finally, hypothesis 12 suggests the respondents overall perceived this concept to be more inline with personnel transformation efforts than not. The overall respondent means was also in between the “neither agree nor disagree” and “agree” selections on the Likert scale.

Qualitatively, this research provides extensive literature indicating human capital management bases personnel on skills held without a class separation as an efficient way to manage personnel.

With additional research into this topic, the Air Force stands to magnify its capability with an increase in the number of airmen employed, without additional cost, by further exploiting the knowledge, education, training, and experience of its enlisted airmen. The emphasis is on further utilization and the expansion of the enlisted force without violating the chain-of-command, customs and courtesies, or officer career progression. It is not intended on resurrecting past programs such as Warrant Officers or enlisted pilots, nor is it aimed at moving toward a laissez-faire concept of management; a chain-of-command and leadership still apply.

The comments indicate there are strong opinions on this topic and should be further researched; hence analysis of these comments, in Appendix C, is the first area left for future research. Seven additional areas highlighting the need for further research including an economic evaluation, duty position review, total force comparison, tracking voluntary enlisted education, institutional administration, repeat research with different variables, and transforming officer duties to enlisted duties instead of the interchangeable rank concept.

Economic Evaluation

This thesis briefly showed the potential cost savings of employing enlisted in lieu of officer airmen but did not extensively research the economic side of human capital in terms of monetary return on investments or rates of return, to the individual or organization, by providing no cost education and training to its airmen. The following questions are left for future research:

- What are the economic benefits to the Air Force for sponsoring education opportunities to its enlisted airmen?
- How can the Air Force improve its return on investment for the sponsored education it provides to enlisted airmen?
- What, if any, loss in investment is the Air Force currently losing?

Duty Position Review

The results of this research support a comprehensive reevaluation at Air Force enlisted and officer duty positions to determine where rank is not a strategic factor and employing qualified enlisted airmen is appropriate; Air Force Instructions 36-2105, Officer Classification, and 36-2108, Enlisted Classification, require review. The criteria

for any Air Force duty position should not be increased or decreased in terms of qualifications required to perform effectively; an advanced academic degree requirement should neither be levied on positions currently not requiring a degree nor should a degree requirement be taken away from positions currently requiring a degree. The criteria in terms of knowledge, education, training, and experience should not be changed for any position. Enlisted or officer airmen must meet these qualifications to be employed in positions that require a degree. A study must be performed on how to effectively employ qualified enlisted airmen in officer career fields while simultaneously preserving officer training and progression. A possible approach that can be modeled is in aircraft maintenance, where junior officers are rotated throughout the maintenance organization. The junior maintenance officers that are rotated throughout the organization often do not hold the primary knowledge base to be in charge, but rely on the NCO/SNCO to mentor them. The intent of the rotation in these areas are to gain career broadening and experience so that the junior officer can lead similar organizations in the future with a basic knowledge of the operations in the lower levels of the organization.

This research recognizes that a change in what duties enlisted airmen are employed in will have an affect on the potential for the career progression of the enlisted airmen. To ensure enlisted progression, the approach could be similar to any other career broadening position that enlisted airmen take in their career. Generally, leaving one's primary career field to fulfill a career broadening opportunity, then returning to the primary career field could be a basis to accommodate the change described in this research. The following questions are left for future research:

- How can qualified mid-level enlisted airmen be employed in company grade officer duties while ensuring officer career progression?
- How can the enlisted promotion system accommodate this change?

Total Force Comparison

Figure 17 shows the military officer/enlisted breakout for active duty, reserve, and guard services. It is understood that the mission of active duty, reserve, and guard are somewhat different but their end goals are similar.



Figure 17. Military Officer/Enlisted Breakout.
(Department of the Air Force, Air Force Handbook, 108th Congress, First Secession, 2003:3).

The following questions are left for future research:

- How can the active duty Air Force increase its percentage of enlisted airmen and decrease the percentage of officer airmen (similar to the Air National Guard's percentages), while maintaining mission accomplishment?
- What are the economic benefits to the Air Force of employing more enlisted in officer billets?

Tracking Voluntary Enlisted Education

It is safe to say that enlisted airmen will continue to voluntarily pursue advanced academic degrees. However, there are two unknown factors: 1) not knowing how many enlisted airmen will pursue education each year; and 2) what degree programs will enlisted personnel graduate in each year. The following questions are left for future research:

- How can the Air Force employ the interchangeable rank concept of this research with the number of enlisted airmen pursuing advanced degrees not being constant?
- How can the Air Force stabilize or anticipate the number and types of degrees (BA/BS or MA/MS), enlisted airmen pursue, in order to ensure a selection of enlisted airmen with appropriate advanced degrees to fill new duty positions requiring an advanced degree?

Institutional Administration

The concept of this research would require a considerable reevaluation and several process and procedural changes as well as Air Force instruction and manning document changes. Also, how to actually initiate the process of identifying qualified enlisted airmen and employing them in positions commensurate with their education qualifications would need research. A starting point, to develop a more thorough process, could be that once enlisted airmen graduate with BA/BS, they are notified of career broadening opportunities that uses their education, at which time he/she volunteers for the available position. If critical shortages become a problem, a non-volunteer process may be initiated at the Air Force's discretion. If the enlisted applicant is accepted, then

he/she proceeds to the career broadening position, that may or may not require additional education (i.e. MS/MA, etc.) for a predetermined number of years (i.e. controlled tour). This position could be at any level of command. After the assignment is completed, the enlisted person would return to his/her primary career field.

This research surveyed mainly TSgt through CMSgt and Lieutenants through Colonel. A future research topic could include a Delphi study or interviews of general officers.

Repeat Research with Different Variables

The intent of this follow on research is to repeat the research to attempt to answer the hypotheses with different variables that have less cross factoring such as those developed in the post hoc factor analysis. Further, to use factor analysis with different rotational methods.

Transforming Officer Duties to Enlisted Duties

As this title implies, instead of interchanging ranks as necessary as described in this research, determine what CGO level duties can wholly be transferred to enlisted personnel. The following question is left for future research:

- What CGO level duties can be transferred to the enlisted force without negatively impacting mission accomplishment?

Conclusion

With effort from many organizations in the Air Force, this concept has the potential to transform Air Force airmen management and how we employ our airmen. In the levels of employment targeted in this research, rank has little bearing on one's ability to perform effectively based on the significant data in this research; it is qualifications

such as knowledge, education, training, and experience that matters. This concept assists the efforts made to transform the Air Force and does not appear to have a negative affect on its culture. It is not intended to be a concept of equality toward all airmen but is intended to increase the capability of the Air Force within the existing manpower and budget constraints by putting the right person, in the right job, at the right time.

Appendix A: Survey

Survey Cover E-mail/Letter

From: Romano Daniel M CMSgt AFIT/ENS
Sent: Thursday, December 22, 2005 10:01 AM
Subject: Air Force Human Capital Management Survey

You were randomly chosen from a list of enlisted and officer personnel to take part in this web-based survey that is collecting data for a research effort that is examine the impact of placing more emphasis on qualifications and less on rank when employing forces in selected technical and management positions.

Your participation in this survey is extremely valuable to the accuracy of the results and is *completely voluntary and anonymous*. Your responses will only be used in analysis that is in combination with all other responses. The survey should take you *approximately 20 - 25 minutes to complete*. Please answer all questions based on your knowledge and experiences. When you are finished please ensure you click the submit button at the end of the survey, which will send your answers to the survey data base. *It is very important that you click the submit button at the end of the survey to forward your answers to the survey data base.*

This survey has been approved by AFPC/DPAPS (survey control number - 05-129; valid through 30 June 2006) and is sponsored by USAF/DPPF. If you have any questions regarding this survey, please contact CMSgt Dan Romano by e-mail at daniel.romano@afit.edu or by phone at DSN 785-3636 or commercial at (937) 256-8564. Thank you for taking your valuable time to answer this survey.

Please click on the following link to begin the survey.

<http://www.afit.edu/en/Surveys/dromanoSurvey/>

DAN ROMANO, CMSGT, USAF
Graduate Student, AFIT/ENS/GLM

Survey

Survey Control Number: USAF SCN 05-129

Privacy Notice

The following information is provided as required by the Privacy Act of 1974:

Purpose: To examine the impacts of placing more emphasis on qualifications and less on rank when employing forces in selected technical and management positions.

Participation: Your participation is completely voluntary. Your responses will help to examine potential changes in how the Air Force employs military personnel. Your participation is very important.

Confidentiality: ALL ANSWERS ARE ANONYMOUS. In no way will the information you provide be used to determine who you are. The demographic information is valuable to the success of the research and will only be used in an analysis of the results. No one other than the research team will see your responses. Group trends and statistical findings may be published and briefed to leadership personnel as part of the thesis research.

Contact information: If you have any questions or comments about the survey, please contact me.

Please base your answers on your own thoughts and experiences..

CMSgt Dan Romano
AFIT/ENS
2950 Hobson Way
Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433-7765
Email: daniel.romano@afit.edu
Phone: DSN 255-3636, commercial (937) 255-3636

[Start Survey](#)

Notice and Consent Banner:

Use of this DoD computer system, authorized or unauthorized, constitutes consent to monitoring of this system. Unauthorized use may subject you to criminal prosecution. Evidence of unauthorized use collected during monitoring may be used for administrative, criminal, or other adverse action. Use of this system constitutes consent to monitoring for these purposes.

Read the [Privacy and Security Notice](#)

Section I: Education Level

This survey will begin by assessing your education level at the time you entered the Air Force, your current education level, and the type of degree(s) you hold. If you have more than one degree at the same level, select the one that you most recently completed.

Select your highest education level at the time you first enlisted or were commissioned in the USAF.

- High school graduate
- Doctorate Degree (e.g., PhD, MD)
- Associates Degree (e.g., AA, AS)
- Post Doctoral
- Bachelor Degree (e.g., BA, AB, BS)
- Professional Degree (e.g. law, medical)
- Masters Degree (e.g., MA, MS, MBA)

Select your highest education level at this time.

- High school graduate (with diploma)
- Doctorate Degree (e.g., PhD, MD)
- Associates Degree (e.g., AA, AS)
- Post Doctoral
- Bachelor Degree (e.g., BA, AB, BS)
- Professional Degree (e.g. law, medical)
- Masters Degree (e.g., MA, MS, MBA)

[Continue](#)

Section I: Education Level (Continued)

What is the general category of your bachelor degree?

<input type="radio"/> Engineering	<input type="radio"/> Mathematics	<input type="radio"/> Business	<input type="radio"/> Management
<input type="radio"/> Social Science	<input type="radio"/> Analytical science	<input type="radio"/> Physical science	<input type="radio"/> Accounting
<input type="radio"/> Medical	<input type="radio"/> Law	<input type="radio"/> Liberal Arts	<input type="radio"/> Other <input type="text"/>

What is the general category of your masters degree?

<input type="radio"/> Engineering	<input type="radio"/> Mathematics	<input type="radio"/> Business	<input type="radio"/> Management
<input type="radio"/> Social Science	<input type="radio"/> Analytical science	<input type="radio"/> Physical science	<input type="radio"/> Accounting
<input type="radio"/> Medical	<input type="radio"/> Law	<input type="radio"/> Liberal Arts	<input type="radio"/> Other <input type="text"/>

What is the general category of your doctorate degree?

<input type="radio"/> Engineering	<input type="radio"/> Mathematics	<input type="radio"/> Business	<input type="radio"/> Management
<input type="radio"/> Social Science	<input type="radio"/> Analytical science	<input type="radio"/> Physical science	<input type="radio"/> Accounting
<input type="radio"/> Medical	<input type="radio"/> Law	<input type="radio"/> Liberal Arts	<input type="radio"/> Other <input type="text"/>

What is the general category of your post doctoral work?

<input type="radio"/> Engineering	<input type="radio"/> Mathematics	<input type="radio"/> Business	<input type="radio"/> Management
<input type="radio"/> Social Science	<input type="radio"/> Analytical science	<input type="radio"/> Physical science	<input type="radio"/> Accounting
<input type="radio"/> Medical	<input type="radio"/> Law	<input type="radio"/> Liberal Arts	<input type="radio"/> Other <input type="text"/>

How did you complete and fund your degree?

Associates

<input type="radio"/> N/A	<input type="radio"/> Full time student while on active duty (i.e. not having to maintain any other job in the Air Force) and funded by the Air Force/DoD	<input type="radio"/> Part time student while on active duty (i.e. taking classes while maintaining your active duty job) and funded by the Air Force/DoD (i.e. Tuition assistance, etc)
	<input type="radio"/> Student while not on active duty and non Air Force/DoD funded	<input type="radio"/> Student while not on active duty, Air Force/DoD funded (i.e. VEAP, GI-Bill, etc)

Bachelor

<input type="radio"/> N/A	<input type="radio"/> Full time student while on active duty (i.e. not having to maintain any other job in the Air Force) and funded by the Air Force/DoD	<input type="radio"/> Part time student while on active duty (i.e. taking classes while maintaining your active duty job) and funded by the Air Force/DoD (i.e. Tuition assistance, etc)
	<input type="radio"/> Student while not on active duty and non Air Force/DoD funded	<input type="radio"/> Student while not on active duty, Air Force/DoD funded (i.e. VEAP, GI-Bill, etc)

Masters

<input type="radio"/> N/A	<input type="radio"/> Full time student while on active duty (i.e. not having to maintain any other job in the Air Force) and funded by the Air Force/DoD	<input type="radio"/> Part time student while on active duty (i.e. taking classes while maintaining your active duty job) and funded by the Air Force/DoD (i.e. Tuition assistance, etc)
	<input type="radio"/> Student while not on active duty and non Air Force/DoD funded	<input type="radio"/> Student while not on active duty, Air Force/DoD funded (i.e. VEAP, GI-Bill, etc)

Doctorate

<input type="radio"/> N/A	<input type="radio"/> Full time student while on active duty (i.e. not having to maintain any other job in the Air Force) and funded by the Air Force/DoD	<input type="radio"/> Part time student while on active duty (i.e. taking classes while maintaining your active duty job) and funded by the Air Force/DoD (i.e. Tuition assistance, etc)
	<input type="radio"/> Student while not on active duty and non Air Force/DoD funded	<input type="radio"/> Student while not on active duty, Air Force/DoD funded (i.e. VEAP, GI-Bill, etc)

What is the general category of your professional degree?

<input type="radio"/> Medical	<input type="radio"/> Law	<input type="radio"/> Other <input type="text"/>
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[Next Section](#)

Section II: Effective Performance Factors

The following items examine your perception of what preparations you have received or traits you have that may allow you to perform effectively in your current Air Force Specialty (AFS).

When responding to these items, please consider only technical, operational, or administrative duties, responsibilities, or requirements to perform in the AFS; do not include supervisory, management, or leadership responsibilities that may be inherent to your position. For example, aircraft maintenance personnel, research engineers, or acquisition managers, who may also supervise or manage others, would only consider what it takes to effectively perform the maintenance, engineering, or acquisition duties and responsibilities of the job and would not consider their supervisory or management roles. Please evaluate these items in terms of the characteristics you believe are inherently required to perform in your position rather than the characteristics of individuals typically occupying such positions. *Effective performance can be defined as meeting the minimum requirements as established in the guidance you follow (i.e. technical order, Military Standard, FAR, AFI, etc.)*

If you are strictly a supervisor, manager, leader, or student at this time, base your responses on your experience from the most recent position where you performed the technical, operational, or administrative duties and responsibilities of the AFS. Please select the number that appropriately indicates the extent to which you agree that the following preparations or traits help you effectively perform the duties and responsibilities of your AFS.

0 N/A	1 Strongly Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neither Agree nor Disagree	4 Agree	5 Strongly Agree
----------	------------------------	---------------	---------------------------------	------------	---------------------

1 Quantity of output is what is important when determining whether I am performing effectively.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

2 To perform effectively, I require factual understanding of the technical part of my AFS.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

3 To perform effectively, I require college level education.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

4 To perform effectively, I require technical school general to the field of my AFS.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

5 To perform effectively, I require a certain amount of time served as a technician in the AFS.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

[Continue](#)

Section II: Effective Performance Factors (Continued)

Please consider only technical, operational, or administrative duties, responsibilities, or requirements to perform in the AFS; do not include supervisory, management, or leadership responsibilities that may be inherent to your position.

Please select the number that appropriately indicates the extent to which you agree that the following preparations or traits help you effectively perform the representative duties and responsibilities of your AFS.

	0 N/A	1 Strongly Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neither Agree nor Disagree	4 Agree	5 Strongly Agree
6 To perform effectively, I require a certain amount of time-in-grade.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
7 Basic military training helped me perform effectively in my current AFS.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
8 Mission accomplishment is what is important when determining whether I am performing effectively.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
9 Airman Leadership School (ALS) helped me perform effectively in my AFS.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
10 To perform effectively, I require practical military skills.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
11 To perform effectively, I require status as a company grade officer.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
12 To perform effectively, I require formal accredited general instruction.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

[Continue](#)

Section II: Effective Performance Factors (Continued)

Please consider only technical, operational, or administrative duties, responsibilities, or requirements to perform in the AFS; do not include supervisory, management, or leadership responsibilities that may be inherent to your position.

Please select the number that appropriately indicates the extent to which you agree that the following preparations or traits help you effectively perform the representative duties and responsibilities of your AFS.

0	1	2	3	4	5
N/A	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

13 To perform effectively, I require field detachment training specific to my AFS.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

14 To perform effectively, I require a certain amount of time serving in different positions within the AFS.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

15 Optimum customer service is what is important when determining whether I am performing effectively.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

16 To perform effectively, I require a certain amount of time-in-service.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

17 Officer Training School helped me perform effectively in my AFS.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

18 Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) helped me perform effectively in my AFS.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

19 To perform effectively, I require career development course specific to my AFS.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

[Continue](#)

Section II: Effective Performance Factors (Continued)

Please consider only technical, operational, or administrative duties, responsibilities, or requirements to perform in the AFS; do not include supervisory, management or leadership responsibilities that may be inherent to your position.

Please select the number that appropriately indicates the extent to which you agree that the following preparations or traits help you effectively perform the representative duties and responsibilities of your AFS.

	0 N/A	1 Strongly Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neither Agree nor Disagree	4 Agree	5 Strongly Agree
20 To perform effectively, I require a certain rank/grade.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
21 To perform effectively, I require an understanding of what is relevant to a problem/situation.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
22 Meeting Air Force standards is <u>not</u> important when determining whether I am performing effectively.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
23 To perform effectively, I require formal accredited specific instruction to my AFS.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
24 To perform effectively, I require other military technical training/courses.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
25 To perform effectively, I require a certain amount of time-on-station	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
26 To perform effectively, I require the status as an NCO.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

[Continue](#)

Section II: Effective Performance Factors (Continued)

Please consider only technical, operational, or administrative duties, responsibilities, or requirements to perform in the AFS; do not include supervisory, management, or leadership responsibilities that may be inherent to your position.

Please select the number that appropriately indicates the extent to which you agree that the following preparations or traits help you effectively perform the representative duties and responsibilities of your AFS.

0	1	2	3	4	5
N/A	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

27 Indoctrination/in processing at inbound bases helped me perform effectively in my AFS.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

28 Senior NCOA helped me perform effectively in my AFS.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

29 Timeliness is what is important when determining whether I am performing effectively.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

30 To perform effectively, I require other supervised instruction/practices.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

31 To perform effectively, I require civilian provided technical training/course specific to my AFS.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

32 To perform effectively, I should be a certain age.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

33 To perform effectively, I require status as a SNCO.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

[Continue](#)

Section II: Effective Performance Factors (Continued)

Please consider only technical, operational, or administrative duties, responsibilities, or requirements to perform in the AFS; do not include supervisory, management or leadership responsibilities that may be inherent to your position.

Please select the number that appropriately indicates the extent to which you agree that the following preparations or traits help you effectively perform the representative duties and responsibilities of your AFS.

0 N/A	1 Strongly Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neither Agree nor Disagree	4 Agree	5 Strongly Agree
----------	------------------------	---------------	---------------------------------	------------	---------------------

34 Squadron Officer School (SOS) helped me perform effectively in my AFS.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

35 To perform effectively, I require formal computer based instruction.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

36 Quality is important when determining whether I am performing effectively.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

37 To perform effectively, I require on-the-job training.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

38 To perform effectively, I require status as a field grade officer.

0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>					

[Next Section](#)

Section III: Supervision/Management Determination

1 Do you now, or have you ever, in your Air Force career supervised any number of personnel?

Supervise can be defined as being in charge of, and responsible for, subordinate personnel, whom you may or may not write performance reports on.

Yes
 No

[Next Section](#)

Section IV: Supervisor Demographics

1 How many years have you supervised personnel?

≤ 1 2 – 5 6 – 10 > 25
 11 – 15 16 – 20 21 – 25

2 How many people do you supervise at this time?

≤ 5 6 – 10 11 – 15 16 – 25
 26 – 50 51 – 75 76 – 100 > 100

3 What is the most number of people you have ever supervised in your career?

≤ 5 6 – 10 11 – 15 16 – 25
 26 – 50 51 – 75 76 – 100 > 100

4 What are the general rank categories of the personnel you supervise at this time? [\(Mark all that apply\)](#)

<input type="checkbox"/> Airmen	<input type="checkbox"/> NCO	<input type="checkbox"/> SNCO
<input type="checkbox"/> CGO	<input type="checkbox"/> FGO	<input type="checkbox"/> General Schedule Civilians
<input type="checkbox"/> Wage Grade Civilians	<input type="checkbox"/> Wage Supervisor Civilians	<input type="checkbox"/> Volunteer
<input type="checkbox"/> Contractor	<input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="text"/>	

5 At what level of command do you work?

<input type="radio"/> USAF	<input type="radio"/> MAJCOM	<input type="radio"/> NAF/DRU/FOA	<input type="radio"/> Wing
<input type="radio"/> Group	<input type="radio"/> Squadron	<input type="radio"/> Flight	<input type="radio"/> Other <input type="text"/>

[Next Section](#)

Section V: Effective Performance Factors for Your Subordinates

This section is for personnel who supervise, manage, or lead personnel. The following statements are concerned with your perception of what preparations or traits you perceive as important for the personnel under your control to have that will allow them to perform effectively in the AFS.

These items are similar to the previous set but you are now asked to consider them from a supervisor's, manager's, or leader's perspective. Please consider only the technical, operational, or administrative duties, responsibilities, or requirements you perceive that your subordinates require to perform in the AFS. For example, for a subordinate acquisition manager you would consider what you perceive to be required for your subordinate to plan, organize, direct, and coordinate acquisition management activities. Please evaluate these items in terms of the characteristics you believe are inherently required to perform in your subordinates' positions rather than the characteristics of individuals typically occupying those positions. Again, effective performance can be defined as meeting the minimum requirements as established in the guidance you follow (i.e. technical order, Military Standard, AFI, etc). Please select the number that appropriately indicates the extent to which you agree that the following preparations or traits would help your personnel perform effectively in their respective AFS.

0 N/A	1 Strongly Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neither Agree nor Disagree	4 Agree	5 Strongly Agree
1 Quantity of output is what is important when determining whether my subordinates are performing effectively.					
0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2 To perform effectively, my subordinates require a factual understanding of the technical part of their AFS.					
0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3 To perform effectively, my subordinates require a college level education that relates to their AFS.					
0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
4 To perform effectively, my subordinates require technical school general to the field of their AFS					
0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
5 To perform effectively, my subordinates require a certain amount of time served as a technician in their AFS.					
0	1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

[Continue](#)

Section V: Effective Performance Factors for Your Subordinates (Continued)

Please consider only the technical, operational, or administrative duties, responsibilities, or requirements you perceive that your subordinates require to perform in the AFS.

Please select the number that appropriately indicates the extent to which you agree that the following preparations or traits would help your personnel perform effectively in their respective AFS.

	0 N/A	1 Strongly Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neither Agree nor Disagree	4 Agree	5 Strongly Agree
6 To perform effectively, my subordinates require a certain amount of time-in-grade.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
7 Basic military training will help my subordinates perform effectively in their AFS.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
8 Mission accomplishment is what is important when determining whether my subordinates are performing effectively.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
9 Airman Leadership School will help my subordinates perform effectively in their AFS.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
10 To perform effectively, my subordinates require practical military skills.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
11 To perform effectively, my subordinates require status as a company grade officer	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
12 To perform effectively, my subordinates require formal accredited general instruction.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

[Continue](#)

Section V: Effective Performance Factors for Your Subordinates (Continued)

Please consider only the technical, operational, or administrative duties, responsibilities, or requirements you perceive that your subordinates require to perform in the AFS.

Please select the number that appropriately indicates the extent to which you agree that the following preparations or traits would help your personnel perform effectively in their respective AFS.

	0 N/A	1 Strongly Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neither Agree nor Disagree	4 Agree	5 Strongly Agree
13 To perform effectively, my subordinates require field detachment training specific to their AFS.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
14 To perform effectively, my subordinates require a certain amount of time serving in different positions within their AFS.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
15 Optimum customer service is what is important when determining whether my subordinates are performing effectively.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
16 To perform effectively, my subordinates require a certain amount of time-in-service.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
17 Officer Training School will help my subordinates perform effectively in their AFS.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
18 The Noncommissioned Officer Academy will help my subordinates perform effectively in their AFS.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
19 To perform effectively, my subordinates require career development course specific to their AFS.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

[Continue](#)

Section V: Effective Performance Factors for Your Subordinates (Continued)

Please consider only the technical, operational, or administrative duties, responsibilities, or requirements you perceive that your subordinates require to perform in their AFS.

Please select the number that appropriately indicates the extent to which you agree that the following preparations or traits would help your personnel perform effectively in their respective AFS.

	0 N/A	1 Strongly Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neither Agree nor Disagree	4 Agree	5 Strongly Agree
20 To perform effectively, my subordinates require a certain rank/grade.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
21 To perform effectively, my subordinates require an understanding of what is relevant to a problem/situation.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
22 Meeting Air Force standards is important when determining whether my subordinates are performing effectively.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
23 To perform effectively, my subordinates require formal accredited specific instruction to their AFS.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
24 To perform effectively, my subordinates require other military technical training/courses.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
25 To perform effectively, my subordinates require a certain amount of time-on-station.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
26 To perform effectively, my subordinates require the status as a noncommissioned officer.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

[Continue](#)

Section V: Effective Performance Factors for Your Subordinates (Continued)

Please consider only the technical, operational, or administrative duties, responsibilities, or requirements you perceive that your subordinates require to perform in the AFS.

Please select the number that appropriately indicates the extent to which you agree that the following preparations or traits would help your personnel perform effectively in their respective AFS.

	0 N/A	1 Strongly Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neither Agree nor Disagree	4 Agree	5 Strongly Agree
27 Indoctrination/in processing at inbound bases will help my subordinates perform effectively in their AFS.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
28 The Senior Noncommissioned Officer Academy will help my subordinates perform effectively in their AFS.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
29 Timeliness is important when determining whether my subordinates are performing effectively.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
30 To perform effectively, my subordinates require other supervised instruction/practices.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
31 To perform effectively, my subordinates require civilian provided technical training/course specific to their AFS.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
32 To perform effectively, my subordinates should be a certain age.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
33 To perform effectively, my subordinates require status as a SNCO.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

[Continue](#)

Section V: Effective Performance Factors for Your Subordinates (Continued)

Please consider only the technical, operational, or administrative duties, responsibilities, or requirements you perceive that your subordinates require to perform in the AFS.

Please select the number that appropriately indicates the extent to which you agree that the following preparations or traits would help your personnel perform effectively in their respective AFS.

	0 N/A	1 Strongly Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neither Agree nor Disagree	4 Agree	5 Strongly Agree
34 Squadron Officer School will help my subordinates perform effectively in their AFS.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
35 To perform effectively, my subordinates require formal computer based instruction.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
36 Quality is important when determining whether my subordinates are performing effectively.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
37 To perform effectively, my subordinates require on-the-job training.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
38 To perform effectively, my subordinates require status as a field grade officer.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
39 Rank <u>alone</u> is what is important when determining whether my subordinates will perform effectively.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

[Next Section](#)

Section VI: Air Force Specialty Criteria Paired Comparison

This set of questions asks you to rank a pair of qualifications, one relative to the other.

For each pair of answers, select the one you believe is most important for a subordinate to have to perform effectively - if you had to choose between the two. There are no duplicate pairs.

1 Knowledge – Having factual understanding and practical military skills required to perform at the qualified level.
Education – Having attended academic study or instruction related to the AFS.

Knowledge Education

2 Training – Having attended courses contributing directly to effective performance in the AFS.
Experience – Having previously performed in the AFS or similar AFS; have shown ability to perform in the past.

Training Experience

3 Education – Having attended academic study or instruction required in the AFS.
Status – Having a certain rank, or category (i.e. airman, NCO, SNCO, CGO, FGO, etc)

Education Status

4 Indoctrination – Having attended basic military training or officer training school
Professional military education – Having attended leadership school, academies (NCOA, SNCOA, SOS, ISS, etc)

Indoctrination PME

[Continue](#)

Section VI: Air Force Specialty Criteria Paired Comparison (Continued)

For each pair of answers, select the one you believe is most important for a subordinate to have to perform effectively - if you had to choose between the two. There are no duplicate pairs.

5 Knowledge – Having factual understanding and practical military skills required to perform at the qualified level.
Training – Having attended courses contributing directly to effective performance in the AFS.

Knowledge Training

6 Experience – Having previously performed in the AFS or similar AFS; have shown ability to perform in the past.
Education – Having attended academic study or instruction related to the AFS.

Experience Education

7 Training – Having attended courses contributing directly to effective performance in the AFS.
Professional military education - Having attended leadership school, academies (NCOA, SNCOA), SOS, etc

Training PME

8 Status – Having a certain rank, or category (i.e. airman, NCO, SNCO, CGO, FGO, etc)
Indoctrination – Having attended basic military training or officer training school

Status Indoctrination

9 Knowledge – Having factual understanding and practical military skills required to perform at the qualified level.
Experience – Having previously performed in the AFS or similar AFS; have shown ability to perform in the past.

Knowledge Experience

10 Training – Having attended courses contributing directly to effective performance in the AFS.
Education – Having attended academic study or instruction required in the AFS.

Training Education

[Continue](#)

Section VI: Air Force Specialty Criteria Paired Comparison (Continued)

For each pair of answers, select the one you believe is most important for a subordinate to have to perform effectively - if you had to choose between the two. There are no duplicate pairs.

11 Experience – Having previously performed in the AFS or similar AFS; have shown ability to perform in the past.
 Status – Having a certain rank, or category (i.e. airman, NCO, SNCO, CGO, FGO, etc)
 Experience Status

12 Education – Having attended academic study or instruction related to the AFS
 Indoctrination – Having attended basic military training or officer training school
 Education Indoctrination

13 Status – Having a certain rank, or category (i.e. airman, NCO, SNCO, CGO, FGO, etc)
Professional military education - Having attended leadership school, academies (NCOA, SNCOA), SOS, etc
 Status PME

14 Knowledge – Having factual understanding and practical military skills required to perform at the qualified level.
 Status – Having a certain rank, or category (i.e. airman, NCO, SNCO, CGO, FGO, etc)
 Knowledge Status

15 Training – Having attended courses contributing directly to effective performance in the AFS.
 Indoctrination – Having attended basic military training or officer training school
 Training Indoctrination

16 Experience – Having previously performed in the AFS or similar AFS; have shown ability to perform in the past.
Professional military education - Having attended leadership school, academies (NCOA, SNCOA), SOS, etc
 Experience PME

[Continue](#)

Section VI: Air Force Specialty Criteria Paired Comparison (Continued)

For each pair of answers, select the one you believe is most important for a subordinate to have to perform effectively - if you had to choose between the two. There are no duplicate pairs.

17 Knowledge – Having factual understanding and practical military skills required to perform at the qualified level.
 Indoctrination – Having attended basic military training or officer training school
 Knowledge Indoctrination

18 Training – Having attended courses contributing directly to effective performance in the AFS.
 Status – Having a certain rank, or category (i.e. airman, NCO, SNCO, CGO, FGO, etc)
 Training Status

19 Education – Having attended academic study or instruction related to the AFS.
Professional military education - Having attended leadership school, academies (NCOA, SNCOA), SOS, etc
 Education PME

20 Experience – Having previously performed in the AFS or similar AFS; have shown ability to perform in the past.
 Indoctrination – Having attended basic military training or officer training school
 Experience Indoctrination

21 Knowledge – Having factual understanding and practical military skills required to perform at the qualified level.
Professional military education - Having attended leadership school, academies (NCOA, SNCOA), SOS, etc
 Knowledge PME

[Next Section](#)

Section VII: Rank and Org Culture

Rank plays a major role in the employment selection process for Air Force personnel and is part of our organizational culture. It is the first qualifier that classifies officer duties (AFI 36-2105) from enlisted duties (AFI 36-2108). The Air Force has many non-rated, mid-level duties that are filled by company grade officers where their status associated with rank is not critical (i.e. their function is not an integral part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command, and their interface with senior echelons, foreign military/governments and outside organizations is limited).

In this section, we want to determine your perception of whether relaxing the rank requirement in these types of duty positions, without violating the chain of command or customs & courtesies, and placing enlisted personnel in them, who are otherwise qualified, would adversely affect the culture of the Air Force. Please select the number that appropriately indicates the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

1 Commitment and holding a high sense of responsibility to the organization is what is important to our Air Force culture. Eliminating rank as a qualifier to duties not part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command will not negatively affect this.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

2 Maintaining appropriate customs and courtesies is important to our Air Force culture. Eliminating rank as a qualifier to duties not part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command will not negatively affect this.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

3 Having qualified enlisted and officer personnel employed in the same mid-level duty positions would violate Air Force culture.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

4 The experience a qualified enlisted airman holds is valuable to company grade officers' future leadership performance.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

5 Holding a common set of values, creeds, and symbols is important to effective organizational culture. Eliminating rank as a qualifier to duties not part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command will not negatively affect this.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

6 A high level of coordination and agreement among employees is important to effective organizational performance. Eliminating rank as a qualifier to duties not part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command will not negatively affect this.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

7 A chain of command is important to effective organizational culture. Eliminating rank as a qualifier to duties not part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command will not negatively affect this.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

[Continue](#)

Section VII: Rank and Org Culture (Continued)

Please select the number that appropriately indicates the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

8 A high involvement of employees in the processes, decisions, and their implementation is important to effective organizational culture. Eliminating rank as a qualifier to duties not part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command will not negatively affect this.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

9 Giving officers an opportunity to supervise personnel would be beneficial to their future leadership performance.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

10 Having qualified enlisted and officer personnel employed in the same duties would have a negative affect on organization performance.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

11 As an organization, the Air Force should consider the concept of employing enlisted and company grade officer personnel in similar duties where grade is not an integral part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain-of-command.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

12 I value your comments on this issue. The questions in this section will capture only a portion of what you may wish to indicate on the subject. Please use this space to comment on anything else that is relevant to this section.

[Next Section](#)

Section VIII: Interchangeable Rank Concept and Air Force Transformation

The Air Force is progressively changing to meet future challenges. To meet those challenges, the Air Force needs to take full advantage of the skills, experience, and knowledge acquired by its members. The Air Force has non-rated, mid-level duties that are filled by company grade officers where the status associated with rank is not critical (i.e. their function is not an integral part of a strategy or plan of action or chain-of-command, and interface with senior echelons, foreign military/governments and outside organizations is limited).

In this section, we want to determine what you think about relaxing the rank requirement and employing some enlisted personnel, who are otherwise qualified, in mid-level positions designated for non-rated company grade officers where rank is not a critical factor. Please select the number that indicates the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

1 Strongly Disagree	2 Disagree	3 Neither Agree nor Disagree	4 Agree	5 Strongly Agree
------------------------	---------------	---------------------------------	------------	---------------------

1 Knowledge is more important than the rank a person holds when employing personnel in mid-level positions that are not an integral part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

2 Education is more important than the rank a person holds when employing personnel in mid-level positions that are not an integral part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

3 Employing enlisted personnel holding advanced academic degrees (AAD) in positions requiring AAD improves the Air Force's return on investment in the education the AF provided or that the member acquired..

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

4 Training is more important than the rank a person holds when employing personnel in mid-level positions that are not an integral part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

5 Experience is more important than the rank a person holds when employing personnel in mid-level positions that are not an integral part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

6 Management deals with how best to leverage resources throughout the organization.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

7 An airman's status as enlisted or officer is important when employing personnel in mid-level duty positions that are not an integral part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

[Continue](#)

Section VIII: Interchangeable Rank Concept and Air Force Transformation (Continued)

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree

8 The concept of integrating qualified enlisted and company grade officer personnel in similar duties (as described above) assists in creating flexible organizations.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

9 The concept of integrating qualified enlisted and company grade officer personnel in similar duties will assist in more effective personnel management.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

10 The concept of assigning qualified enlisted and company grade officer personnel in similar duties does not put the right person in the right place at the right time.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

11 The concept of integrating qualified enlisted and company grade officer personnel in similar duties (as described above) will enhance personnel management capabilities.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

12 Rank is important when employing personnel in positions that are not an integral part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

13 The concept of interchanging qualified enlisted and company grade officer personnel in similar duties can result in effective mission outcome and personnel transformation.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="radio"/>				

14 I value your comments on this issue. The questions in this section will capture only a portion of what you may wish to indicate on the subject. Please use this space to comment on anything you wish.

[Next Section](#)

Section IX: Personal Demographics

This section contains a few items regarding your personal characteristics and is collected strictly for statistical purposes. Respond to each item by writing in the information requested or selecting the corresponding circle that best describe you.

1 What is your age? Years

2 What is your gender?


3 What is your current grade?

a. Enlisted
b. Officer

4 Were you ever prior enlisted? Yes No

5 What is your AFSC now?

6 On the following scale from one to ten, mark whether your day-to-day duties are technical or management in nature. Technical can be defined as hands-on with minimum supervision or management requirements. Management can be defined as supervisory or leadership roles with limited hands-on work.



7 What is your time in grade? Years

8 What is your total time-in-service (Total Federal Active Service)? Years

[Next Section](#)

Section X: Feedback

I value your feedback! Please add any final comments you wish:

[Finish Survey](#)

Appendix B: Human Subject Exemption and Survey Approval Letters



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE PERSONNEL CENTER
RANDOLPH AIR FORCE BASE TEXAS

|14 DECEMBER 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR CMSGT DAN ROMANO

FROM: AFPC/DPAPS
SUBJECT: Request for Survey Approval

We have reviewed your request to conduct the Air Force Human Capital Management Survey and approved it for use for Air Force officer and enlisted personnel. We have assigned a Survey Control Number (SCN) of USAF SCN 05-129; valid through 30 June 2006. Please ensure that the SCN and expiration date appear within the survey, survey instructions and appropriate web site as well as on the initial document/e-mail introducing the survey.

With regard to the survey and its associated results, it is important to draw your attention to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Under the FOIA, the public can request the results of your survey. Furthermore, if the results will be released outside the Air Force, please follow proper approval procedures through Public Affairs before the results are released.

Questions or concerns can be directed to me at DSN 665-2448. We wish you much success with your data collection effort.

//Signed//

LOUIS M. DATKO
Chief, Air Force Survey Program



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE OHIO


29 November 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR: CMsgt Daniel M. Romano
AFIT/ENS/GLM

FROM: AFRL/Wright Site Institutional Review Board

SUBJECT: Request for exemption from human experimentation requirements

1. Protocol title: Air Force Capital Management
2. Protocol number: F-WR-2006-0002-E
3. The above protocol has been reviewed by the AFRL Wright Site IRB and determined to be exempt from IRB oversight and human subject research requirements per 32 CFR 219.101(b)(2) which exempts "research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior."
4. Data collection for this study can begin immediately. The IRB must be notified if there is any change to the design or procedures of the research to be conducted. Otherwise, no further action is required.
5. For questions or concerns, please contact your IRB administrator, Helen Jennings at (937) 255-0311 x232 or helen.jennings@wpafb.af.mil OR Lt. Douglas Grafel at douglas.grafel@wpafb.af.mil or (937) 255-0311 x202. All inquiries and correspondence concerning this protocol should include the protocol number and name of the primary investigator.



JEFFREY BIDINGER, Maj, USAF, MC, FS
Chair, AFRL/Wright Site IRB

Appendix C: Respondent Comments

Case – 8

Rank – O-1

Comment – I think that one important aspect is the perspective personnel will have on this issue. An enlisted person may feel lighted or undermined if an Officer (Higher Rank and Pay Grade), did the same job he/she was doing. Based on this concept, there might be a tendency to undermine the rank/authority of said officer in various ways (upprofessional relationships or insubordination).

Case – 10

Rank – O-2

Comment – Felt like the questions were being repeated over and over again. I had difficulty differentiating between the questions.

Case – 15

Rank – O-3E

Comment – Having worked in an environment for several years where ranks were not used, I did run into more infractions than normal assignments concerning customs and courtesies and chain of command. Furthermore, I noticed that if these infractions went unpunished, then the performance of the unit was negatively affected due mainly to gossip, rumors, and perception by outside organizational personnel. Therefore, I do not believe this environment shows potential to be replicated to the Air Force as a whole; it is useful for certain situations only.

Comment - Hope you also looked at the number of positions you're considering and the number of enlisted who would be qualified. If not, then pull enlisted demographics from AFPC homepage. I have no suggestions on determining the number of positions. Also, if there isn't a shortage of CGOs (given Force Shaping initiative), then are there too many enlisted personnel in jobs that they are over qualified for? Perhaps certain jobs should be reclassified.

Comment – Took me about 35 minutes.

Case – 16

Rank – O-2

Comment – Bottom line, I feel the AF, should utilize the abilities of every airman. So regardless of rank, if someone is the best person for the job, they should be performing in that capacity.

Case – 20

Rank – O-4

Comment - The premise is intriguing. I believe there are many places where qualified enlisted personnel could effectively perform similar functions as some junior officers where there is not a chain of command issue. I believe this would be the exception rather than the norm. Age and time in service would be critical to determining where this would be appropriate. I've seen conflict among junior enlisted personnel over 1 stripe due to previous college education. I see the potential for even greater problems where substantial pay differences for similar work could be an issue for junior members (both officer and enlisted). I've been in offices where the basic job function of GS-7 was the same as a mid-level captain and a GS-13. Conflicts over pay differences were avoided by an understanding of additional requirements related to each pay grade. Implementation of the proposed approach should be approached with great caution and only implemented on a wide scale after several (read 5-10 yrs) of pilot studies at various organizations and command levels. It could work well in a number of organizations regardless of the people involved, or it could only work due to the people involved. Any pilot studies should use people without handpicking for a desired outcome to get a truer indication of what circumstances it might be successful. I tried to answer the survey in terms of my most recent assignment. However, my answers change significantly as I look back on other assignments. This was especially true when interactions with other intelligence organizations was involved. Analysts at other intel organizations were often senior GS (13-14). Inputs from CGOs or senior

NCOs would occasionally be dismissed by some of these analysts regardless of the validity of the military member's input based solely on their lack of rank. (Thankfully this wasn't always the case and there were many great senior analysts that actively sought out these inputs.) I'd be interested in seeing the results of the survey and learning about such a system might actually be implemented.

Comment - There are organizations with the right people where such a concept could be implemented successfully. It will require a severe organizational cultural change for some organizations and/or people. The personnel office does not have a track record of successfully placing officers to maximize their training and education now. Adding this additional layer of options may only make matters worse while frustrating the placed enlisted personnel as well (whether into an unreceptive office or an office receptive to the idea but lacking the ability to leverage the enlisted member's education, training, and experience).

Case – 21

Rank – O-2

Comment – I answered the questions "being a CGO, NCO, SNCO, etc. is not important to be effective" as N/A for my job but what I would have liked to have said is that being a CGO or NCO and above is important. My point is that I don't think it has to be one or the other, particularly, but at least one of them. I think being below an NCO is not advantageous for the positions I have held. Also, I would like to say that I think the idea of employing enlisted and officers in similar duties happens in the Operations Flight of CE squadrons with the Facilities, Infrastructure, etc. elements. I held one of these positions and the other three were held by two SMSgt's and one civilian. It worked well to have the different ranks as I learned a lot from all three of these individuals. You can contact me if you have questions. (RESPONDENT'S NAME REMOVED BY AUTOR)

Case – 22

Rank – O-4

Comment – This last section disturbs me--such thought works in some of the office settings, but get out into the field of battle--as so many Airmen are currently and projected to be deployed in the future--in what have typically been Army missions--and someone has to be in charge. The officer/enlisted system does that--not saying it always works and there are countless examples where the enlisted person took charge (natural leadership) and saved the day (REFERENCE TO RESPONDENT'S HOME TOWN REMOVED BY AUTHOR).

Comment – This concept could possibly work in the business world...but look at AFMC for example...where SNCOs are currently being used as PEMs...they get NO respect when they go to the table. I found it quite embarrassing that the two CMSgts that worked for me needed me, as a young major, to go to the table for them--because I had the utmost respect for them as the technical experts they were--but the civilians in the room---GS 14s and 15s--simply did not respect them. Your proposed concept would only work with a major organizational shift.

Case – 24

Rank – O-3

Comment – Rank is not given arbitrarily. It is a qualification to have rank. Everyone has opportunity to achieve rank according to their abilities and their own effort. It is important to respect rank. Everyone should be allowed to contribute to the organization to their full abilities. Don't use that fact to attack the military rank system.

Comment – I wonder why we have officers at all?

Comments – Good Luck

Case – 25

Rank – O-2

Comment – If we have officers and enlisted airmen doing the same job, we're in effect paying 2 people differently to do the same job. Why not re-evaluate the slot and make a decision as to what demographic best fills the job?

Case – 31

Rank – O-4

Comment – Examples of what scenarios you had in mind for the rank mix would be helpful.

Case – 32

Rank – O-3

Comment – The statements to which I am agreeing & disagreeing are quite vague. Sometimes I agree or disagree only under certain circumstances. I'm not sure anyone can learn anything from the results of this survey.

Comment – I strongly question the value of this survey. The statements to which I am agreeing & disagreeing are vague and could easily be subject to misinterpretation.

Comment – I question the value of this entire survey. It's very vague, and I'm concerned that it's results will be misleading.

Case – 33

Rank – O-2E

Comment – Question 10 - having either enlisted or officer employed in the required duties would not have a negative affect. However, assigning both office and enlisted to required duties would have a negative affect in that as short handed the Air Force is already, this perception would only take away valuable man-hours that could be spent elsewhere. I have on a couple of occasions put the most qualified person SNCO vs. NCO and NCO vs. Amn and found that the rank rarely mattered. If you put the most qualified person in the job, they, as well as their position, are repeated. The only problem I had is with intra-service agencies. For some reason the Army always wants to talk to a SNCO or an officer. In those cases, I would just make sure to have the appropriate mouthpiece available even though the SrA was calling the shots for the shift.

Comments – I feel that there will be a decline in effective personnel management. I believe that there could be a danger of making a AAD position for enlisted a stepping stone requirement for rank. I believe that enlisted should not be excluded from these positions, but care must be taken not to make it seem like it should be requirement. There are some assumptions that go along with the rank. CGO's have bachelor degree's, FGO's have masters, SNCO should have a CCAF. Rank can have some influence on people who do not know the person. Many times, I have had to repeat exactly what my Amn or NCO's have told someone just because the person didn't believe that someone of that low of rank could make that kind of decisions.

Case – 41

Rank – O-3

Comment – Because younger officers without real-world experience possibly offer less to the position (until they've gained this experience in their military AFSC), it only makes sense to place NCOs/SNCOs who have experience/quality work in the same positions to ensure the AF mission is completed efficiently and effectively.

Case – 42

Rank – O-4

Comment – Great concept that should be applied in numerous AFSCs. Huge "old school" cultural barriers will be biggest hurdle. Until status quo of this concept is realized, the rating system would probably benefit

Enlisted troops: "...fills position previously held by a Major..." and not Officers: "...fills position previously held by enlisted trooper..." I'm behind the concept, but the "sell" needs to address cultural barriers.

Case – 43

Rank – O-1

Comment – Qualification and Experience supercede rank in job performance. Enlisted may perform many of the technical tasks afforded only to officer billets. However, asking a qualified enlisted member to work along side a qualified officer to perform the same task and then paying the enlisted member less will frustrate the member.

Case – 44

Rank – O-3

Comment – I don't have any strong objections to seeing officers and enlisted personnel performing the same jobs, but I do not see many situations where this should be applicable. Ideally, each job is evaluated for its required qualifications. Many jobs designated as "officer jobs" require specific technical or other knowledge obtained via a college education. Many non-supervisory officer jobs are already filled by officers of different ranks (although rarely by more than +1 or -1 difference in rank). My biggest concern is for promotions and evaluations. Officers are promoted based upon their competitiveness with their peers, and the comparative level of the duties performed. It is important for an officer to perform a job commensurate with his/her rank (i.e., for a captain to be seen filling a lieutenant's position is seen negatively). To shift to a more "skills-based" system would require a significant cultural shift to avoid penalizing officers who perform the same jobs as lower ranking personnel (officer or enlisted). In addition, in many career fields, it would be difficult to quantize someone's skill level beyond training courses attended, time in the career field, and time in service. Rank requirements for non-supervisory jobs capture the latter two factors in a reasonable way.

Case – 47

Rank – O-2

Comment – Whether this becomes a problem or not will largely depend upon how it is done and the character of the Amn, NCOs, SNCOs chosen to do these duties.

Comment - What this survey is proposing could potentially be resolved by bringing back the Warrant Officer ranks. Aren't those some of the jobs that a warrant officer is supposed to do?

Case – 49

Rank – O-3

Comment – A separate purpose and mindset for enlisted/officer roles is as beneficial to the military today as it ever was. I've worked in the civilian world for over 7 years before joining the military -- what a mess! The professionalism of the enlisted personnel has inspired me to be a better officer. If every person with experience does the work of an officer, then who will be focusing on the critical role of doing the work of a SNCO. When the SNCOs are not doing their jobs the NCOs will fail and then the Airmen will be poorly led and the mission will suffer. Junior officers will suffer if the SNCOs are not mentoring them, and as junior officers rise in rank the senior officers will be less competent. Bottom line: I predict a serious erosion in the ability to conduct missions and lead effectively if SNCOs are used interchangably with CGOs.

Comment – I suggest you look hard for potential unintended consequences of changing the way the military is organized. What are the possible consequences to NCOs, Airmen, CGOs, commanders?

Case – 51

Rank – O-3E

Comment – Very interesting survey. I was enlisted for 11 years (E1-E6), a cadet for 4 years, and have been commissioned since '98. Can always find someone, regardless of rank, who is sharp regardless of opportunities and tools provided to them. On the other hand, there are plenty of folks who've been around

for awhile and/or have had everything at their disposal including PME, education from a top University, etc... who're complacent with surfing the internet at work.

Case – 54

Rank – O-4

Comment – I have no problem with Officers and enlisted performing the same duties. My only concern is having SNCOs (MSgt and above) performing the duties of Lts and Capts. I believe that most SNCOs should be holding leadership positions vice serving as technicians.

Case – 57

Rank – O-4

Comment - Survey method holds little face validity. I'm not 100% sure what I answered!

Comments – I understand the initiative here but there are many like me who have seen these situations in work and it's a mess for officer and enlisted career progression. Could work if there was an entire paradigm shift in an entire AFSC across MAJCOM, NAF, WING, SQ, FLT, etc. to effectively evaluate or implement.

Case – 59

Rank – E-9

Comment – I have personally worked side by side with officers on projects and day-to-day duties without any problems. However, there are officers and enlisted alike who fail to learn from each other and have problems working together. Like any other change, the concepts posed by the questions in the survey would take time and proper management to become a part of the USAF culture.

Case – 60

Rank – O-3

Comment – I think that having people with two distinct pay grades performing the same job would adversely affect morale. A Captain and a Technical Sergeant may have similar qualifications (education primarily) but there is a LARGE pay gap. If they are to perform the exact same work, I think that the pay issue must be dealt with.

Case – 62

Rank – O-2E

Comment – Employing enlisted and company grade officer personnel in similar duties would be a good practice in all aspects except for two: (1) The officer would feel that he or she, by virtue of rank, should have more responsibility than the enlisted member, and may feel demoralized if he or she didn't, and (2) The enlisted member in a similar duty would have less success gaining agreement and coordination from higher ranking field grade officers, unless the enlisted member was a Chief Master Sergeant.

Case – 63

Rank – O-3

Comment – If an enlisted trooper has an educational background at the same level as the officer corp, one would agree that it would make sense to put them in equal positions. The problem is, the officer gets paid better, and each experiences different benefits. If their jobs are the same, then they should get paid the same (or somewhat close), right? That wouldn't happen in the situation you are proposing. The education they both have (off. and enlisted) contributes in different ways to the mission -- even if they have identical degrees -- both of which benefit the AF in a positive way. There's no easy solution here -- it's unfortunate. Thankfully, a highly educated enlisted trooper (assumed to be one of the best among his/her peers) should have an easy time getting to OTS. Then the problem is starting at the bottom of the rank structure again -- possibly the commissioning rank of prior service folks should be based on their previous enlisted rank? SrA to 2Lt -- not a problem. MSgt to 2Lt is a problem.

Case – 64

Rank – O-3

Comment – Having officer rank helped me lead my flight with credibility that I might not have otherwise had as a 24 year old with only a couple of years experience in the Air Force. On the other hand, some officer positions probably could be held by enlisted personnel without harm to the mission.

Case – 66

Rank – O-4

Comment – The Special Operations Forces already do this to a large degree. The more qualified soldier, regardless of rank (officer or enlisted), will lead the tactical group in the field. Pilots, to a lesser degree (no enlisted pilots), do this. The lead pilot in a 2 or 4-ship formation, regardless of rank, is responsible for that tactical group. Qualification and experience are the factors considered most important in these situations and there is no reason why these factors could not or should not be employed in other military duties or situations.

Case – 67

Rank – O-3E

Comment – This survey is too long. I got tired of it towards the end.

Case – 68

Rank – O-4

Comment – This issue depends greatly upon what AFS and position you're considering. While in general I would agree that knowledge and experience are the most important factors, sometimes it does make a difference whether the office holder is enlisted or officer.

Case – 69

Rank – O-4

Comment – Assign duties to most junior rank capable of performing it: there shouldn't be mixed officer/enlisted shops performing identical duties--strikes me as a misallocation of resources. Moreover, always desirable there be off-duty camaraderie as well -- comparable rank among peers encourages this.

Case – 70

Rank – O-3

Comment – I am an intelligence officer and have seen enlisted and officer performing the same duties with no negative results, but this may have been purely because of the job of briefing the Wing CC and pilots. Some enlisted members enjoyed their jobs more knowing that we performed the same basic duties. The officers still played the oversight role on the final product, but we all were equally trained to deploy in the same positions and perform the job at home.

Case – 74

Rank – O-2

Comment – Trying to eliminate rank will not only undermine AF culture, it's also an asinine idea. This survey is too long.

Comment – This survey is too long.

Comment – This survey was too long.

Case – 76

Rank – O-4

Comment – Some may see this idea as an erosion of traditional officer/enlisted roles, but I think there may be increased opportunities in some career fields for officers to work with enlisted personnel. Speaking as an officer/engineer, having more interaction with enlisted personnel would be a good thing.

Case – 78

Rank – O-4

Comment – If we still had specialists, such as warrant officers, I would strongly agree with this issue. I was enlisted and earned my commission. I agree that there are enlisted airmen more qualified in most instances than some of the officers especially in some technical areas. However, placing officers in comparable positions to our enlisted confuses many issues and absolutely erodes the officers status and most likely his or her chances at promotion. It's difficult to tell what's driving this train of thought from a few survey questions but they are enough to give me the impression that we're looking to save money by injecting chaos into our core structure at a time when we require more clarity.

Comments – For a few specialty areas this may be a good thing; AAD billets that are based on specified levels of technical skill commensurate with the AAD program and in those instances this makes sense. On a broader level what message are we sending. It used to be an officer was assigned to a position to do a job that required leadership and management skills and our enlisted corps provided the specialists and core experience to get the mission done. If an airman wanted more general and leadership roles there was a clear path to get there. It worked for me. The concept of putting the right person with the right skills in the right place to get the job done makes sense but you're using it to support a position that if poorly executed will erode the role of officers in the Air Force, particularly on the support side. You have so many qualifiers (integral part of strategy, plan of action, or CoC) that your definition is unclear, and finally one of the reasons we have a fraternization policy is to avoid contempt and familiarization with the officer corps in a way that erodes good order and discipline. If this concept is not well executed it will drive a similar wedge between our officer and enlisted corps. This also doesn't seem to offer a step up or incentive for enlisted troops. If we have a large enough corps of enlisted with the skills we need let them excel at these jobs and transfer the officers to jobs they can do. If our officer corps isn't worth of following that is a real issue that needs to be addressed. I believe we have the greatest AF in the world and if our enlisted folks can be put in more satisfying jobs that better reflect their talent, skills, and increasing education level lets absolutely do it but either/or will erode officer credibility. You draw a clear line in the survey between technical skill and leadership ability. If officers aren't in positions where they can be leaders they don't need to be there even if that requires a smaller officer force. Flying is a technical skill. I'd love to see enlisted flyers come back to the AF especially for depot flights and UAVs so more officer flyers could get more training and fighting in. But again, where you draw this line is crucial.

Comments – This topic must address all of the issues that effect our culture and where we want to be as a force beyond the short term cuts we know we need to endure to support the war effort. The best qualified person should fill each position. But this is a fundamental change that if implemented across the Air Force could make filling a position easier but at a huge potential cost.

Case – 80

Rank – O-4

Comment – I believe that for many jobs, experience, judgement and responsibility are key performance factors. I believe that mid-grade officers and senior NCOS can fill the same duty positions, as long as it does not create a situation where a junior member is supervising a senior member.

Case – 83

Rank – O-4

Comment – I don't particularly like the way this survey was applied. It seems there is an specific agenda being pushed and I don't feel comfortable with the "gut feeling" I get from the limited questions/answers available on this subject.

Case – 84

Rank – O-3

Comment – In general I found the following verbiage hard to fully understand: "Eliminating rank as a qualifier to duties not part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command will..." I do not fully understand what you type of duties you are describing, but I answered the best I could.

Comment – I believe in the concept of interchanging qualified enlisted and company grade officer personnel, but I'm not confident in the AF's assignment process to achieve that well. Ideally it could be more "flexible" for personnel management, but in reality I think it would create major complications in assignment/career management for both enlisted and CGOs. To be honest I think the CGOs would get the short end of the stick because they have fewer connections, mentors, etc. looking out for their career interest (because they are younger and not as well connected as SNCOs). I can see well qualified SNCOs doing great work in CGO jobs that they are well qualified for, while CGOs miss out on growth opportunities. I think CGOs have a hard time getting good leadership opportunities already and have little to no mentorship to help them find those jobs. The assignment process is already haphazard, without mixing assignments between CGOs and SNCOs.

Case – 87

Rank – O-3

Comment – If they will be performing the same duties they should be the same grade. Mixing grades with the same duties leads to contempt on one side or the other. I've held the grades E-1 to E-5 and O-1 to O-4. In my opinion, blurring the lines between the enlisted force and the officers would damage morale on both sides. If anything needs to be changed, bring back the Warrant officers grades who can then be specialized/technical but outside the so called strategy, plan of action, or chain-of-command structure.

Comment – Again, don't mix E's and O's with similar duties. Determine one grade for the job and stick with it.

Case – 88

Rank – O-4

Comment – At my first duty station, company grade officers, NCOs, and junior enlisted were trained to perform the same duties, without regard to rank. Often, mid-level NCOs were in a role as an instructor for an officer. On duty there were no negative impacts to mission performance or unit morale.

Comments – In this section, it is difficult to answer on the agree or disagree side. The way the questions are worded require an understanding of AF personnel management. It takes a personnelist to understand the impacts on managing AF personnel within a career-field. Certainly, if as a commander I have more qualified personnel for a position based on the inclusion of enlisted personnel for a given position, I will have more options, flexibility, etc.

Case – 89

Rank – E-8

Comment – Assuming I understand the ultimate goal of this line of questioning, I know that we, the AF, is at a crossroads in trying to effectively and efficiently utilize our enlisted AFIT graduates. Although the questions and answers above seemed to force me to answer one way or the other, I don't think it's as easy as that. It's not black and white. There aren't absolutes and yes, there are certainly instances where interchanging and O vice an E or vice versa won't affect an organization. But that's subject to organizational chemistry. Yes, over time and a change in our AF culture, it would become more the norm and acceptable. At this time, I can't say that it won't have an impact, negative or positive, on an organization.

Comment – Again, big difference in "can" or "will." Sure, organizations deciding to use qualified enlisted personnel in mid-level positions traditionally held by officers "can" result in effective mission outcome but I can't say it "will."

Comment – I didn't answer the supervisory section because I don't currently supervise anyone.

Case – 90

Rank – E-9

Comment – I believe that the narrowing educational gap between enlisted and officers necessitates an examination of current rank structure. Not only should qualified NCOs and Officers work in the same duties; the military should think about having everyone enter at the lowest rank. In this way everyone would be judged on merit and potential rather than an artificial status which is conferred at the beginning of one's service. We now have many cases of where people who are of the same age, educational level and experience work together. However, one is "in charge" only because they chose the officer career path. This demeans the accomplishments and experience of the NCO. These situations lead to morale problems and an inefficient use of resources.

Case – 92

Rank – O-3E

Comment – If I understand the goal correctly, you would place the appropriately qualified personnel in a position commensurate with their knowledge, education and experience, regardless of rank. As I see it now, AFPC attempts to do this within their limits (CGO, NCO, SNCO, etc.) and doesn't do it very well. If you add another level to this, AFPC will probably do a worse job. Additionally, I have worked in an environment where CGOs, NCOs, & SNCOs performed the exact same technical duties, only separated by supervisory levels (AFSN at Gunter AFB). The work environment was fine, but I felt underused (EE with experience doing a job easily handled by competent NCOs with training). AFPC did not do a good job of matching job responsibilities, simply plugging the right rank in a hole.

Comment – While I see the advantage for enlisted with AAD, won't this undermine the already diminished sense of rank importance in the AF? Compared to other services the AF already is seen as quite lax in customs and courtesies and if a Capt, MSgt, and SrA are doing the same job, this will continue to foster that. The other factor is don't most degree holding enlisted folks become officers?

Comment – I see the merits of this study, but are there actually enough enlisted AAD and technical backgrounds sufficient to cause this type of change in assignments. Just a guess, but I would say the overlapping percentage is less than 5%. On the other hand, if we could develop this capability, jobs currently held by CGOs could be converted to enlisted positions permanently.

Case – 94

Rank – E-9

Comment – Worst survey I've ever taken. In Section VI, military skills are always grouped with other skills. Military skills may not always be necessary in many jobs. In section VII, what are "duties not part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command?" All duties are inherently one of these. I hope no decisions are based on this survey.

Comment – I decided not to waste any more of my time on this. If you improve the survey, I'd be willing to try it again.

Comments - I made them in previous sections.

Case – 96

Rank – Not provided.

Comment – It is more important what the person is capable of, how they have performed in the past and their ability to execute the functions of the job than is the rank or status they hold. Good organizations search for skills and abilities that have been proven or have a high likelihood of being proven. Weak organizations are focused on rank and status. To describe more think about this: I really don't care about who the person is, but if they can do it. We should be results oriented. If the right person for the job is 36 years old because the organization needs experience the brand new person needs to take heed of that. Case in point...we don't need a brand new officer straight out of school to believe he is the answer to everything. Often times the NCO and SNCO with 10-20 years of experience should be running the show. This is a

civilian viewpoint. I want results. If the person can't lead get out of the way. If they are hampering the progress get them out of the way. We don't have the manpower anymore to be trying to work around people. Give leaders the chance to lead. Give people with potential the chance to learn, but let them grow in an environment where they are told to listen to their experienced professionals.

Case – 97

Rank – E-8

Comment – I believe Officers and Enlisted can/should work together. However, there still has to be a chain of command and established roles and responsibilities within the Officer and Enlisted force, based on rank and/or experience.

Comment – I agree with the concept under "similar duties" however, I don't feel enlisted and officers should be doing the same tasks.

Comment – I believe Officers and Enlisted can be closer integrated, but there still needs to be a boss/worker relationship at all ranks to maintain discipline and roles of responsibilities.

Case – 98

Rank – O-1

Comment – My previous assignment was as a Cadet at USAFA, and it was only upon leaving that my PAFSC was set to 92T0.

Case – 100

Rank – E-9

Comment – There are other services where rank is everything. It must be considered in a purple world.

Comment – While my current duties are very management centric, I require a high level of technical knowledge. The scale at the end doesn't really capture that I require both a high degree of management ability and a high technical competency.

Case – 104

Rank – O-4

Comment – I will gladly take the experience of an NCO as equal to the rank of a CGO if they are both committed to the mission. Unfortunately, my recent experience with several E-7s was that they tried to minimize work instead of lead the mission.

Case – 107

Rank – E-9

Comment – Why only CGO duties? Many SNCOs today are accomplishing duties at the level of Field Grade Officers.

Comment – Qualifications and grade are still tied to each other to a point. Can't have SrA, regardless of education, performing a job that should be a Capt or Maj. At the SNCO level we acquire the status to be able to fill these positions based on experience and education. Part of that status is the practical support from our senior leadership. Many SNCOs have AADs but with the exception of developmental positions, we shouldn't require these for enlisted positions. There is a military necessity for a rank structure...although I agree there should be less of a pay gap between an educated enlisted force and officers, we can't blur the lines between officers and enlisted.

Case – 112

Rank – E-8

Comment – Rank has traditionally been directly related to perception of ability/capability. Reality is that rank is directly related to overall responsibility. The mix of officers/enlisted in similar duties helps increase organizational capability by capitalizing on the experience of the enlisted person while maintaining the

responsibility inherent in the officer duties. Poor organizational decisions are often made because of the (mis)perception of officer capability.

Comment – Similar to before...using the experience of an enlisted person leverages the investment made in their training and education while allowing the junior officers an opportunity to gain practical management experience without the expectation of technical competency.

Comment – Reward systems will need closer scrutiny as well. Giving an officer an MSM for something the enlisted person doing the same job gets an AFCOM or AFAM for will negatively impact motivation. The reward should not be rank-dependent, but performance-dependent. Performance reports will also be impacted and possibly require modification.

Case – 113

Rank – E-9

Comment – I am the CFM for the (SPECIFIC AFSC REMOVED BY AUTHOR). (SPECIFIC AFSC REMOVED BY AUTHOR) people perform similiar duties alongside officers (Maj and below usually) without negative impact to the mission. At times, however, the close association of enlisted with junior officers has caused some problems with customs and courtesies. Call me at DSN (NUMBER REMOVED BY AUTHOR) if you would like to discuss. The (SPECIFIC AFSC REMOVED BY AUTHOR) AFSC might be a good case study.

Comments – Integrating folks into positions that are not key leadership positions based on skill rather than rank is a good idea. With many positions we already do that; for example a SSgt acting as the unit Resource Advisor can tell a Col that a purchase isn't authorized. In this case and with many other positions, the authority is inherent with the position, not the rank of the individual sitting in the position. However, I do feel that positions like "Superintendent," "NCOIC," "Commander," etc. need to be based on grade.

Case – 114

Rank – E-7

Comment – Some questions were hard to answer. Some situations will need an individual with rank status. Others would not, depending on the task.

Comments – Education is great and everyone should pursue it. I don't feel an individual with higher education should necessarily be given a higher status job. Performance on the job should definitely be a wager. Education will help an individual get promoted, if deserving.

Case – 115

Rank – E-9

Comment – There must be good order and discipline within an organization. It is important to have qualified, motivated, and balanced leadership in order to maintain a hierarchy in which all personnel can grow into their respective roles and responsibilities. Also, affording personnel the best training and experience possible is invaluable to teach or enhance skills required to lead and manage.

Comments – In my opinion, losing many of the field training detachments in the 90s was one of our biggest mistakes. I believe our supervisors and trainers would be better served by having detachments at the base that serve to provide an education/training environment, away from the duty location, to teach skills and knowledge required. Whether this is PME, OJT, or other types of courses is not the question. PME helps to teach management skills and leadership responsibilities. The detachments, training classes, and even distance learning, can and should be utilized in order to allow personnel to develop and hone AFSC skills. In the question of the enlisted and officer jobs...there are some areas where I think an enlisted leader of appropriate grade can perform jobs previously reserved for officer personnel.

Case – 120

Rank – E-8

Comment – Having officers and enlisted performing similar duties side-by-side will negatively impact mission accomplishment due to people performing like duties but with different pay and privileges. The same situation exists when you have military working the same jobs as contractors or government civilians. For those jobs that officer and enlisted perform together, the officer positions should be eliminated and converted to enlisted positions.

Comments – Again, the issue of compensation for people doing like duties is likely to negatively affect morale and mission. How do you explain to the E-6 who is doing the same work as the O-3 and getting less compensation that his work is as valued?

Case – 121

Rank – E-9

Comment – My organization currently assigns enlisted and company grade officers, as well as mid-grade civilians, to similar duties without too many problems. The unit commander and unit superintendent normally ensure military customs & courtesies are observed.

Comment – Officers, enlisted, and civilians with similar training and experience can easily be interchanged to accomplish the unit's mission without harm to management of the personnel and the unit.

Comment – Personally, I don't see a need for anyone above E-7 to attend AFIT for an AAD. When this was first being explored, I recommended grades E-5 to E-7 be the target group. While E-8s and CMSgts can bring significant experience to highly technical tasks, it tends to reinforce the "E-9 vs CMSgt" concept in subordinates. It's just my opinion...

Case – 123

Rank – O-4

Comment – Satisfactory performance in the development engineering career field requires an ABET accredited engineering degree, with no exceptions. Rather than placing enlisted personnel with ABET accredited engineering degrees in company grade officer positions, I recommend encouraging qualified enlisted personnel to obtain commissions. This would develop a cadre of junior officers with hands-on experience, and improve the pool of technically proficient senior leadership which is currently sadly lacking in the Air Force.

Comment – I answered neither agree nor disagree with these questions. One disadvantage that I see with this proposal is that if rank is shown to have no impact on a person's job performance, it can be argued that those jobs that are interchangeable should probably be filled by qualified civilian personnel.

Comment – This was hard to answer without specifics of the proposal. I think NCOs or SNCOs with technical education (especially in computer/comm fields) can and should be used to the limits of their abilities. Commanders need flexibility to assign the right person to the job at hand. Also, with the changes in the comm/computer career field I suspect that there is a large cadre of NCOs with better technical skills than the junior officers assigned to the career field. However, I don't believe there are very many NCOs with ABET accredited engineering degrees.

Case – 124

Rank – O-2

Comment – I believe that there should be jobs which are available only to officers and likewise for NCOs. There is a reason for requiring an individual to have a degree for particular jobs. Perhaps some jobs could be filled by either an officer or an NCO, however, this is situational dependent. Otherwise, why did those that came before us design the command structure as it exists today? If an NCO desires a particular position that is typically held by an officer, he can always compete for a commission.

Case – 126

Rank – E-9

Comment – While enlisted Airmen can perform many of the duties of CGOs, the rank structure of the organization would have to be carefully scrutinized to prevent enlisted Airmen from having OPCON over an Officer. In my opinion, experience is much more valuable than rank in most situations, but it is contrary to the culture of military organizations.

Case – 128

Rank – O-3E

Comment – In order for an overall shift to lower ranked personnel in certain positions to work, there will need to be a paradigm change for everyone. This would be required due to our culture where historically rank implies experience and knowledge gained over time and circumstances. While rank is obviously not the only indicator of potential, it does traditionally imply that the particular person "should" have some experience that a lower ranking person would not have that is beneficial to the current position held.

Overall though, there is no reason why qualified enlisted personnel can not fill many billets currently employing company grade officers.

Case – 129

Rank – O-2

Comment – I have been in a squadron where enlisted and officers (SNCOS and FGOS) did the exact same job, and it only helped mission accomplishment. The one distinguishing characteristic was the officers always held positions of squadron leadership as an additional duty, not the enlisted people. However on individual projects, it was not uncommon for me as an lieutenant to be under a more experienced SNCO. In that situation, there was mutual respect for the SNCO's experience and my rank. I never saw an instance where there were any violations of military customs and courtesies.

Case – 130

Rank – E-9

Comment – #9. Giving officers an opportunity supervise, just to fill a square is very bad and creates chaos. There are grossly to many officers in the AF today. A ratio of 1 officer to 5 enlisted is detrimental to mission accomplishment.

Comment – Having enlisted personnel do the same jobs as officers is fine, as long as they are recognized as equals...and an enlisted should be able to supervise officers with less qualifications/TIS.

Case – 131

Rank – E-9

Comment – Ability to get the job done, not rank are the keys to getting in the work center. Having too many levels in your chain of command slows down the job and adds to burocracy. Having a leader is key, rank should be tied to the position not the person. If a junior member is the best person to fill a senior job give them the appropriate grademake him a O-5 for that assignment. Rank should be based on ability and performance not privlige and paying of dues or filling career squares. Hire those best qualified and give them the status (rank) to do the job.

Comment – Looking at this from a strictly business perspective it is easy to justify the interoperability of O's and E's. Once this is done we could say it's cheaper to replace all O's with E's. Problem is that we need O's and key to their development is holding the same positions these individuals with advanced degrees would hold. My feel that if it's technical it should be an E because they are specialists and can remain in this field indefinately. If it's broad miltys knowledge and leadership...application of the technolgy it should be an O.

Comment – Hope my inputs were helpful. Their is a fine line that must be maintained between O's and E's or good order and discipline will be impacted. Having a requirement for an advanced degree to hold an enlisted job is nothing new... look at our AF band, most have advanced degrees in music. What we need to

do is develop a similar program for these advanced degree types at positions were they are critical to the mission of the AF. These members would have to be looked at differently for promotion (like the band). Be careful though a potential side effect would be loss of E-8 and E-9 leadership positions due to congressional caps on these positions from your key enlisted leadership positions for these super techs.

Case – 134

Rank – E-7

Comment – I work with a officer and we do exactly the same job. I supervise more personnel than the officer. I have greater knowledge and wider breadth of experience. I have 3 associate degrees and will finish my BS this year. I am paid less for knowing more, having more responsibility, with less authority. Let the enlisted perform the jobs they are able to perform. Do not have Os and Es doing the exact same job but pausing one more based on a rank as opposed to the knowledge!

Case – 138

Rank – E-7

Comment – As the enlisted forces becomes more and more educated, it is logical that enlisted and officer personnel with the same knowledge and education level will work side by side in the future.

Case – 140

Rank – E-8

Comment – Qualifications and experience are a better indicator of success than rank. there are many times within an AF organization when you get an officer who has never supervised anyone who now has to lead the team. Invariably there is a huge learning curve in understanding team dynamics and providing appropriate leadership and guidance. I have seen many times where an NCO might do the job better simply because they've been in a supervisory position before.

Comment – This concept would more than likely give some enlisted airmen more of a reason to strive for higher education. Knowing that an advanced degree could open more job opportunities might entice them further.

Case – 142

Rank – E-7

Comment – Enlisted pay should match that of an officers pay if performing the same duty position.

Case – 146

Rank – E-8

Comment – CGOs are in leadership positions based simply on their rank; positions they are not qualified for. Eliminating rank as a qualifier to some duties will enhance our ability to execute the mission and may help reduce non-essential coordination.

Case – 148

Rank – E-8

Comment – Certain positions require a rank that some may just not take seriously!

Comment – Not sure what this survey is looking for. As a SNCO I feel that certain positions require certain rank unless you break that mold. I can relate this to First Sergeant duties, unless you actually wear the diamond you are looked at differently. I feel that Officers and Enlisted may not be able to change the perception when it comes to rank/education/experience! I'm not sure if placing an enlisted person in a position that needs strong backing or CGO status in a specific position would benefit the Air Force! You would have to change the entire thought process that is embedded into troops since day 1.

Case – 154

Rank – E-7

Comment – I think a lot depends on the specific job that is being performed. Some jobs that interact with the various services are better served by personnel of rank.

Case – 157

Rank – E-7

Comment – Specific duty positions should be identified for staffing by either officer or enlisted personnel. Mixing officer and enlisted grades in the same duty position or specialty will instill confusion and a negative morale associated with the enlisted not being paid the same rate for doing the same job as the officers. From the officer perspective, I suspect it would be negative as well from the perception of their actual place in the chain since they are obviously filling positions capable of being performed by lower grades.

Comment – If a duty is capable of being performed by enlisted personnel, why would you want to pay an officer do perform that duty? In some cases, enlisted personnel are much more qualified for a specific position than the officer currently billeted there. Example: Comm. Sq Chief of Maint. is currently an officer from a Lt to a Major depending on the size of the squadron. However, frequently the Maint.

Superintendent, A SMgt or CMSgt, is actually running the section and is more experienced and capable than the officer assigned.

Case – 160

Rank – E-7

Comment – You have questions that have one part that contradicts the other part. I can't answer them since I agree with one part but not the other.

Comment – I think you should let people know that this takes longer then stated, track time to take the survey.

Case – 172

Rank – E-7

Comment – I have always held that we place too much importance on rank/status compared to who actually possesses the skill sets necessary to effectively accomplish a task/mission. I have placed junior ranking people in positions traditionally held by higher ranking persons because the higher ranking person relied solely on rank/status and the junior person possessed and demonstrated the skills necessary to accomplish the job with vigor. I DO NOT believe in nor subscribe to the "Peter Principle" and oppose anyone that fills a position just because they have the correct rank/status. Additionally, I believe we can do more to enhance skill level progression. We must eliminate relying strictly on CDCs, courses, or tests to award a particular skill level, we should base the skill level award on a combination of book/test learning and actual performance. Having the information is one thing; however, consistently employing/applying the information tells me more regarding a person's professional/personal growth.

Comment – We must honor the rank and file to ensure discipline; however, I have personally witnessed this work in my career field when the shift commander program was reduced and SNCOs assumed the duties. Additionally, I instructed PME and performed 1st Sgt duties for 5 years. During my PME tenure, I witnessed CMSgts and SMSgts handle issues as competently, if not more so, as Major or Lt Colonel unit commanders.

Comment – Based on my experiences, I personally feel that a person's demonstrated leadership abilities is most important. I do, however, understand that a person must continuously study and prepare themselves to encounter a myriad of situations or circumstances. Focusing solely on a person's AFS doesn't adequately prepare them for some issues, so the ancillary education/experience is indispensable when filling the positions this survey covers.

Case – 174

Rank – E-7

Comment – Many enlisted personnel have college degrees, professional licenses, and have completed specialized certification training in both technical fields and management. An officer without these credentials is actually LESS qualified than an NCO or Airmen who has them, but will be assigned based solely on their status as an officer.

Comment – I am glad to see that the Air Force is looking into this concept. I actually did a paper on this subject at the SNCOA.

Case – 175

Rank – E-8

Comment – Moving previously Officer positions to enlisted would be no problem. Having both O's and E's do the same tasks at the same time in the same workcenter would pose a problem. One gets paid significantly more and has a different level of respect/responsibilities. Pick one or the other and press on.

Comment – Again, pick one or the other, but enlisted could take on significantly more responsibilities.

Case – 179

Rank – E-7

Comment – If an enlisted person is qualified to do a job and the criteria listed here in regards to chain of command etc is followed, the enlisted person should be considered and put in the job as appropriate. This frees up officers to do what they were brought in the service to do.

Comment – It is a misuse of resources to put only an officer in a job that an enlisted person could do as well. An example would be that only officers fly UAVs. Enlisted personnel have shown over the years that they can do this type of work. Look at the drones flown in the Vietnam war. They were flown by enlisted. There are several jobs as described in this survey that can be done by both enlisted or officers. Education and/or experience counts more than rank in many non technical jobs and should be used as the criteria for filling these jobs.

Case – 185

Rank – E-7

Comment – 1) In the military of today, we will fight jointly, we will deploy jointly. Any process that puts Air Force NCOs in a traditional officer positions may present challenges for the Air Force NCO. 2) There is no doubt in my mind a good NCO can be as good of a leader as a CGO. 3) Many of our SNCOs are leading flights that many Field Grade Officers can not even imagine. I am the Superintendent of a flight of over 220 personnel from five different AFSCs. The leadership of a good SNCO is difficult to find in many officers under the rank of Lt Col.

Comment – I believe in order to effectively utilize NCOs and SNCOs in a joint, strategic environment, better training will have to be provided to the enlisted corps. Our PME does not include enough of the big picture campaign strategies.

Case – 188

Rank – E-7

Comment – Rank is very important in a military org. However, I believe with the enhanced educated enlisted force, many jobs currently performed by officers can be performed by enlisted personnel.

Comment – I do not think it would be a wise investment of tax payer dollars if you were having officers do the exact same job as enlisted. Many officer billets today could be easily converted to enlisted billets.

Case – 189

Rank – E-8

Comment – I believe that sometime in the future we will eventually get away from the ranks of enlisted and officer and have a blend of both based on ability and experience.

Comment – Now that I see where your survey is going, please read my previous comment.

Case – 198

Rank – O-4

Comment – I can't think of a reason not to put senior enlisted personnel together with junior officers performing the same tasks they are qualified to do. I think it will give the junior officer an excellent perspective on the enlisted force that he may not otherwise be exposed to. It will also open up some areas that are currently closed to enlisted personnel for which there is no other reason than it must be filled by an officer. If one is qualified to do the job then he/she should be able to compete/interview for it.

Comment – Good luck completing your degree. I am glad the previous Secretary has offered qualified enlisted the opportunity to get their Master's at AFIT. It will only make our senior enlisted force more capable and capable.

Case – 201

Rank – E-8

Comment – Too many questions asking too close to the same thing.

Case – 202

Rank – E-8

Comment – When given a choice between someone with rank or experience, I choose experience first. On a note, while it is good to use the experience where you can, some positions used by junior officers are stepping stones to learn the trade before moving into a position of authority. It would be good to have that experienced enlisted person, but at the same time we may take away that educational tool we are using to train our officers.

Comment – see comments from last section

Case – 204

Rank – E-8

Comment – I feel what our AF is missing is a bigger focus on the value of active mentorship and supervision. It has been my experience that the troops that get mentored and supervised appropriately have a much greater chance at having a highly successful career.

Case – 208

Rank – E-7

Comment – There is more to our organization as a military as compared to civilian corporations. Our rank structure is critical to our mission accomplishments through being able to order subordinates to accomplish difficult tasks without asking questions. Delays in decision making over authority could cost mission accomplishment and ultimately...lives.

Comment – I do agree that some enlisted members with advanced degrees can benefit the USAF as a whole, but rank is of greater importance clearly identifying who is in charge and RESPONSIBLE for actions. As an educated enlisted member, I often work for officers who may not have expertise in a particular area and I give the best advice backed up by rational thought processes, but then they must make the decision as the ranking member. If you give enlisted members authority over officers, who is in charge? Who has responsibility? The sergeant had it the last project, but this time the captain? Too much change, too much room for confusion and error will jeopardize the mission.

Case – 212

Rank – E-7

Comment – I believe SNCOs are taking on more mgmt roles now and are some times not given the authority to make decisions in those positions because officer's are in charge. Being an officer doesn't have to mean you are automatically put in charge of a workcenter. Just as enlisted folks must prove they have the competence and ability to lead a workcenter, I believe officer's should be required to do the same. The Air Force does its junior officer's a great injustice by putting them in charge of workcenters they know nothing about and in essence drowning out the SNCOs in the workcenters. We seem to be the only branch of service that doesn't give the proper respect to our SNCOs or the proper level of authority. Look at the way the Navy treats its E-7s through E-9s and you will see a huge diffence. Training is vital to our continued success a the world's greatest Air Force. We must devote more dollars to ensuring our folks are well trained. You can't expect an email technician to perform like a Microsoft Certified Technician when servers go down if they haven't received that level of training. We put undo pressure on our Airmen to do things we are willing to spend the money to train them to do.

Case – 217

Rank – O-3E

Comment – It seems that there are already many positions that CGOs and NCOs share; especially in the log planning area. One base may have a CGO planner and another base may have a SSgt or TSgt doing the same job/tasks.

Case – 218

Rank – E-6

Comment – My observation over 15 years is that I have had enlisted members who could perform duties well above their pay grades and officers who could perform only to the level expected of airman. In some cases, rank may matter in a political/command sense, but in most cases it is the individual member who is either up to the task or not. Rank should not be a factor if a person proves they can perform. If the right individual is empowered to perform a task her/his rank will not matter, they will succeed. If we did more as a service to mentor, develop and empower our junior personnel in their first 4 years of service this may have reduced attrition and improved individual performance at the unit level. Thank you for the opportunity to respond via this survey and share my opinion/s.

Comment – The largest hurdle will be cultural/social. Especially considering that most field/company grade officers have a hard time acceting that many enlisted have attained degrees equal to or greater than those they have.

Case – 219

Rank – E-6

Comment – This is a very good surey and I hope there are many Enlisted and Officers from all levels taking it. Having midgrade officer and enlisted personnel crossing some traditional boundries, such as supervision and management, can only make the Air Force a better orginization. I am very proud of the enlisted personnel doing very well at AFIT.

Case – 220

Rank – E-6

Comment – Rank, Knowledge and training should all be on the same accord to accomplish the mission and continue effective management. The ranks structure should play a part in maintaining discipline /the AF culture, but they should be harmonious, but Enlisted adn Officer sould all work on a level to accomplish this mission

Case – 221

Rank – E-6

Comment – I believe senior enlisted members can do the same job with the same responsibility and urgency as officers. It will also save the AF a ton of money.

Case – 222

Rank – E-6

Comment – I believe that the organization would benefit in general and it would also contribute to the growth of the enlisted personnel also.

Comment – As long as each person is professional and maintain military bearing I believe the concept will work. It gives officers the opportunity to learn how to right performance reports, and it helps enlisted personnel share some of their knowledge with the officers. This concept enables enlisted people to experience certain positions earlier in their career. This helps in the long run when they become SNCO's. I believe that it will create a stronger Air Force.

Comment – Thank you for giving me the opportunity to participate in this survey.

Case – 223

Rank – E-8

Comment – We are losing a lot of valuable mid level personnel. Our young Lts should be more involved in training, supervising, and working alongside our folks. Not sitting back watching.

Comment – I would rather have a SSgt that knows what he is doing in a position than a Capt that doesn't.

Comment – The bottom line is today we are being asked to do more with less. We can not forget, We can not perform our mission without a strong mid level experience pool of people. As soon as we lose our experience the mission will suffer.

Case – 225

Rank – E-6

Comment – Rank is important, but does not over turn common sense and specific knowledge. A person's ability to lead does not always come from rank, but with experience and the ability to see how to fix what's wrong.

Case – 230

Rank – E-8

Comment – Rank is vital to Chain of Command and ability to control programs.

Case – 243

Rank – E-7

Comment – Integrating enlisted and officer into similar positions will not strengthen the unit. It will cause problems and miscommunication in the chain of command. Who will be seen to be in charge, the officer as they should be or the enlisted who is under the officer?

Case – 250

Rank – E-8

Comment – MSgt's and above should be afforded to go to AFIT programs to complete advanced degrees related to their specialty

Comment – Currently doing this with deployments. Just because someone has a degree does not guarantee they have the knowledge or experience.

Comment – Do not underestimate the value of your troops, many have more advanced degrees and experience in certain areas they may have. Focus on each individual's strengths and assist in improving those weak areas through education and training. Always remember the motto "TEAM" ...together everyone achieves more.

Case – 252

Rank – E-6

Comment – The only thign I can see happening is resentment among junior officers in the same position as NCO's. Also, the reverse may happen as Jr Officers will be earning more money for the same job. I feel that a minimum of a NCO would be needed to fill a jr officer position

Case – 266

Rank – E-7

Comment – Many, many times CGO's and NCO/SNCO's are essentially doing the same job/functions with equal responsibilities. Are my duties and responsibilities often greater than a CGO, YES. Do they (CGO's) rate higher on the food chain and pay scale than I do, YES. As a NCO/SNCO I might take offense to a CGO performing the same duties and responsibilities as I do in the same office/unit, while receiving a vastly different pay scale. While, I don't perceive it as related to your survey, I do feel strongly that this type of disparity could be eliminated by the warrant officer program. Practical experience in different positions in my AFS is truly KEY, over education and or rank/status.

Case – 273

Rank – E-6

Comment – While I don't believe that having a four year degree in liberal arts makes a CGO more capable of performing tasks described in this section, the blurring of the lines suggested here has the potential to open a sizeable can of worms in respect to fraternization and possible abuse of rank. I am more apt to agree with the suggestion of filling critical slots within the enlisted force with little regard to rank, or within the officer corps without regard to rank. I am leary of assigning similar tasks within an orginization to officers and enlisted personnel.

Case – 274

Rank – E-6

Comment – This is a hard subject to discuss, mostly because we respect officers because they have been appointed over us. They are officers because they had a degree before they came in, where as most enlisted personnel earn it while on active duty. For those of us (enlisted) that have a degree, it seems the system is outdated. We are not respected for the amount of experience that we have, most officers seem suprised when you tell them you have a degree. I'm afraid for some people, whether officer or enlisted, they may not be able to work side by side in the same position because of the rank issue. The people will be doing the same job, but because of rank they will be making a lot less. I'm afraid depending on the person it may cause decrease in respect for the chain of command and rank itself.

Comment – I feel that if we ignore rank, putting the best experienced/educated person into a job is what is best for the Air Force. I firmly believe this is a great way for the Air Force to continue challenging its Airmen to be the best. I believe in rank, but if you have 3 people of the same rank just diffrent pin on dates, and one person would do a better job at managing a department, then we need to be putting the best qualified person into that job, not strictly concentrating on rank and who outranks who.

Comment – I like the ideas behind this survey. We truely have some well educated/experienced enlisted airman out there, that are only being held back by rank. The government is paying for our educations, lets make use of that education before we retire or separate.

Case – 278

Rank – E-6

Comment – The biggest problem I see today is POLITICS. People need to stop worrying about whose butt to kiss and press on with their jobs. Too many officers feel the need to "flex up" on enlisted people just because they have an MS in Basket Weaving. The NCOs have always been and always WILL BE the backbone of the Air Force, yet it is ironic we are the ones that get dumped on the most. We make sound decisions...it is our job. Don't overrule us just because you have a piece of metal on your lapel. The same goes for NCOs trying to kiss their way to a step promotion as well. These are a few of the reasons I will not

even consider doing 1 day more than 20 years. Too many headaches are induced from underachievers stepping on their bread and butter to move up, even though they do not possess the knowledge or skill to do so.

Comment – Until you get the bull-headedness out of the officer corps, this concept will never reach optimization. The officer corps wields a wealth of power and prestige with so few checks and balances. It is Officer vs Enlisted; rarely have I seen an officer OVERTURN the decisions of another officer when it comes to enlisted matters. To many enlisted, officers are seen as untouchable and unable to be challenged unless you get lucky and the person has an open mind (few and far between). I have lives and equipment I am responsible for and I take great pride in what I accomplish; BUT the hammer falls HARD on us while there is no "apparent" recourse to the officers for bad decisions that cost time and money.

Comment – Politics belong in WASHINGTON, D.C.!!!! There has been a huge transition to political agendas within organizations over the past several years. IT DOES NOT BELONG IN A FUNCTIONAL, QUALITY ORGANIZATION. We have Air Force beat into our heads in Basic. Try BEATING OUT the politics for a change. Of course, there are always those that enjoy having their butt kissed; I don't feel they should be a part of this Team since they are as much a part of the problem. I have a few years left until retirement, and I WILL NOT LOOK BACK. "You need people like me on that wall" and it is people like me that keep the Air Force on target every day. I do it for my country, not for the political A**HOLES I work for.

Case – 279

Rank – E-9

Comment – While I can see some value-added in limited situations, I would proceed with extreme caution and sensitivity. I can agree to some situational applications, but I'm strongly opposed to this becoming any sort of norm. Rank, in our AF culture, is rightfully important to how we do business.

Comment – Rank is NOT everything... what this survey does not capture is the degree of flexibility in question. Swapping a SSgt and TSgt in a one-deep technical position is no problem... nor, in some cases, is putting a Lt in that same job. However, putting a SSgt in a MSgt slot may cause confusion and weaken the rank structure -- a structure still of import to the Air Force. If taking rank totally out of the equation is part of transformation, then we're forgetting that we are military. If we're just talking about a limited amount of flexibility and getting out of the old GO/NO GO mentality, then I'm all for it.

Comment – I appreciate the opportunity to provide feedback on such an important issue.

Case – 282

Rank – E-6

Comment – As I read this survey, I see an attempt to organize Air Force unit-based leadership principles more in line with current Army squad-based ops. I see this as a good thing. In my opinion, the US Army has a better grasp on unit-based leadership principles and training (with Lts and Capts working alongside NCOs to accomplish the mission and learn from each other), while the USAF has a better grasp on formal and technical training. If we learn from each other, we both become better.

Case – 284

Rank – E-6

Comment – Rank should never dictate position when training is involved, only experience. If an E-4 is qualified to fill the position, then so be it. Rank should only dictate position when absolutely necessary

Case – 288

Rank – O-4

Comment – I agree that officers and enlisted can be trained to do the same job and that it will not affect the strategy or chain of command. However, I would be afraid it would affect morale. If the enlisted person is

better at his job and ends up receiving more job responsibility than the officer, it could hurt morale that he is not receiving the same pay as the inferior officer.

Case – 290

Rank – E-6

Comment – Having junior officers and NCOs in the same duty position would not be a wise decision in my career field. It is the NCOs responsibility to help mold the young officer into tomorrow's leader. To put the officer on the same level as the NCO, without the same training and experience as the NCO, would be detrimental to morale, the mission and the officer's development. Part of the problem with having junior officers working in the same duty position as NCOs, is maturity. Speaking from experience, I have had a junior office attempt to "pull rank" and order me to accomplish a task his way, even though the situation clearly needed to be handled in a different manner. Not to say every officer acts in this manner or that education is not a qualifier to work in the same position, but there is a significant difference between "Book Smarts" and "Street Smarts."

Case – 292

Rank – E-7

Comment – I appreciate the intent of this project, I believe the SPO's do a good job of mixing experienced maintainer's and career track acquisition/logistic's officers. More enlisted manager billets from maint AFSC's would be beneficial in my opinion

Case – 293

Rank – E-6

Comment – Officers working with enlisted???? Hmmmmmm It is possible and could work, but implementation might be tricky, rank structure is hard wired into us from Basic Training, people that have been in the Air Force any number of years will always fear change and might not take kindly to this idea, but the new comers who don't know or are still moldable would be the best place to start with something like this. I know Officers are suppose to be leaders, but having them get some dirt on their hands would make them better leaders, such as the case with prior enlisted officers, they seem to have a clue and are now in a position to change things for the better. Yes this idea might put some NCO's out of management positions at the section level or on the other hand could put more workers with experience and initiative on the section floor. As with anything give it a try and see what happens.

Case – 297

Rank – E-6

Comment – There are many experienced enlisted personnel who would do a better job than an inexperienced officer! Qualifications rather than rank should be the decisive factor!!!

Case – 301

Rank – E-8

Comment – In this section, many questions were asked about rank...officers vs. enlisted. I can tell you that many of the jobs and duties that were once officer-specific are now accomplished by Airmen and NCOs. It's already the reality. Rank means less now than it ever has in my 19-year career. Skill-sets and competence cannot be measured by rank alone.

Comment – Ability and attitude is respected over rank.

Case – 305

Rank – E-7

Comment – Mentorship from SNCO's to Jr CGO's is vital process in the growth of our future leaders in the officer corp. Our future leaders of the Air Force must gain a firm understanding of the enlisted corp at a early time in their career.

Comment – Education level of the enlisted should not be primary factor for this section (Interchangeable Rank Concept), qualifications and leadership abilities should be the forefront considerations.

Case – 310

Rank – E-7

Comment – These questions were a little hard to answer as I could come up with many situations where it would not matter what rank a member held to get the job done as long as they did not supervise but there were many other situations where individuals who did not supervise (no chain of command) but required rank for respect/authority when dealing with individuals outside the particular office/job.

Comment – Interchanging enlisted and officers at the mid-level with no direct chain of command is a good concept but if I am performing the same duties as an officer why not pay me the same? It might help for future promotions but if someone walks through the door and performs the same duties and has a higher salary than me it would definitely lower my morale.

Case – 311

Rank – E-6

Comment – Experience is the single most important factor when considering the overall effectiveness of a unit.

Case – 314

Rank – E-8

Comment – The Air Force should have the rank of Warrant Officer for those interchangeable positions like the other branches of service.

Comment – Warrant Officer positions!

Case – 316

Rank – E-7

Comment – It is extremely difficult to separate rank within the structure of the enlisted/officer structures. People look for guidance, training and supervisory responsibilities (taking care of their people) from those higher in rank and experience. Time in Grade does not have a lot to do with experience. Experience is gained through structured training formats, schools, practice scenarios and evaluated scenarios. We do a job most people do not want to do. Training our team chiefs and subordinates are paramount to our survival and mission accomplishment. Standardized training sites offer the same training over and over to create a baseline knowledge level. Civilian or other military courses offer a variety to expand the knowledge base and decision making ability of our team members. Civilian courses have the ability to change to meet and design scenarios quickly and do not have the limitations AETC puts on the training courses it manages. By removing the supervisor responsibilities of leadership, management and day to day supervision, the training value of interaction and demonstration are lost. The supervisor determines the minimum acceptable levels of training to meet the needs of the organization and mission.

Comment – Rank is important when dealing in a joint service environment. The services train different and have different rules and regulations and certifications.

Comment – I am in a one deep position, so leadership and management are almost the same. I have a supervisor but my workload is determined by our priorities. If I was at flight level, I would be the superintendent of my last flight. There I would be in mostly a management mode vs technical. Priority is given to training and providing the assets to train with. Training and education go hand in hand as long as they complement each other. Training in an AFS to know your job and perform the best you can is the primary function of a person arriving at a new duty station. Once on station and qualified, you hone those skills to be better than you were. Training is a life long joyful battle but gets put aside to easily for convenience.

Case – 317

Rank – E-7

Comment – The majority of Highly Qualified Enlisted have Duty time that would be higher than officers.

Case – 318

Rank – E-7

Comment – While there are many jobs where SNCOs would be more than capable of performing instead of an officer I don't believe it should be "optional". Either have it an enlisted or an officer position. One or the other. Not either or. I think making it an option would undermine the military structure. As a footnote, in my opinion everyone should have to serve as an enlisted member prior to becoming an officer. How can someone lead if they don't know how to follow?

Comment – I see the benefits, but I think interchanging enlisted with officers would degrade the officers corp status overall. Yes, maybe we have highly qualified enlisted members and maybe it's their outstanding abilities that would make this work, but most are only going to see it as why was an officer there in the first place. Once an NCO is put into a position, there will probably never be another officer put there. Just look at the Commandant of the SNCOA position. It used to be an O-6, now it's an E-9. Do you think any officer will ever run the SNCOA again? Much less an O-6?

Comment – I agree with your hypothesis in that it is a good idea to put the most qualified person in a position rather than basing it on rank. However, I don't believe this would be good for our organizational structure for the reasons I have already given.

Case – 322

Rank – E-8

Comment – The use of SNCO's in jobs that were traditionally Officer positions has become common place. There has been no negative trends by doing this. The only drawback is the rift it places between the two paths(O vs. E). The work has been transferred but the respect, pay, and recognition has not come with it.

Comment – We have placed a high emphasis on formal education. It is the dividing line separating O from E. Far too much weight is given to a 4yr degree over experience. In addition, with the AF push for formal education the Enl Corps now has the equivalent education level and the extensive knowledge base and still are treated as the less valuable asset.

Case – 325

Rank – E-6

Comment – I think having an NCO with the same job as an officer would cause conflict and could be little the officer to others. I think having a responsible NCO for an officer to learn from is a great idea, like an LT learning from a Chief.

Comment – I am a firm believer that rank does not matter when it comes to technical experience. There are many Airmen that can outperform NCO's. Unfortunately, sometimes NCO's also lack management experience. As far as officers, I think they need an enlisted "mentor" when they first come into the military for guidance.

Case – 327

Rank – O-6

Comment – The air force is not a corporation. It is a military entity. Corporations don't have managers making life and death decisions about subordinates. The Air Force does!

Case – 328

Rank – E-7

Comment – Your AFS is just a part of the required duties. PME, Fitness, mentoring make us a more lethal force. My belief is the officer corps should be developing leadership with an eye towards combat operations

from the start. They should also be bringing (with their degree) an advanced knowledge on something the AF needs.

Case – 330

Rank – O-6

Comment – Thousands of years of military experience have proven that rank is important to our military cultural. Your questions insinuate rank is not important and that company grade officers and senior NCOs should be interchangable. I wholeheartedly disagree.

Comment – We are not a corporation. The military has a unique culture based on thousands of years of tradition and experience. Rank is a large part of that tradition and experience. This survey seemed to be pushing for an interchangable CGO and Senior NCO corps. I think that is a huge mistake. When you diminish rank in favor of all else, you will destroy the military as we know it. Here's a better idea. Better define the roles of NCOs and officers and then promote the right people to fill those roles.

Case – 331

Rank – E-8

Comment – Job placement should not be based solely on any one attribute, rather a well rounded combination of them. Officers - especially junior grade - should be placed with SNCOs to benifit from the SNCO's experience.

Comment – The gap that we are trying to fill with this concept is the exact reason that the Air Force should have Warrant Officers.

Case – 332

Rank – E-6

Comment – I'm currently assigned as a Project Officer (RESPONDENT'S SPECIFIC DUTY LOCATION REMOVED BY AUTHOR) as an TSGT. I have the same job duties and responsibilities as four Lt. Cols assigned to the (RESPONDENT'S SPECIFIC DUTY LOCATION REMOVED BY AUTHOR). I was hired based upon my previous job experience and knowledge of my career field not the rank I hold. This is a commom practice through all the battlelabs.

Comment - Take a look at the Battlelabs, these are units that have enlisted performing same type of management positions as CGO's and higher. They may be useful to your research.

Case – 334

Rank – O-6

Comment – A trained SNCO could perform duties currently requiring a CGO. Positions that require coordination/meetings with other Service or joint organizations may require a similar rank structure to enable AF positions to carry required weight.

Comment – I would say MSgt is a good starting point for considering replacing duties currently held by a CGO. As to advance degrees, need to look at what they are and where they are from. Some routes to degrees in the enlisted force may not provide the broad level and rigor of education required in some CGO positions.

Case – 334

Rank – O-6

Comment – I am a dentist and do not believe the answers I provided would benifit your survey.

Case – 338

Rank – O-3

Comment – Where education is the mission, I believe "mixing" ranks would not adversely affect the organization. However, in other mission environments, this mixing may breed an insensitivity to the rank structure that is so vital to our military environment

Case – 340

Rank – O-6

Comment – Putting enlisted and officers in same/similar duties would in my opinion create a concern/problem for the enlisted members they should get "equal pay for equal work." Imagine getting this Congressional Inquiry: "Hey, I'm a MSgt and I'm doing the same thing Capt X is. Why am I paid so much less than he is? It's just not fair!"

Case – 347

Rank – O-5

Comment – A good example of enlisted and officer's working together and in some cases working similar tasks is the Aircraft Battle Damage Repair effort. CLSS enlisted and engineering officers work very well together and form cohesive teams.

Case – 349

Rank – O-6

Comment – I missed in the email or on the first page...how much time in minutes this survey might take. Suggest it get included somewhere (or highlight it if I missed it) Will help person to make better decision as to when to take/finish the survey.

Case – 345

Rank – O-6

Comment – Officers and enlisted personnel essentially perform different functions and are not really interchangeable.

Case – 355

Rank – E-6

Comment – Employing officers and enlisted in the same duties will lead to resentment by both. If nothing else the pay disparity will come into play on the enlisted side. On the officer side you will have prestige issues.

Comment – If engaged in the exact same position the officer will have an advantage when dealing with any outside agency as they will leverage their rank to get better results for their efforts.

Case – 357

Rank – O-6

Comment – Your survey questions became increasingly unclear with the double negative questions. At that point I stopped answering your questions.

Case – 361

Rank – E-7

Comment – I believe there are many positions that CGO hold that could easily and possibly be run more efficiently by SNCOS. The other services have Warrant Officers to fill these positions--we should bring back warrant officers in the AF and then we could utilize the SNCOS and CGOs where appropriate without affecting AF culture or traditions.

Case – 364

Rank – O-6

Comment – I don't think you can have it both ways as number 10 and 11 above state. There is a difference in status, expectations, leadership, and pay/benefits that would seem idealistic to have enlisted and CGOs performing the same duties and not affecting that relationship. Further, education does make a difference and formal college education is recognized as one component of entry into the officer corps. I am aware some enlisted have college degrees but have opted to remain enlisted. That being said, the duties a person is assigned should be commensurate with rank.

Comment – I don't agree with your premise that enlisted and CGOs performing the same duties leverages personnel transformation. Enlisted with AADs are generally have more enlisted rank and as such shouldn't be engaged in CGO activities but leading the enlisted corps. In addition, the AADs pursued by enlisted members should fit their assigned duty code. If they are gained the academic qualifications to be CGOs, then they should be CGOs. I don't think it is appropriate to expect enlisted to hold AADs to perform their duties except as senior NCOs and then they should be leading the enlisted ranks -- their job isn't to be doing the CGO job -- they have plenty to do in their own job.

Case – 365

Rank – E-6

Comment – I believe now that SSgt is a guarantee in 5 years or less was a mistake and puts the burden on TSgt's and above. SSgt is like a SrA, (just five years and you have it and not earned anymore). Rank is important when choosing a person for a job or task but also experience is a big factor

Comment – As I stated before. I believe now that SSgt is a guarantee in 5 years or less was a mistake and puts the burden on TSgt's and above. SSgt is like a SrA, (just five years and you have it and not earned anymore). Rank is important when choosing a person for a job or task but also experience is a big factor

Case – 366

Rank – O-6

Comment – The military is built on hierarchy and the benefits from apportioning responsibility to those at top. Although many (most?) of AF enlisted are obviously capable of performing in equivalent jobs, it is not desirable to charge them with the responsibility but not the pay or rank to go with that equivalent to officer job. The mid-grade officer loses and the enlisted loses. Who would want to underpay enlisted and denigrate the officers? This does not make sense.

Case – 368

Rank – E-7

Comment – I am currently in an enlisted flying position, working in the wing safety office. I work with and for officers and at the same time, maintain a professional relationship and adhere to the chain of command. I perform the same level of work in the safety office as my Major and Captain counterparts. I think SNCOS could fill their positions with the same quality of work being produced.

Case – 376

Rank – E-9

Comment – Why even have officers and enlisted...

Comment – Personally, I think we have a great system today..I'm open to change, but caution mixing Os and Es with the same level of responsibilities... Os in my opinion are in the right place today, providing leadership for the Org...Es are in the right place providing recommendations/suggestion and following the orders of the Os (commanders), but providing leadership at the same time. What's broke?

Case – 378

Rank – O-5

Comment – We should stick to the time tested tradition that SNCO's teach the trade to CGOs. The CGO needs to be the Flight Leader and the NCO needs to be the SNCOIC. This has worked well in the past and should continue to be practiced in the future. To do away with this structure would lend to blurring the relationships amongst the officer and enlisted corps and that could ruin discipline. Pay issues for doing the same job etc....officers get paid more because of the leadership role assigned to them.

Comment – We must maintain the chain of command and have the CMSgt in an organization work for the 2LT. Without this basic precept (everyone knows the Chief is the resident expert) but we must maintain that the Junior Officer is "in Charge" and held responsible for the mission of that unit.

Comment – Thanks for asking...I am a bit confused by this survey. I came in the AF in 1979 as an enlisted trooper. I was commissioned in 1984 through the ROTC program. The AF must maintain its traditions as a chain of command discipline oriented outfit. We cannot afford to adopt this "hug them and love them" attitude where nobody knows who's in charge for the final answer. Training of junior officers by a dedicated SNCO corps is what makes us the world's best Air Force. I do not think I like this mixing of responsibilities talk in this survey. The Chief's job is to make sure the LT gets trained in the tricks of the trade and make sure the mission gets done. The LT's job is to pay attention to the Chief and learn and begin to make decisions and learn how those decisions affect mission accomplishment. Sorry I am a lousy speller; forgive me if I misspelled a few words.

Case – 379

Rank – O-6

Comment – A small correction: As Section VI involves comparisons of two choices, the instruction should read "select the one you believe is MORE important", not "most important."

Case – 382

Rank – E-6

Comment – The Air Force should employ enlisted and CGO's personnel in similar duties, it would definitely save DoD some \$\$\$. Fraternization could be an issue for some personnel. Warrant officers could solve many manning issues that are apparent in today's AF as well.

Comment - I would like to hear end results and then what the AF intends to do.

Case – 384

Rank – E-6

Comment – Rank should be equal responsibility. If you are suggesting a more qualified TSgt should do a Majors Job because the Major is inept the answer is not to underpay me to do a Majors Job, It is to kick the Major out and get one that can do the job. Rank/pay should be designed to be equal to the responsibilities of that position. PME is OK, taking college courses are ok, but time in a position with proper training and supervision is the key to a great office...tell me mission, train me to do the mission, then get outta my way...

Comment – The only way a 0-3 and an E-3 should be doing the same or similar jobs with similar responsibilities is if they are paid the same. Come now be fair...

Comment – Please see and understand/comprehend previous comments.

Case – 387

Rank – E-9

Comment – The agenda here seems to be breaking down the rank structure, which having enlisted/officer personnel performing the same duties would do. The blurring already occurs in close but structured environments, such as hospitals and aircrews. To further take away rank by performing same duties would eliminate professional customs and courtesies. I agree many jobs held only by officers could be done by

enlisted, but the choice for which career path to choose is open for a long time and a clear distinction should remain.

Case – 389

Rank – E-8

Comment – At flight level, and above, the AF should keep an officer and a SNCO side by side. This will help the SNCO with management procedures and will help the officer with management, personnel, technical, administrative issues not familiar to him due to the lack of exposure on his part.

Comment – Replacing officer with qualified NCOs will only create a generation of officer that only know how to deal with officer issues. The involvement of officers with SNCOs early in their career (O1, O2, O3) is important to us (AF) to grow a well rounded officer. Is not always about saving money by placing an NCO in an officer's place.

Comment – As with my comments before. Replacing officers with qualified SNCOs is not a good idea. They need to be kept together so they can learn from each other.

Case – 392

Rank – O-6

Comment – I'm having a tough time following where this is going. The rank structure in the military has its purpose...we are military personnel first and technicians second. We must uphold the expectations of our nation for performance as military personnel first and foremost!! This survey would seem to suggest that enlisted personnel should be running the AF--they are the backbone of our service, don't get me wrong--but, when push comes to shove, it's the commissioned officers who are directly responsible for the consequences of our military actions.

Comment – If we were IBM, we could interchange people of differing pay scales into similar jobs--we are not IBM--we prosecute military activities for the United States of America. The military tradition of rank is recognized internationally--when looking to negotiate government to government, other nations will look for a "commissioned" officer first and foremost. I think your research survey is trying to equate officer and enlisted personnel on the technician level. Come on out, I'll hire you for your experience, but never will I place you into the same position I would a CGO--that would be the wrong use of a valuable resource. Sorry I couldn't be more help.

Case – 394

Rank – O-5

Comment – I'm not sure that your questions on subordinates really "work" for larger organizations. I'm a Deputy Group Commander and have many different specialties and career fields under me. I would answer differently to many of the questions depending on which group we're talking about. Not sure if my answers are of much value.

Case – 399

Rank – O-6

Comment – This is a very touchy proposal. It could work in some environments not in others. The questions are too general, especially for someone who supervises several thousand people in a extremely broad number of jobs.

Comment – I've been in situations where officer and enlisted were basically doing the same job, but ultimately decisions must be made and rank wins.

Comment – Interesting concepts, but would face many challenges in implementation.

Case – 401

Rank – E-6

Comment – keeping the enlisted and officer corps separate is good even though enlisted are being just as educated as officers so I feel the pay should be closer as enlisted are getting their education while working 8-12 t hours a day

Case – 406

Rank – O-2E

Comment – Sorry, I got tired of all the bs questions. My bottom line is: Rank doesn't make a good engineer. Although if one is an engineer and doesn't get promoted, they will not stick around. Some of us have experience with industry and know more than most of the officers appointed over us.

Case – 408

Rank – O-6

Comment – your language is stilted and confusing. the questions are repetitive, and irritating and that irritation will surely explain why the results are skewed. and too long

Case – 410

Rank – E-9

Comment – A very long survey.

Comment – The survey is too long.

Case – 411

Rank – O-6

Comment – I think your questions are too broad and subject to different interpretations. I think you should phrase the questions to a particular situation. Like would it be okay for a senior NCO to be in charge of personnel office and supervise junior officers?

Comment – You haven't defined what is an integral part of a strategy, plan of action, chain of command, but I can't think of any AFS that isn't in some way integral.

Comment – I needed more examples to understand the type of situations you are considering assigning people to with out regard to rank.

Case – 413

Rank – E-8

Comment – enlisted & CGOs employed in similar duties should be paid similarly, otherwise don't employ enlisted in CGO jobs just to save money.

Case – 417

Rank – E-7

Comment – Rank is not a serious qualification for most positions throughout the Air Force. Experience tends to outrank education when applying knowledge to everyday events. Good Luck Chief on your thesis!

Case – 418

Rank – O-4

Comment – The slippery slope here is further graying the line between officers and enlisted. The AF culture is already far weaker than other services in traditional military measures. Many AFSs already mix officers and enlisted in similar jobs and it creates problems when dissimilar ranks compete for the commander/decision-maker's ear.

Case – 420

Rank – E-8

Comment – In many cases SNCOs (and some experienced junior NCOs) are already doing jobs that were once filled by CGOs. The key is to have qualified personnel in these positions. Now that the enlisted force is by-in-large much more educated than in the past, I see the use of NCOs and SNCOs being more prevalent.

Case – 424

Rank – O-3

Comment – WHY IS THIS DAMN SURVEY SO DAMN LONG!!! Think about it. We are all very busy. I took the time to start this, but nearly every one of the first 30 questions are identical.

Comment – This survey was too long. In section one, all those questions were identical. Sure some words were changed here and there, but 30 questions on effectiveness? Come on!?! Too long. By the end I was just clicking on buttons to finish. I am taking the time to give this feedback because I care about doing this the right way. People are busy, you need to ask what you want quickly and efficiently, not by rephrasing the exact same question 30 times just to capture a slightly different view point! I agree that surveys and feedback are essential, but this was toooooooooooo long!

Case – 426

Rank – E-8

Comment – In my 25 years I have seen many junior officers who had plenty of education in charge of section, offices and programs where they were not as effective had they been able to put some AF experience under their belts. Education is important but it is not a substitute for experience. If AF/military leaders really mean it when they say the NCO/SNCO corps is the back bone of the AF/military they should put NCO/SNCOs in positions based on their experiences and capabilities not whether they are officer or enlisted. Will co-habitation of officers and enlisted in these jobs traditionally staffed by officers lead to familiarity and breakdown the officer/enlisted relationships? It could happen but I think most NCO/SNCOs understand what is required and will maintain a disciplined relationship with officer regardless the situation.

Comment – Rank does not determine who is right for the job. Case in point is when the SALTY OLD sergeant with the combat experience was the informal leader of a squad or platoon. All due to the experience and knowledge gained by doing the job "under-fire". In our case it is the growth experienced as one progresses in a military career not solely the education the person had that matters.

Comment – The shape of the future AF is important to keeping us the premier AF in the world. I hope the leadership of today is able to embrace the capabilities of today's enlisted force.

Case – 431

Rank – O-4

Comment – This is a poorly designed survey Question 7 in section 7 - what does that mean? If you eliminate rank for a requirement to command not part of chain of command???? Other questions were also poorly worded and confusing.

Comment – I disagree with the concept of having both enlisted and officers performing the same duties in the same office. If there are currently positions on the books that can be filled by qualified enlisted personnel or officers, then I would recommend making all of the positions at a given location either officer or enlisted, but not mixed at the same location. Also, this survey has taken far longer than the advertised 15-22 minutes, even without the time I've taken to type in the additional comments.

Case – 432

Rank – O-5

Comment – Unfortunately this is one of the poorest surveys I have taken. The last questions, rank and org structure, were loaded questions tying to "force" me to a certain answer. "Eliminating rank..." in most cases caused me to select a different answer, usually Disagree, than I would have otherwise.

Comment – These questions were a convoluted way to ask if I believe an Company Grade Officer and NCO could perform the same jobs and could be equally effective. My opinion is yes, and I'd like to see this carefully applied throughout the AF!!

Comment – Repeated: The survey was very difficult to take, way too complex. Basic questions should have been asked, with qualifiers required by AFIT to make it more academic. Not sure this will yield the accurate results you are looking for.

Case – 435

Rank – O-4

Comment – This is the military. Organization is based upon rank structure and that's what sets us apart from our civilian counterparts. I've worked in both civilian companies and the military, and the military adds more discipline. Merging the officer and enlisted corps in order to accomplish mission will blur the lines and chain of command. From being an enlisted trooper and then an officer, I don't see your purpose or point. The military structure has worked throughout history, longer than any other form of organization. Don't mess with it!

Comment – Okay, from working in a military software organization, we had issues with CGOs working side by side with airmen and NCOs. The CGOs were basically workers and not supervisors. On one hand, the airmen and NCOs were disgruntled because they were doing the same job with less pay (unequitable). On the other hand, the CGOs were disgruntled because they were doing the same work as airmen/NCOs and felt that they were not growing as officers. I don't see any questions pertaining to job satisfaction, growth potential, etc. Also, to adequately portray responses, you need to break this up into categories of responses because various ranks will answer these questions differently based on rank biases.

Comment – 1. Make sure you separate the results according to rank structure or they'll be a screw in the results. 2. You need to add inputs on what airmen/NCOs perceive versus officers. When I was enlisted, I always felt like I could do as well a job as an CGO. As an officer, I look at young enlisted and understand that they may have the technical abilities, but lack leadership. You need to take this into consideration. 3. You need to take into account competencies. I see no input or questions relating to competencies.

Case – 437

Rank – E-8

Comment – Interaction and mentoring new LT's by SNCO's I believe will enhance an officers career.

Case – 438

Rank – O-3E

Comment – I currently hold to the belief that senior enlisted personnel and company grade officers complement each other rather than provide substitutes/redundancy for one another. While at certain levels (flight especially), either can often cover the other's duties for short periods of time, the flight members need the cohesive efforts of both a SNCO and CGO working together for the best organizational outcome. I tend to see the daily management of flight activities as the realm of the SNCO, while the CGO is there to provide a connection to senior leadership, policy, culture, upcoming trends and changes, and to work on longer-term issues. The CGO needs to be present at that level of organization, however, in order to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the flight first-hand. This is often construed as micro-management when the CGO gets too involved in the daily activities of the flight, and this often results from a senior leader (MXG CC) who is overly concerned with the daily activities themselves. I find this to be detrimental to the organization, often leading to a general feeling among airmen that "no matter what we

do, it won't be right". This "meddling" effect is unfortunate and should be avoided at all costs; the problem is that some junior CGOs are taught early-on that they need to be knee deep in everything that's going on out on the flight-line. This, I believe, is another mistake. While they should be aware of the situation, their leadership role is not one of directing a crisis response effort during a major fuel spill. Their leadership effort has already taken place, and if they've done their job, then they'll see a well executed response as the crisis is taken care of by those trained in how to handle it.

Comment – The questions get more interesting as you go! I feel I may need to comment on each of these. 8. There is some flexibility created, but not to the extent that you can plug-and-play enlisted for officer in each circumstance. I believe this would work in SOME instances. 9. The added flexibility in 8. creates a problem when you look at career progression. While the very BEST enlisted folks could no-doubt do the same job in some circumstances, how do you then allow CGOs to gain the experience needed at that same level? They don't need the experience so they can play pro-super, but they do need it to understand how the pro-super makes his decisions. If CGOs don't gain this knowledge, then they're bound to plan, direct, and strategize later in their careers in ways that create increased complications when it comes time for implementation. 10. Qualification isn't the criteria for putting someone in the right place at the right time. It's a mix of qualification, experience, background, and perspective. I emphasize the perspective part, because I feel only CMSgts with AADs would possess the breadth of experience and understanding of how the Air Force works necessary to fill such jobs. I'd hate to see a TSgt in such a position simply because their perspective is still overly narrow in my opinion. 11. I believe it will complicate the personnel management effort immensely, but may offer some added capability. It could be worth the effort. 12. Rank is still important simply because nobody operates in a bubble. In Acquisition Logistics positions, there are often CGOs and SNCOs filling similar positions. Sometimes this is a problem simply because of the contractor's perspective of who he's talking to. I've seen a SMSgt make recommendations based on his flight-line experience that were not in line with the goals of the acquisition program. While he was justified in addressing his opinion, he lost credibility with the contractor because he was over-emphasizing his side of the problem. In my experience, the CGOs in those positions are able to better convey the problems without burning bridges with the contractor team. 13. The idea of "interchanging" personnel doesn't sit well with me. The idea of selecting candidates based on individual merit would seem to offer a more supportable approach. If we go for the "interchangeable" position idea, then we obviously have a problem and should ask ourselves if we need officers in those positions to begin with. If not, then we need to get them out of there. If so, then the personnel folks need to do a better job of conveying why an officer is required for such a position. What I'd REALLY like to see is another enlisted-to-officer program added for those enlisted personnel who have excelled throughout their careers and are striving for more. While few Chiefs will relish the idea of becoming a 2LT, I'd propose a conversion program for Seniors and Chiefs involving an OTS type experience, followed by a direct commission to mid-grade Capt where they'd be eligible to compete for Major in 3 years or so. I'd revise the O3E pay scale so they're not losing any money when they commission, and guarantee them the same amount of time to compete for Major as the regular Captains. For those fast burners, this would be the equivalent of allowing them to basically pursue 2 very different Air Force careers over their lifetime and retire at a higher grade than originally possible.

Comment – (COMMENT REMOVED BY AUTHOR. DISCUSSED RESPONDENT'S CURRENT DUTY LOCATION)

Case – 439

Rank – E-6

Comment – Having the appropriate rank/chain of command is very important but some of the civilian positions could be eliminated, simple fact that the buddy system in the civilian world (prior military personnel who have retired or separated) hinder the squadron moral or production because the Air Force should evolve and the old timers seem to want to keep everything the same, making things become stale to progression. Getting rid of civilians should not be as hard as it is when the mistakes are made they should be held as accountable as the military counterpart.

Comment – The promotion scale needs to have a hands on basis, when personnel work 12's and the other have work 8's weekends/holidays off their is no fairness. The new PT program forces personnel to work extra time to get a workout, where personnel in hospitals and MPF's etc. There is no equal bases when office jobs are affecting morale when the hours and down time do not come close when the flightline, cops, fire department and CE fail to come close to down time and working extra time to complete things that the personnel on dayshift type hours complete during duty hours, MPF's, Hospitals and other services should be open atleast 2 days every other week so that nightshift personnel can complete their mission essential business without staying at work or on base for an exrta hour or two to complete mission requirements due to office hours.

Case – 441

Rank – E-7

Comment – I had very few strongly agree/disagree answers mainly because I haven't given many of these issues much thought in the past. That said I do think there are plenty of positions currently held by CGO's that could be performed equally as well (or better) by SNCO's. In todays enlisted force even some TSgt's have had significant training/education in many management functions, these highly qualified NCO's may be considered as well.

Case – 442

Rank – O-3

Comment – It's hard to say with Mngt...It is the person...not the rank or status...the officer could be good...may not...same with enlisted. I believe you are either born an effective leader or learn over a long period of time...

Case – 447

Rank – O-3E

Comment – If rank is not a requirement for a duty then the Air Force should put an enlisted person to perform the task as it is more cost effective. If officers and enlisted are doing the same task then the question immediately is asked. Why are you getting paid more than me to perform the same task? I have been in this situation and it was not good for morale, the chain of command, or mission accomplishment. There is an equivalency between senior NCOs and CGOs. Any good CGO knows to depend on senior NCOs for insight. However, there must be a chain of command. The Air Force would do better to promote enlisted to officers based on performance and change the rank system than to start putting officers and enlisted to perform the same task side by side.

Comment – I am prior enlisted. I have worked in places where knowledge and experience were key in accomplishing the task. However it only worked within a framework that had a chain of command. There still has to be someone who "facilitates" harmony and provides direction. Mixing officers and enlisted in the same tasks is detrimental to good order and discipline. If the enlisted person is just as qualified (I have often seen the enlisted as more technically qualified), educated, and with the same leadership abilities then there should be a method of promoting them to officers.

Comment – Please do not view my comments as denigrating to our enlisted. I have been consistently impressed with the quality of our members. Many have bachelors and advanced degrees and can accomplish whatever they put their mind to. I do feel however that under the current system you have to make a choice. If you seek to lead and focus on leadership then you should try to become an officer. If not when you make senior NCO ranks you have the respect of both officers and enlisted. It goes without saying that senior officers also enjoy this respect.

Case – 448

Rank – E-7

Comment – In the intelligence community, we have SNCOs performing the duties of a LtCol, yet a 05 is being paid to sign off the data and speak in forums with their 2 SNCOs passing information and in some cases providing the meeting or group the specific data. Reducing the number of Officers billets and

increasing the number of qualified production assest would increase the over all productivity and reduce the cost. Warrent Officers would be a welcomed addition to the force structure. They would provide the experienced based mid-level leader currently held by Lt's with 2-4 years experience keeping out of trouble. Another option would be limited duty officers, those SNCO's willing to cross to the Officer track to provide an additional 10 years and serve as the mid level leaders. their would be a 60/40 split with 60% in the warrent/ Limited duty officers and 40% career based officers. The cost to benifit return would be extremely effective in these days of shrinking budgets Chief, Thank you for allowing me to take part in your survey.

(RESPONDNET'S NAME DELETED BY AUTHOR)

Comment – We must be careful in how this is implimented, educated officers must be leaders for this to work. They must have both "book smarts" and practice experience.

Case – 453

Rank – O-6

Comment – Survey is confusing and a waste of time

Case – 454

Rank – O-6

Comment – Most junior officers know far less about how to get things done than the SNCOs do. They are also usually less effective leaders and managers.

Comment – Bring back Warrant Officers and Enlisted Pilots.

Case – 456

Rank – E-6

Comment – The Air Force needs to provide leadership training to junior officers that teaches the same styles as enlisted PME. Officers as supervisors to airman and NCOs can negatively affect their carriers due to lack of leadership education.

Case – 458

Rank – O-2

Comment – CMSgt Romano, I appreciate the direction you are taking with this survey. I believe this thrust will help several career fields, but may be a detriment to others.

Comment – Supervision is NOT the same as Management.

Comment – Wow, that was too long.

Case – 460

Rank – E-8

Comment – Results of this survey may indicate the AF is agreeable to allowing education and training to replace rank structured duty positions but I don't think the other branches of service have the same mindset. They have a highly structured point of view and are extremely rank conscience.

Case – 461

Rank – E-8

Comment – Seems you have developed a targeted survey...I believe it to be somewhat skewed...eliminate rank, PME, CDCs and eliminate the culture that has been built for many years...engrained...consider giving enlisted airmen, NCOs and SNCOs more responsibilities commensurate with their grade. Promote enlisted and continue to force out the officers...lets see 5 1/2 years experience as a captain or 25 as a Senior Master Sergeant...who do you want running your most complex critical duties? I have higher education level than over 90% of the officer core in my career field...though, I get the title as Superintendent and get my ass worked off...I don't see the cushy jobs, the accelerated promotions...if the jobs were merit based, I know I would be making a lot more money and doing a lot better job than I am...the enlisted force pays the price

for the officer leaders...we write their performance reports through our actions...educate and promote your enlisted force! Eliminate the waste and redundancy of officers performing the same jobs as SNCOs...honestly, I've been making the tuff calls for over 20 years...do you think I really need to run my decisions through an O-3 to an O-5...we are upside down...if your NCO corps is the back bone of the Air Force, then we need to strengthen the E1 - 4 ranks, start at the foundation and work our way through the ranks...but remember, doing more with less means less! These are some of the reasons I am retiring after 25 years of service...the BS political promotion system, the waste and redundancy and the enlisted guy getting the shaft on almost everything. Have we really come a long way or is this cyclic? After every major world conflict we in the military get drawn down...now personnel cuts will continue to reduce your overall efficiency. Think about it...if you lower the ASVAB scores you're not getting a better product...you're just getting an under performer. Thats why we get a lot of the crap of society into the military.

Comment – Please continue to eliminate officers! I am all for getting rid of the road blocks to my success. While you are at it, lets cut out the positon of First Sergeant...seems to be a wasted part of a unit...transfer the responsiblities of the first sergeant back to the SNCOs and Officers running the organizations.

Comment – I believe your title of "Human Capital Management" is an oxy moron! You need to call it what it is...human resource management...too many times we in the military continue to build jobs for the sake of building empires...honestly, what would our founding fathers say about the double and tripple layer of supervision to commander's? Lets cut out the redundancy...here's something to ponder...if we eliminated the performance report and went to a web based reporting system of only markings with limited comments such as education we'd eliminate a lot of wasted man-hours. We've done nothing but create BS by things like 30+ combat programs, commanders special interest items (CSIP)...which is another way to spell metrics...read Genral Patton's memoir's...staticstics and quantitative management are not new the military...all great leaders has some system...the problem is we have no real leaders or postive influences because of the dogma created by the less than superior leaders...bottom line: Great theroy...though, when you start to eliminate your survey focus you will start to erode the military...thanks for the opportunity.

Case – 463

Rank – E-8

Comment – I believe a seasoned SNCO will perform better in these positions then a recently commissioned college graduate.

Case – 472

Rank – O-6

Comment – Terrible survey, hard to follow, and not clear.

Case – 475

Rank – E-8

Comment – If Company Grade Officers can fill similar duties as those of their enlisted counterparts, why do they need to be officers? Reducing the number of officer slots or converting the position to an enlisted slot would be more cost-effective.

Comment – The questions do not lead to plausable outcomes since it has not been tested and it would seem a waste of taxpayer dollars to hire an officer to do an enlisted job. Also, what positions are not mission critical that have not been reduced or deleted already?

Case – 477

Rank – O-6

Comment – One would hope the promotion system values experience and technical skill. If we are promoting people to higher grades who do not have BOTH techical and leadership skills, we need to fix the promotion system, not design a system where "rank does not count." I believe effective leadership of people and management of resources and programs are, in fact, technical skills. We seem to imply here that there are effective military leaders with limited technical skills. I am not sure how that is truly possible in

our setting. Likewise, we seem to imply here that there is some population of highly technically-skilled folks who just cannot get promoted, but that we should give them more responsible positions. Frankly, I have met very few of these kinds of folks in 23 years in the Air Force. I have met a lot who seemed to believe in their own minds they were technically skilled, and were angry at fellow NCOs and officers who got promoted based on a variety of factors (including, interestingly, tests designed to gauge technical knowledge). All of our education and training should be cumulative, preparing our people for higher levels of responsibility, both technical and managerial. No one aspect of the education and training process is more important than the other. PME simply makes better officers and NCOs. Technical training does the same thing. In the final analysis, we need officers and SNCOs who can both lead and manage. That a Senior Airman may have stronger technical skills in one area is no reason to place him in charge of the shop that a TSgt should run. Make the TSgt smarter, and teach him not to feel threatened by smart subordinates.

Comment – As an enterprise, it is not possible to interchange positions on an ad-hoc basis without negatively impacting the assignment process. Yes, local commanders need to make best use of their assigned talent, but randomly interchanging positions at local levels gives the assignment system an unmanageable movement challenge.

Comment - This is a truly interesting survey and study effort. It has merit and deserves study. However, I believe we best serve our nation and institution by ensuring our promotion, school selection, and assignment systems promote and move the right people in the SNCO and officer grades. If we have Chiefs and Colonels with limited technical skills and limited leadership skills, then in those instances, we have failed. Our young enlisted members deserve technically competent leaders and managers.

Case – 480

Rank – E-7

Comment – Why not eliminate commissioned/non-commissioned status and just pay according to the job?

Comment – I believe that enlisted should be compensated with additional pay if we are doing the same job as an officer.

Case – 482

Rank – O-2

Comment – I think that rank should be overlooked in the case of a captain/lieutenant filling similar jobs... the captain has more experience, but the lieutenant may have a better understanding. However, a captain/lieutenant should not be interchangeable with a junior enlisted member-- if so, then those positions should all be turned over to enlisted members. That would indicate something wrong with our commissioning services if an undergraduate degree makes no difference in who does a job.

Comment – Even if an enlisted member has more education/training/experience than an officer, the managerial aspect can not be separated from doing one's job in the AF.

Comment – Good Luck with your thesis!

Case – 486

Rank – E-7

Comment – It is always good for Officers to work with enlisted in sort of a mentoring role. I have seen many benefits with Lt and even Capts working with SNCOs. I do not feel they should be doing exactly the same job though. I have never felt it was right to pay two people different amounts for the same job. Examples a contracting Lt and a MSgt doing the same job. A 2E2 and a 3C doing the same job.

Comment – A lot of this is dependent on the person, just as in any job. In some cases it makes a lot more sense to have an officer though. Especially when dealing from a Majcom, DRU, etc decision making level.

Case – 487

Rank – E-7

Comment – I am unclear at what level of leadership this section is trying to determine if rank should be a qualifying factor. I feel that company grade officers need to have experience in supervision in order for them to become better leaders. However, that does not mean that SNCOs could not perform the same job just as effectively. In fact due to the supervisory experience some SNCOs have, they could probably do a better job than an inexperienced company grade officer. I feel that company grade officers need the positions so that they can learn supervisory responsibilities for career growth.

Comment – I do think that interchanging QUALIFIED enlisted personnel and company grade officers can provide flexibility to organizations and the AF as a whole; however, I do not think it would be good to flip/flop enlisted and officers in the same duty position. For an example if an office is being held by an officer and when they PCS then fill the position with an enlisted person and then possibly fill it again with an officer. I feel this may create thoughts that the officer is not performing a function commensurate with his grade. I feel that mid-level positions need to be looked at on a case-by-case basis and if it can be filled by a qualified enlisted person then make that position a permanent enlisted position. Again, I feel that it is very important for company grade officers to receive experience supervising at mid-level positions prior to attaining squadron commander or higher positions.

Comment – It was difficult to answer the training/education part of the survey dealing with my specific AFSC. My AFSC like others, has been merged and transformed into something different than when I was a technician. Depending on what workcenter a person is assigned to determines the level of education required. If a technician is assigned to a workcenter responsible for maintaining cryptographic equipment then very little education is required, anymore, as most repair actions involve replacing bad units (personnel no longer troubleshoot down to specific boards, etc). If however a technician is assigned to a workcenter where they are responsible for maintaining computers, servers, switches, routers etc then education to include commercial vendor training becomes significantly more important.

Case – 488

Rank – O-6

Comment – I thought rank in the military was the result of performance, education, training and experience. If it's not, why stop at the mid level in positions that are not an integral part of a strategy, plan of action, or chain of command? How do we grow our future force if everything is interchangeable?

Case – 490

Rank – O-6

Comment – Not really sure what you are trying to determine in this survey? Putting the best person in a job regardless of rank/education/etc. is the best way to be effective. With that in mind under current practices for me to get the right people means they have attained a certain level of rank/education that is inherent with their positions.

Case – 493

Rank – E-6

Comment – Rank has a definite place in the military. There needs to be a clearly defined chain of command along with military discipline and order. This aside, often times there is too much importance placed on the rank of an individual when it comes to whether or not that person can accomplish the task. More importance should be placed on actual knowledge and whether or not the individual has in the past and can effectively accomplish the task.

Case – 498

Rank – E-8

Comment – There are many times that unqualified officers are placed into a position solely on rank, and not upon qualifications, whereas many enlisted are not considered for their input due to their enlisted status...they may be respected in their area, but just not have the "duty title" to be involved or at the decision level.

Comment – Depending on the job it comes down to capability. Just because an enlisted person has a BA in human resources doesn't necessarily qualify them for a job over a person that has worked it, and knows the systems.

Comment – Confusing survey, I don't think all the information is given to accurately answer the questions. Some questions have one answer for younger Airmen, but would be answered differently for the NCOs/SNCO ranks.

Case – 500

Rank – E-7

Comment – I have no idea what this survey is all about. We are in the military. There is a structure. If you think it needs to be changed, then we should get rid of the military all together and become a civilian force. Also, Section VII could have been worded better. "Not negatively affect this" is a double negative and confusing when read.

Comment – The miliary has a rank structure that has been place for a couple hundred years. I was a TSgt when I got my Masters Degree at 13 years. I could have applied for OTS and become an officer, but I was happy where I was and didn't want to start over. I don't want to be considered an "equal" with CGOs--I would appreciate respect for my education level and experience, but I don't need to hold the same job as a CGO (and get paid less). If you are going to recommend equal pay for positions, that's a different story.

Case – 503

Rank – O-6

Comment – On a nursing unit, every shift requires a "chain of command" structure 24/7. So there is a danger in interpreting these responses as only the flt/cc or element leader needs to be an officer. Also, in the health care profession, licensure and credentials are frequently the ruling factor regardless of either experience or education.

Case – 506

Rank – E-8

Comment – Need a way to go back to the previous section. For example, have a continue/next section button and a back button.

Case – 515

Rank – E-6

Comment – In my particular specialty, Officer and Enlisted personnel do hold some of the same positions with the same duty requirements. I have not encountered degraded operations, morale, or mission accomplishment strictly due to this fact (although, as a caveat, there is generally a very high officer to enlisted ratio in my AFS... quite contrary to many AFSS... which does impact the inter-personal interactions and military customs/courtesies dynamics). There are occasionally minor "disturbances" but this is generally related to personality issues, rather than an organizational or leadership problem. Allowing QUALIFIED personnel to perform identical duties without regard to rank, outside of the chain of command, does not seem to be an issue within my particular "area of experience". However, I do see the potential for this type of circumstance to present problems in other "spheres of influence"/AFSSs, as personnel not accustomed to this type of working environment could feel either threatened or uncomfortable due to the "apparent" contradiction to military protocol and customs. Like anything new, it will meet with some resistance and hesitation, regardless of its effectiveness.

Case – 516

Rank – E-8

Comment – To answer these questions one must imagine such positions without a rank structure. This is very hard to do. Even in civilian employment there is rank by virtue of one's position. I do not understand how this could be viably assessed from those who only know the rank structure.

Case – 517

Rank – E-6

Comment – Enlisted personnel should be able to hold mid-level positions, it would broaden their scope of experience

Comment - Enlisted personnel should be able to hold mid-level positions, it would broaden their scope of experience

Case – 518

Rank – O-6

Comment – Chief - I think you asked the wrong questions. Nothing in this survey considers how we might fight in the next 20 years - as part of a joint, coalition, expeditionary force. Regardless of how good enlisted troops might become, our partners in the other Services and from other nations will want to deal with officers. You gave that notion some attention in your early questions, but lost track of it later. Your proposal to eliminate rank qualifiers may work for personnel offices, but would have limited applicability elsewhere.

Comment – Rather than collapsing officer and enlisted ranks (which the Chinese did so unsuccessfully and abandoned), let's consider increasing the chances for enlisted with advanced academic degrees to become officers. I say that tongue-in-cheek. I guess I don't see what the problem is with being a Chief. Chiefs run 700-900 member aircraft maintenance squadrons. There are handfuls of captains and a lieutenant colonel as the commander in those squadrons, but the Chiefs run it. What's wrong with that? Is the problem that we don't have opportunities for Chiefs in other career fields (i.e., personnel) to lead? Then have them transfer into other career fields, like paralegals did. I think what you're really making a case for is revival of warrant officer grades in the AF. If we want just technical experts, we should hire civilians or contractors. They have the staying power and employment flexibility we need. If we want leaders, we need officers because we need a big enough pool we can cull down to the senior leaders we eventually need. If we want a mix of technical and leadership skills that will also be expeditionary, then we should look at warrants.

Case – 521

Rank – O-4

Comment – Good issue. 1) CGOs need leadership and management experience. 2) CGO roles may be identical to NCOs/SNCOs while expectations for contributions in those roles may differ (same roles, different focus). 3) A role of SNCOs, in particular, can be to expose CGOs to enlisted issues. 4) Customs and courtesies must be rigorously observed especially if/when NCOs and CGOs share similar duties. 5) Repeat point 4 for emphasis! 6) Care must be taken to observe that differences of opinion between NCOs and CGOs with similar positions do not become E versus O issues (we respect each other and ultimately must perform--and be evaluated--in our very different roles in the USAF).

Comment – Ref Qs 7/12: Status is important more because people have perceptions of what an individual can/cannot do for them based on that visible status. Perhaps the biggest challenge here is in defining the requirements for a given job. I, as a Major, filled a previously undefined position that was ultimately downgraded to a Capt slot. But the responsibilities I took on in that role were beyond what a CGO would/could do. Similarly, a MSgt may be able to fill a role and get that job done very effectively, but his overall contributions may be significantly different than the Capt who follows in the same slot, even while both have the same duty description.

Comment – Education is extremely valuable but not emphasized; it's not one of those "first questions" people ask about a military member. As I answered the questions I assumed a common basis for comparison--we "know" every military member has gone through basic, OTS, or similar programming. I was also conflicted as I answered some of the supervisory questions since the bulk of my supervisory experiences were as a 21A, a very different world than the acquisition world of which I'm now a part.

Case – 527

Rank – O-6

Comment – Tough survey to take...took too long...not enjoyable at all. Would have appreciated knowing how long of a time commitment it required, then would have deleted the email. This is a bit much to expect.

Case – 528

Rank – E-9

Comment – Many officers already have the opportunity to supervise, however, they should never skip over enlisted supervisors. Officers are generalists, not specialists, and should not be supervising specialists in the performance of their duties. They should be supervising the enlisted supervisors and managers in the execution of their specialist functions. It would be wrong to have enlisted working with officers on the same duties and tasks at the same level of responsibility unless the pay scales were also leveled. Officers (in theory - not always in practice) assume greater overall responsibility for the organization and thus earn a higher status. While the AF may seek a Field Grade Officer with greater specialization and perhaps greater confidence in their ability to lead in a particular functional area, this specialization of officers comes at a price. The cost is a more stovepiped officer corps with less overall opportunities for advancement. This was the case with Munitions Officers of the 1960's and 70's. Although, they were technically specialized, they could not get promoted past Major (or Lt Col in few rare cases) because the AF did not value their skill compared to Aircraft Maintenance officers and could not compete for rank. The AF decided to create the Aircraft Maintenance officer who would float between the two (maintenance and Munitions) areas, and this has caused some diversification in the specialization. Ultimately, from my viewpoint, having worked closely with CGs throughout my career, they need more focused guidance and training by their Commanders and Group Commanders on assumption of leadership and their role in the organization. True leaders will inherently be supervisors, others will inherently be followers, and so on...

Comment – I Disagree with the concept of integrating officer and enlisted on similar duties and tasks. If we can do this, then we have no reason to differentiate between officers and enlisted personnel. If officers are not going to provide officership, and will provide technical task work along side enlisted personnel, then convert their positions to enlisted ones. We either need them or we don't, but we don't need officers doing the same work as an enlisted person. If we flip this coin over, can we say that if an enlisted person is supervising or put in charge of something, they should be considered officers? Why would we apply this logic to officers in the performance of technical tasks? Perhaps young officers are finding it hard to identify with their roles because they've been over-accessed.

Case – 534

Rank – O-6

Comment – Everything we do is based on rank. There is no doubt rank by itself does not equal mission success nor is it the most important factor. The only real difference between officer and enlisted is education and training. We turn NCOs into officers all the time with education and training. So it's not a question of ability, it's a question of how we perceive status associated with rank. That's AF culture...not to be changed lightly.

Case – 536

Rank – O-6

Comment – Many questions were poorly written and hard to follow.

Comment – Interesting concept; a huge culture change would be required...more like culture shock!

Comment – Very interesting project, it can work under the right circumstances but probably not in a joint environment

Case – 537

Rank – E-7

Comment – It is always important to put the right in person in the right job at the right time. The military, though, is a hierarchical society. If we begin placing officer and enlisted together, we will breed familiarity and familiarity breeds contempt. Our society has also developed the idea of status for certain types of positions at the expense of others. For instance, those in administration are looked upon with more regard than those on the line (the actual producers). There are many jobs which just by the nature of the position where experience is a better qualifier than education. Two that come to mind are Security Forces and Pharmacy. In pharmacy, the technician rarely needs the pharmacist professional judgement in the typical setting. The pharmacy technician with many years experience only needs the pharmacist because they are required to have. Experience has taught them what is important and where to look for information. I really can't think of the need for officers in Security Forces, other than the parochial nature of our society where only an officers word counts (i.e. that's why there are officers in the PJs now). In addition, if we are going to put enlisted in what may be now officer positions, we need to define what QUALIFIED means. Face time with the commander doesn't mean qualified. We do not always put the best people in the job. I will say they are the minority, but there are enough people in leadership positions that do not fit the qualifications that the effectiveness of the Air Force could be called into question.

Case – 540

Rank – E-6

Comment – In my current career field, officers and enlisted do the same job. Rank becomes an issue when personnel believe it is part of job knowledge/experience. Not all officers have the answer...neither do all NCOs.

Case – 543

Rank – E-9

Comment – You need to consider different levels of joint officer and enlisted employment. I can not agree with your general questions. Specifically, at MAJCOM and Air Staff level I do see opportunities for this to happen. There are intangible aspects of having officers in particular positions. I would not want to see junior NCOs and junior officers working hand in hand. We have lost enough respect for authority from our younger troops. SNCOs are better suited to deal with junior officers. Additionally, we will generate a huge issue concerning pay disparity. It is best to let this sleeping dog sleep. The AF is smart; its already making money off our highly educated enlisted ranks. The other services let/push their educated enlisted members to cross over; need I say more.

Comment – AAD, it depends on what kind of job the individual fills. Please consider the fact that technology is driving overlapping of AFSCs. With this said, the AF/DP community is cutting manpower positions...90% of which are enlisted. With this said, we need our enlisted troops in their traditional positions. If there are excess midlevel officers, then let them fill those positions that we will not be able to in the near future. Your questions are not specific enough in my opinion. Midlevel positions is vague. Officers are (by definition) leaders. Our enlisted force don't normally pull leadership duties/responsibilities until they are SSgts and don't really receive leadership respect until they graduate from NCOA. Now their my be some positions outside of Aircraft Mx that your concerns specifically addresses. It might be wise to get the opinion of other enlisted AFSCs.

Comment – I already say enough :) Good luck with this and yes, I would like to see the final results.

Thanks (*RESPONDENT'S NAME REMOVED BY AUTHOR*)

Case – 548

Rank – E-8

Comment – I think the concept of having qualified enlisted and officer employed in the same duties can be of benefit however, I do believe there are some levels of command that require an officer in that position for organizational structure e.g CC

Case – 554

Rank – O-6

Comment – The type of duties and position will impact how well (or whether or not) these concepts are supported. If the duty requirement calls for a certain level of education and experience, how will the military compensate individuals? Attention needs to be paid to the fact that specific licensing and educational requirements/mandates exist that must be met before individuals can even occupy certain AFSs...in other words, the demographics of the professional population would differ from the majority of folks needed to keep the organization up and running.

Comment – The medical community has very unique requirements...it would be challenging to employ this concept.

Comment – As previously stated, the medical community does not fit the profile of concepts presented in this survey. It is difficult to answer many of the questions because a great deal depends on the specific specialty, education, experience, and licensure required to perform certain duties. The requirements are not interchangeable.

Case – 555

Rank – O-4

Comment – I think the questions about eliminating rank are too broad. There are some specific jobs (e.g. aircrew/aircraft scheduling) that work well with a mix of officer/enlisted, but I think it has to be considered on a case-by-case basis. If this is to be "global" change I would recommend limiting it to lieutenants only on the officer side, since captains (especially senior captains) should be working on their leadership skills. In my opinion, the leadership opportunities for young officers have been dwindling in recent years.

Case – 558

Rank – O-7

Comment – The questions were sometimes difficult to understand.

Case – 559

Rank – E-6

Comment – Creating a mid-level rank between enlisted and officer similar to the army may be beneficial to the overall strategy, plan of action and or chain-of-command.

Case – 564

Rank – E-7

Comment – Same job, differences in pay and class? No way...

Comment – Chief, Best of luck with the project. Do you get the same weight allowance for a PCS as an officer?

Case – 566

Rank – O-6

Comment – This was a poorly constructed section -- too many long questions with multiple negatives made it hard to follow and answer the questions ("eliminating," "not part of," "not negatively," SHEESH! What are you really asking?

Case – 571

Rank – E-7

Comment – I actually believe that our system of creating Officers is very outdated by basing it on formal college education when so many enlisted members now have advanced degrees. I feel officers should be grown as a natural maturation and progression of the enlisted ranks. Instead of having SNCOs, NCOs grow into mid-career officers and the truly exceptional grow into senior leadership.

Case – 572

Rank – O-4

Comment – I believe that there are many jobs in the Air Force that are done by officers that could be done better by enlisted personnel. However, I would hesitate before having officer and enlisted personnel do the same jobs in the same offices.

Comment – I think you might a flaw in your survey. When you ask whether rank is important, you do not discern between officer rank and enlisted rank. For example, you might not want a SSgt or a Lt performing a job, but either a TSgt or a Capt would be effective. Thus, rank is important, but not necessarily officer rank.

Case – 573

Rank – E-6

Comment – In a few of the above questions you talk of placing officers and NCO's in the same job. Unless you're going to pay each of them the same it could be called discrimination toward the NCO. Why should an NCO be paid less than an officer if they are doing the same job? That should go for bonuses too. If one gets a bonus everyone should be entitled to the same bonus. If you want to do away with rank, does it go for officers too. The AF is a two class society. It's often thought that this is why officers and some senior NCO loose touch with reality. Nobody can tell them "no". They are so focus on trying to get promoted they miss the big picture. Or they've played the game for so long and have mastered it. Senior officers get treated like kings, why???? They are no different then either you or I. Maybe rank should be done away with. Maybe people would get paid for how long they have served and the experience they have, not for whether or not they have been to college. Most anyone can be a supervisor with the right training. Others will never be good supervisor no matter how much training they get. Just because a person has a certain rank, often times doesn't mean they're qualified to do the job. In the military you are just a number on a piece of paper, if you think you are more then that you are mistaken.

Comment – If rank doesn't matter in these positions why leave a military member in that position? Why not put a civilian there? The AF is contracting out about everything else why not this too. Then you won't have to worry about who out ranks who.

Comment – Rank will always come into play. Mixing officers and NCO in the same duties/jobs where they work side by side and not one for the other will one day make you rethink the fraternization rules. Sooner or later that will be an issue.

Case – 577

Rank – E-6

Comment – In some cases, this is already being done. CGOs are OICs of small sections (by nature of their rank), with qualified NCOs/SNCOs working for/with them. At first, the NCO/SNCO does the bulk of the work, with the CGO "ultimately responsible" for the tasks; however, as the CGO gains proficiency, they become more of a "team" instead of a supervisor/subordinate. The status of rank never diminishes and organizational effectiveness is increased.

Comment – In the "doing more with less" environment we find ourselves in, flexibility is key to mission success. UMDs are mirroring UPMRs less and less every day. Having flexibility at the mid-mgmt levels might improve this situation.

Comment – Even with TOTAL EFFICIENCY and TOTAL EFFECTIVENESS, you still need ENOUGH PEOPLE TO DO THE JOB. I'm all for getting the most out of the resources available; however, I fear we'll someday reach the point where we're going to ask ourselves to do more than is humanly possible. We need to be effective and efficient, BUT WE NEED TO BE CAREFUL IN DOING SO!

Case – 579

Rank – E-9

Comment – Selecting qualified enlisted to serve alongside company grade officers seems good for enlisted personnel development purposes (negative affect for the officers), but the difference in pay is such that it would be a travesty having two people performing the same job while receiving horrendously different pay. Pay needs to be a factor in any formula expecting officers and enlisted to perform the same duties. And if enlisted can be trained and educated to perform officer duties, why the officer ranks at all? They can certainly be diminished, if not eliminated.

Case – 581

Rank – O-4

Comment – Rank is not that important when you are talking about a difference of + or - one rank. However, I still think rank is very important when the difference is greater than that or we are talking about enlisted vs. officer.

Comment – In the ops side, AFS-specific experience and training is more important than rank in the junior ranks, i.e. airmen and CGOs. However, they are not interchangeable. The officers have their roles and the enlisted have theirs. In the higher ranks for both enlisted and officers, rank and AF experience are more important than AFS-specific knowledge and training. Again, officers and enlisted are not interchangeable.

Case – 585

Rank – E-8

Comment – IN MANY CASES THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TECHNICAL COMPETENCE OF AN ENLISTED MEMBER OR OFFICER IS 0. THE DIFFERENCE IS THE AUTHORITY TO EFFECT AND IMPLEMENT CHANGE. I AM A STRONG PROONENT OF EMPOWERED LEADERSHIP. OFTEN TIMES THE RUE CONTINUITY OF AN OPERATION IS HELD BY THE ENLISTED FORCE. OFFICERS MUST BE CONSCIOUS OF CAREER PROGRESSION AND OVERALL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS. I OFTEN ASSIGN MORE VALUE TO A RESPECTED SNCO'S PERSPECTIVE OVER A CGO. RIGHTFULLY SO, THE NCO OR SNCO USUALLY HAS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE, HOWEVER THEY LACK THE BIG PICTURE PERSPECTIVE VOICED IN OFFICER CENTRIC FORUMS. A MARRAIGE OF THE TWO IS ALWAYS BEST.

Comment – MATCH THE PERSON TO THE JOB. SOMEWHERE ALONG THE LINE, MILITARY ASSIGNMENTS AND PREFERENCES BECAME A DEMOCRATIC DECISION. IF YOU HOLD SPECIAL SKILLS THE AF REQUIRES, YOU SHOULD BE COGNIZANT THAT THOSE SKILLS WILL BE CALLED UPON WITHIN SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS. IN PARALLEL, SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS BASED UPON A PARTICULAR SKILL SET SHOULD NOT BE A KISS OF DEATH FOR AN INDIVIDUAL'S CAREER. IN FACT, THE LABEL OF A MASTER IN A PARTICULAR AREA SHOULD BE SHOWCASED AND USED TO IDENTIFY THE INDIVIDUAL'S SEPARATION FROM THEIR GENERAL PEER GROUPING.

Comment – SIR, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TECHNICAL AND LEADERSHIP CAPABILITIES BETWEEN OFFICERS AND ENLISTEDS HAS NARROWED DRASTICALLY. I WILL ALWAYS PROMOTE THE ADVANCEMENT AND EMPOWERMENT OF THE ENLISTED FORCE. EVIDENCE SHOWS THEY HAVE THE MENTAL CAPACITY AND INITIATIVE TO GET THE JOB DONE RIGHT, THE FIRST TIME-EVERY TIME. OFTEN, THE BIGGEST HURDLE IS THE AUTHORITY TO AFFECT CHANGE WHEN ITS NEEDED. I AM IN A UNIQUE POSITION BECAUSE MY PEER GROUP IS O-5'S & O-6'S FROM THE SISTER SERVICES. I HAVE EARNED THE RESPECT AND AUTHORITY FROM MY PEERS AND LEADERSHIP TO EFFECT POLICY AND TRANSFORMATION. MY STATURE AS A SNCO OFFERS THE JUNIOR ENLISTED FOLKS A TRUSTED AGENT FOR VOICING THEIR CONCERN WITH POORLY THOUGHT OUT OR EXECUTED CHANGE. EVERY MAJOR POLICY BOARD SHOULD HAVE A SNCO CONTINGENT AVAILABLE. THESE SNcos HAVE THEIR PULSE ON THE ENLISTED FORCE AND CAN MAP THE POTENTIAL PITFALLS WHEN CHANGE IS REQUIRED. THANKS FOR YOUR TIME.

Case – 587

Rank – O-7

Comment – Degree questions need flex for people who hold multiple degrees (AS, BS, MS, etc).

Case – 588

Rank – E-7

Comment – Some question in this survey were to broad. Also, how can I decide what benefits my subordinate would have if he went to school or received more technical training, PME, I gave you my answer on how I feel which would be the same if I was to answer for my subordinate. The ranks should be airmen, NCO, SNCO & smae for officer. Not just enlisted & officer.

Case – 590

Rank – O-6

Comment – Knowlege and experience is important in the basic operations of an organization. Rank is important in the operations of a military organization's culture and mission. Combining these two may hamper or benefit.... depending on the mission. To make this a simple "one way or the other" decision is an error.

Case – 592

Rank – E-9

Comment – Pay and allowances always seems to be a quality of life issue within our force. If we have an enlisted and a company grade officer performing like duties with like responsibilities, then, the question becomes, "Why are they paid more than me?" In industry, the answer may be we are compensating for the officer's education level. But, in today's AF, an enlisted may hold the same eduction level (or higher) as their officer counterpart.

Comment – Interchangeablility is an interesting idea; but, some formidable challenges. Thanks and good luck.

Case – 596

Rank – E-7

Comment – In this last series of questions regarding enlisted and officers serving in similar duties, I think that Flight Commanders and Flight Superintendents do this now. The two people really run the flight together.

Comment – I have seen many Senior Airmen and Staff Sergeants who could have served in positions associated with these questions. Obviously, many Senior NCOs could fill Company Grade Officer positions (like section commanders).

Comment – A few of my responses related to supervision where a little skewed because I am an AFIT student and currently do not supervise.

Case – 598

Rank – O-5

Comment – Core values are needed no matter what rank and duty title you hold! Customs and Courtesies are vital to our survival as a service.

Case – 600

Rank – O-2

Comment – I think the AF and the military in general fails to take full advantage of their personnel due to poor selection criteria and other rules and regulations that are unnecessary.

Comment - The officer enlisted division often makes our jobs harder. I have experienced several occasions where input from an experienced enlisted person would have had more value than anything that I had to bring to the table, yet enlisted personnel are not considered qualified for the position that I was in, and were

rarely accessible for consultation/knowledge sharing. It is hard to determine the best way to make improvements without currently understanding the way things are and have been in the past.

Case – 603

Rank – O-6

Comment – Are we re-visiting the warrant officer issue? When I go to the MSS, do I trust the answer from the Cpt or the SNCO any differently? No. What I want is the accurate answer. He or she who delivers the right answer has my trust to get my next question. Our patients feel the same way about their docs, nurses, techs, etc.

Comment – How does the word "No" affect all this. I don't know too many Colonels that say no on a regular basis to a General. I can't imagine a SNCO, dead to rights based on policy in the MSS, saying "No" to a line Colonel. There would have to be some big changes in Corporate culture.

Comment – Degrees: I do have an AF funded Master's degree that is technical, I got it at AFIT after I came in with a Master's degree, I think this section needs to be expanded, multiple degrees is very common. Our enlisted Corps can do a lot more at the CGO level, if we transform how do we grow senior officers? OTS is the vehicle between the two. Instead of 5 Capts with Master's degrees could I do the mission with 5 MSGts with Bachelor's degrees? 3 Warrant officers with Master's degrees? Yes. But how do you grow the senior leader who as an 06 is the Group Commander?

Case – 606

Rank – O-3

Comment – Survey could be shortened up a bit.

Case – 608

Rank – E-7

Comment – Need to ensure the officers still are recognized as LEADERS!

Comment – It would be helpful to have a status or progress bar to indicate remaining pages. Thank you

Case – 610

Rank – O-4

Comment – The comptroller career field has put CMSgts in flight commander positions normally filled by CGOs at some bases and it has worked well.

Comment – My experience is that SNCO rank is higher respected by senior officers than CGO rank.

Comment – I fully support using SNCOs in CGO positions. Their experience and training is more valuable than the rank of a CGO. SNCOs also get more respect than CGOs. Any plan to allow SNCOs to fill CGO positions must include the development of CGOs so the AF will have qualified and experienced FGOs.

Case – 611

Rank – O-4

Comment – If NCO's are to be given the same duties as CGO's, then their pay must be made commensurate with the CGO's. It would be counter-productive to have two individuals with same duties, responsibilities and accountability be held to different pay standards and standards of conduct as well. I would hate to see a TSgt as a team lead with some Jr Capt's and Lt's on the team (not leaders due to experience levels) and be the least paid member of the team with all of the responsibility and accountability. There must be a "bonus" pay, or "assignment" pay associated with the positions when they are given to the enlisted troops. They qualify for the position by doing things above and beyond their peers, therefore they must be rewarded in some way, and additional pay is the most visible, and desirable reward that can be offered.

Comment – Be very careful here...If transition goes too far and the bulk of the positions are filled by NCO's, SNCO's and not enough CGO's, there will be a backlash when the CGO's that remain are now FGO's and have not had the opportunities to fill the "nuts and bolts" positions. You will end up with too many "users" and not enough "developers" in leadership positions. This will lead to ill-advised decisions based on "management" concepts versus experience and leadership. Something similar to what happened with the RIF in the mid-'80s. All you had left were pilots who spent their careers in the cockpit and they were thrust into technological leadership positions with no understanding of what implications they were mandating upon their subordinates (things like demanding the Laws of Physics be violated because they needed to look good).

Comment – This can be a double edged sword. Take tiny steps as this course is taken, but be sure to compensate the NCO's and SNCO's that are the "guinea pigs" in your first steps of this experiment. The biggest hurdle you will run into will be resentment of pay for the same duties and responsibilities...and you can't place an NCO,SNCO into the same mid-level position and a CGO without also giving them the same responsibility and accountability, and AUTHORITY. When you give them the responsibility, give them the AUTHORITY to do what is necessary to get the job done effectively or this experiment of yours could quickly turn into a dismal failure. Also be aware that as the mid-level positions are being filled by NCO's, you are not getting the opportunity to groom the future field grade officers with the breadth of experiences that are now available.

Case – 612

Rank – O-2

Comment – A number of the questions in the first few sections were vague and therefore hard to answer well.

Case – 613

Rank – O-4

Comment – Initial questions do not allow enough choices. I have multiple degrees, and have obtained them multiple ways. Regarding questions of education vs. experience (Section 1) for my position, my jobs have all been managerial. Therefore, it is impossible to not consider the managerial aspect of the job, and only consider the technical side. Regarding the next portion, that of education vs experience of my subordinates, I view each of the questions/answers dependent on which level of my subordinates. An airman's job versus a chief's versus a captain's job are two entirely different things, and thus dependent on different things.

Case – 616

Rank – O-3

Comment – There is nothing wrong with the concept of employing enlisted and CGO in similar duties as long as all pre-requisite experience and knowledge is there. What the survey doesn't speak to so far is the effect on career progression. Will these jobs become highly sought after by enlisted personnel because of the status of what was previously an "officer" job. CGOs in my career field already have limited opportunities for certain jobs.....and now these opportunities would be diluted even further? I am not opposed to the idea....I just think that a firm plan would have to consider the career development aspects for all parties.

Case – 623

Rank – O-4

Comment – On the issue of rank--in my last technical assignment (THREE WORDS RELATING TO CURRENT DUTY LOCATION REMOVED BY AUTHOR), I was a supervisor in an acquisition-support organization (operational testing squadron) that had NCOs, SNCOs, CGOs, and FGOs all performing in a similar capacity on differing programs. We had a problem when acquisition programs with NCO test managers ran into trouble--CGOs and FGOs had to be reassigned to provide "top cover" and represent our organization when commenting negatively on other organizations' performance (i.e., SPOs and contractors). This was no fault of the NCOs involved--the reality was that when multi-million dollar programs were on the line for delay or cancellation, the contractor/SPO would "pull rank" (either directly

or discreetly) and try to muzzle the NCO test manager when delivering the bad news on poor operational testing performance. In many cases these test managers had associate's and/or bachelor's degrees, but the bottom line was that rank **STILL** mattered when it came time to handle these sticky situations. Particularly in the aerospace industry, it is assumed that an NCO only has a high school education (and no real "power" in the corporate end of the military-industrial complex, so to speak).

Comment – There are certainly positions currently held by officers that could be migrated to enlisted personnel with the appropriate educational credentials, but they should be examined closely to see if there are benefits associated with commissioned officer status that are not readily apparent based on the technical qualifications alone.

Case – 624

Rank – O-4

Comment – There were several problems with the survey from my perspective. 1) There was no way to enter multiple Master's degree's from radically different majors. 2) More importantly, I have supervised very different groups of people and my answers to the survey depended greatly on which group you were talking about. If I answered your questions as a flight commander in a fighter squadron, my answers were very different than if I answered as the wing scheduler supervising enlisted and NCOs.

Comment – There are a whole lot of third and fourth level effects of trying to do something like this. Remember, we are not IBM and placing Captains and Airmen in the same positions would cause huge cultural and organizational strains. Of course, there are lots of jobs being done by Captains that could very easily be done by Airmen or NCO's but that is a very different thing than what you are proposing (Not putting Airmen and Officers into the same jobs, but instead moving out levels of middle management and giving those jobs completely to Airmen and NCOs).

Case – 625

Rank – O-5

Comment – We are in the military. Rank is required to clearly identify who is responsible for the actions of a unit. Eliminating rank and creating a set of "group thinkers" will not motivate a unit to perform. This survey appears to seek a consensus that rank is not important and should be eliminated as a requirement for technical performance in the Air Force. If we wish to eliminate the rank structure, we may as well be a civilian organization that is only technical in nature. I believe this would be a big mistake, since we would no longer be an effective fighting force. Service to the nation and self sacrifice would also become a casualty of such a move.

Case – 628

Rank – O-6

Comment – aar

Comment – aar

Case – 630

Rank – E-7

Comment – I think the management duties shoudl go to those who have demonstrated the ability to perform versus picking someone who holds a specific rank. In some ranks, there is no testing of abilities and I have seen units suffer greatly when someone with no practical experience is put in charge.

Comment – Again, management shoudl be based on ability and performance versus who holds the rank. Again, some ranks do no testing whatsoever to determine who is fit to promote...it ends up being a popularity contest where community activities and volunteer activites weigh more than actual job performance.

Comment – Thanks for allowing me to participate.

Case – 633

Rank – E-8

Comment – In my experience rank comes with knowledge and experience, they go hand in hand. I've worked in a flight scheduling office as a TSgt with Lts, Cpts, and Majs. We did similar duties and worked well together. Several questions answered would depend greatly on the individual. Knowledge and training can reduce the need for rank if the individual with the knowledge and experience has the backbone and backing to do the right thing. Unfortunately some people only listen to individuals with a certain level of rank. Would I be as effective without being a SMSgt? I could still do the job, but I would need more assistance and support from leadership in order to get the job done.

Comment – Rank becomes a much greater player as we transition more and more to joint environment. When working with sister and foreign services rank needs to be equivalent to that of the other services to be effective in performance of your assigned duties.

Comment – Thank you.

Case – 639

Rank – E-6

Comment – Experience is invaluable and cannot be taught in any course. Education is very important, but the most qualified individual(s) should fill the job first. There are many qualified enlisted that have qualifications and experience over Field Grade Officers with a degree.

Case – 641

Rank – E-8

Comment – I work in a officer/enlisted crew of 13. The mission comes first and rank comes second. It's been done this way on this aircraft since Vietnam and has worked well. At times the close relationships do lead to inappropriately addressing each other. The officers do sometimes disregard the enlisted's knowledge/experience because of rank.

Comment – Since enlisted usually stay at a base longer than officers their experience is usually more in depth than an officers.

Case – 643

Rank – O-1

Comment – I understand where you're coming from, there are officer positions not being filled because there are not enough qualified officers out there, so you think enlisted could fill those positions. I think it's a good idea but goes against the Air Force culture. I think the better idea is for the enlisted to be able to consider those positions, but must take them as a civilian to preserve the Air Force culture.

Case – 644

Rank – O-3

Comment – Shorter next time.

Case – 652

Rank – O-4

Comment – I think the culture in the Air Force would drive an officer to not want to hold the same duty position as an enlisted person for fear of lower ratings on an OPR versus an officer working in an "officer only" duty.

Case – 654

Rank – E-9

Comment – It should be a combination of rank/experience.

Case – 655

Rank – O-6

Comment – The concept of utilizing qualified enlisted personnel in the same positions as company grade officers in the same AF position will create more problems than it can be worth if the AF is to remain a Military organization. What problems will occur when a NCO becomes accustomed to co-equal responsibilities (or perhaps perceived superior responsibilities) and must eventually interact with lower ranking officers in other military settings? Will they be able to maintain proper customs and courtesies? Who will lead and who will follow in other situations? Additionally, would a qualified enlisted person be willing to have equal responsibility with a CGO, but with less pay? I do not think the concept of co-equals would work in almost all settings, military or civilian. Personnel with the same duties and responsibilities need to be perceived as equals . . . in all respects, rank and pay included. If enlisted persons are needed to fill slots which cannot be filled by officers, then either promote the enlisted or officers or eliminate the officers from working in such positions.

Case – 656

Rank – O-3

Comment – Your questions in section 7 were very confusing. Not too sure what you were trying to ask, so I answered "Neither Agree nor Disagree" for most of them.

Case – 657

Rank – O-2

Comment – This provides an opportunity to mix various backgrounds producing a richer environment for everyone to learn and grow

Case – 663

Rank – E-6

Comment – I've already worked in positions (in a TDY capacity) for which I'm not qualified if I were to PCS. I strongly believe in allowing certain personnel to work in positions for which they have the appropriate knowledge. Rank should not be a limiting factor.

Case – 667

Rank – O-4

Comment – My previous job was on a joint COCOM staff, so many of the initial questions didn't apply well.

Case – 670

Rank – O-6

Comment – Use of officer vs enlisted personnel must include range and scope of responsibility

Case – 673

Rank – E-9

Comment – Good luck

Case – 674

Rank – O-4

Comment – By its nature, officer rank implies a certain amount of knowledge (if from nothing other than longevity and experience); therefore, it's difficult to accurately answer this section's questions.

Case – 676

Rank – O-4

Comment – Too many of the answers depend on the job and requirements. It is difficult to answer them without the context especially when in student status and not having a job to look at in a day to day basis. Most of my answers were based on my last assignment.

Case – 677

Rank – O-4

Comment – I have been in organizations and jobs where CGOs, Amn, NCOs, and mid-level civilians all did the same work. This situation negatively effected moral and performance of both CGOs, and enlisted, leading to many separating from the AF.

Comment - If rank (officer vs enlisted) is not important to a job, then that job should be civilianized.

Case – 680

Rank – O-3

Comment – Questions on importance of rank aren't specific enough. I would answer the questions differently if differentiating between a lt & capt versus a lt and SrA. Also, depends on position. In positions of leadership (mx officer), rank (Capt vs. lt) usually reflects experience & maturity, but not necessarily. Much more important than in the position of a engineer at a SPO or lab, where importance of knowledge, etc. outweighs rank. Also, officers are in AF to lead. I would say that if they're not in a leadership position, they aren't being used correctly. With that being said, engineers, scientists, etc. don't necessarily fall into this role as a CGO. Could an enlisted person with proper education perform these duties? Absolutely, however you would need to differentiate responsibilities between the officer & enlisted, keeping in mind the leadership role of the officer.

Case – 681

Rank – O-4

Comment – I understand the pragmatics associated with the approach in this section, but the USAF is a military organization. Young CGOs (esp the Lieutenant corps need -- require -- strong enlisted mentorship to help them grow into leaders. They should never be 'peers' in exact equivalent jobs: they should be set up for success by their bosses for leadership and their enlisted mentors should work hard to grow them into the USAF's future leaders. If the Lts fail, it is most likely due to their boss AND their enlisted mentors.

Comment - My overall qualifying statement for this section is: everything is "possible" but not probable with a military organization. An enlisted airman can do an executive officers job, but we are not growing enlisted airmen to become tomorrow's colonels or generals. I only see this as a possible effective approach with the 2LT corps (new ascensions) with strong mentorship by the Lt's boss. This concept is questionable at best for a 1Lt. It simply will not work for a Capt and would also be a cheat to the USAF.

Comment – Would not mind discussing this concept further verbally.

Case – 685

Rank – O-2E

Comment – Rank and Org structure questions are poorly written and unclear.

Comment – Lost interest at this point

Case – 697

Rank – O-3

Comment – There are many highly qualified enlisted members that are more than capable of taking on the challenges of particular jobs that may be currently reserved for officers. In many cases, it is probably a waste of talent to not utilize the assets that these enlisted members possess. However, throughout this survey I was thinking of several instances where there could be problems when enlisted and officer positions are the same, especially when working closely in the same unit. It really depends on the individuals and their levels of professionalism and maturity. I think it would be a benefit to the Air Force if warrant officer positions were available. These positions would provide our highly qualified and motivated enlisted members another opportunity to take on these jobs typically filled with officers without the concerns related to a commission.

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Case – 699

Rank – O-4

Comment – This survey can be very misleading. The instructions mentioned to separate the technical from the leadership; however, many of my technical jobs required leadership. I needed to use my technical experience and education to recommend and take responsibility for a plan of action. Having the technical knowledge without leadership skills would have lead to an unsuccessful career.

Case – 701

Rank – O-4

Comment – The major problem (no pun intended) between having NCOs and officers do the same jobs is the wage discrepancy and rank structure would cause problems for the organizational culture. There is no doubt that many an NCO is capable of doing better work than an officer; however, I could see the wage discrepancy and rank causing serious friction if there was no job skill or responsibility differentiation.

Case – 703

Rank – O-4

Comment – I think making rank not a qualifier for duties could work in a limited capacity. However, it should be the exception rather than the rule. There could be problems if left unchecked. Although, I do believe that we could make it work at the SNCOS and field grade level.

Comment – Could work if they all worked for a field grade officer and the CGOs weren't left in the position for a long time...maybe they could use it as a launching off position to somewhere else in the organization that needs that technical expertise.

Comment – My answers relate to the Personnel career field. Although I ranked "rank" below technical training and expertise, rank is important when enlisted personnel do not have a higher ranking person available to "back them up" with customers. Customers tend to not believe our airmen so NCOs or SNCOS have to get involved to verify answers in many cases.

Case – 704

Rank – O-5

Comment – I categorically disagree with the implications of this survey. If a position can be filled by an enlisted troop, then the CGOs filling those positions are under-employed and should be moved to

supervisory positions somewhere else. Enlisted troops and CGOs should not be filling the same billets--I don't even like the implication that they should.

Comment – See previous comments in last section.

Comment – The idea that enlisted troops and CGOs can fill the same positions is fundamentally wrong. To me, that means that the CGO is being under-utilized and needs to be moved to a supervisory position.

Case – 710

Rank – O-5

Comment – If we are going to mix ranks, why not bring back the warrant officer program. I'm not worried about the officer core but I think the enlisted morale will plummet if we give a SSgt and a Capt the exact same job and pay one 2-3X as much. Might as well make them all civilian jobs or outsource if we have no need to distinguish between officer and enlisted in those technical areas.

Comment – Same arguement. If we can blur enlisted and officer staff jobs, might as well outsource. I think unless we change the pay scale and pay people for performance like the civilians are about to do, we will have a hard time explaining why we need officers if we can effectively train enlisted personnel and pay them a measly wage to do the same job an officer now does. One or the other is getting the shaft.

Case – 711

Rank – O-3E

Comment – In the missile maintenance career fields, enlisted members with vast weapons system knowledge and experience work side by side with CGO's in the technical engineering section. The officers, who are electrical engineers, use their knowledge of electronic theory, circuit design, etc., while the enlisted members, generally NCO's, use their experience with the weapons system to isolate peculiar problems. This type of offcer/NCO relationship seems to work out just fine, without a detrimental impact to the mission, chain-of-command, or unit morale.

Comment – Being enlisted is not a handicap. Why should an enlisted member, who has the same or higher level of education and higher level of experience than his officer counterpart, be excluded from the same jobs made available to the officer? I can think of no good reason why this should happen.

Case – 717

Rank – E-6

Comment – Being of a certain rank does not mean you can perform the job. We have all seen those NCO's and SNCO's who test well but don't have a clue about there job. Could it be that these people moved up the chain so quickly that they didn't gain valuable experience in their AFS? Further it is important as a SNCO that you have an understanding of the "big picture" not just your little section of the unit. In Security Forces a SNCO should understand manning, reports and analysis, pass and id, law enforcement, security, training, and supply issues in order to do their job

Case – 718

Rank – E-7

Comment – One thing I'm finding in today's AF is that most officer don't want to listen to what the experience SNCO's has to say! They feel as if they have all the answers to all the questions.

Commnet – Thanks you for the opportunity for me to express myself. Survey's like this should be done more often. Thanks again for the opportunity. (*RESPONDENT'S NAME REMOVED BY AUTHOR*)

Case – 719

Rank – E-8

Comment – Survey is to long.

Case – 722

Rank – O-4

Comment – When I have had excess Lts I have put them in positions in which SNCOs hold the same position. This has been crucial to their development technically and professionally. I believe the officers will be better officers for that experience.

Case – 725

Rank – E-6

Comment – Sounds like we need to bring back Warrant Officers and what used to be called "Battlefield Commissions". If someone has the experience and practice knowledge to do a job, but it's over their current rank, promote them into it. A lot of Sergeants became very effective Warrants, Lieutenants and Captains this way in the past.

Case – 726

Rank – O-6

Comment – Scope of responsibilities is aimed at certain rank structure due to the experience, education, training, and abilities it took to get there. We promote and hire our personnel based on different criteria in the enlisted and officer corps. If we break down those differences, we will eliminate what makes our military the best in the world. This survey steers us to a concept that would tend to downgrade wherever possible...to save money. Not a good strategy...and not a good concept. Help me keep our force the strongest in the world! There are many reasons..."No One Comes Close."

Comment – While it is true it would be possible to interchange some enlisted and officer personnel in mid-level duties, it would hamper the growth of some of those same personnel for their future development. If I have an enlisted filling a good OJT job, then my CGOs may not be able to learn that job.

Comment – Like I said before, this survey leads me to believe the Air Force is considering downgrading many of our CGO positions. If we do that, we would severely hamper the growth of our field grade and senior officers by not giving them the full opportunity to learn those more technical or more management oriented duties. They need to learn in the job to progress to higher levels of understanding and leadership roles.

Case – 728

Rank – E-6

Comment – Regarding the PME questions. All of them related to how PME affected my job. The only benefit that I saw from PME (NCO Prep, ALS and NCOA) was the history classes. All of the instruction on EPR's and speaking only apply in class.

Case – 729

Rank – E-7

Comment – As long as the NCO that holds that position is seasoned and knows what is going on in that particular squadron, then there shouldn't be a problem. I don't think a piece of paper makes you better, it is time and experience.

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14. ABSTRACT This research explored an asymmetrical concept of personnel management, specifically whether status, rank, is an artificial barrier to employing qualified enlisted personnel in some company grade officer duties. It takes the approach under the Human Capital Theory and questions whether rank plays a roll in effective performance and whether eliminating rank as a criterion to employment, in some duties, can support Air Force transformation efforts, without negatively affecting culture (i.e. chain-of-command, customs and courtesies). It describes a concept where more emphasis is put on meeting the knowledge, education, experience, and training qualifications and the required rank be interchangeable between enlisted and officer. Key support factors include: increase in enlisted education level; reduction in end strength; undermanned career fields; and salary difference between enlisted and officer. The finding suggest status has little affect on one's ability to perform effectively and the extensive qualitative information indicates managing the knowledge personnel hold is the important aspect of human capital management. This concept is not intended to be a model of equality toward all airmen but attempts to increase the capability of the Air Force within the existing manpower constraints by putting the right person, in the right place, at the right time.				
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